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Administrative Law. Town of Richmond v. R.I. Dept. of
Envtl. Mgmt., 941 A.2d 151 (R.I. 2008). The Rhode Island
Supreme Court determined that under the administrative
regulations of the Rhode Island Department of Environmental
Management (RIDEM), the superior court has subject matter
jurisdiction to grant a town declaratory relief under both the
Administrative Procedures Act (the APA) and the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act (the UDJA). However, when a town
acts as an intervenor in administrative enforcement proceedings,
it lacks any right to prevent an agency and a third party
manufacturer from reaching a negotiated consent agreement.
Because RIDEM was created under the State's legislative powers,
the Court will be deferential when interpreting RIDEM's
administrative statutes, thus allowing the agency discretion to
create informal proceedings for matters within its jurisdiction.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This dispute arises out of an incident in which RIDEM served
a Notice of Violation (NOV) in August of 2004 on Charbert, Inc.
(Charbert), a textile manufacturing and fabric-dyeing business
which operated in the Town of Richmond. 1 The NOV, which
alleged numerous RIDEM administrative violations, ordered
Charbert to comply with the applicable regulations and to pay a
penalty of $9,500.2 Pursuant to RIDEM's Administrative
Adjudication Division (AAD), Charbert requested a hearing to
address the NOV. 3 Thereafter, the Town of Richmond (Richmond
or the town) moved to intervene. 4
The hearing officer granted intervenor status to Richmond
1. See Town of Richmond v. R.I. Dept. of Envtl. Mgmt., 941 A.2d 151,
153 (R.I. 2008); see also id. at n.1 (Charbert, Inc. was the prior owner of the
subject property during the relevant period for this inquiry. It transferred its
interests to Alton Realty Corp. in 1991, but continued operating the textile
manufacturing facility in Richmond until February 2008).
2. Id. at 153.
3. Id.
4. Id. (Richmond argues that RIDEM has failed in the past to protect
the town's rights and interests).
366
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because the town established that its interests were not
adequately represented in the hearing and that it suffered an
injury in fact. 5 Consequently, the town issued discovery requests
to the other parties, and when the parties did not comply, the
town moved to compel the production of discovery documents. 6
While the town's motion was pending, RIDEM and Charbert
negotiated an informal disposition of the NOV - a proposed
consent agreement, which was received by the town on June 29,
2005.7
In a transaction that seems like a slight-of-hand, the town
received the proposed copy on the same day that Charbert signed
the final copy.8 However, the consent agreement itself did not
become final until July 5, 2005. 9 Two days after the consent
agreement was finalized, Richmond filed an objection with the
hearing officer; however, before the officer could resolve the
objection, Charbert withdrew its original request for the NOV
hearing on July 11, 2005.10 Therefore, pursuant to RIDEM's AAD
regulations, the proceeding closed, thus cancelling Richmond's
motions to compel discovery. 11
Because the proceedings concluded, Richmond filed a new and
independent complaint against RIDEM in Superior Court on July
22, 2005, requesting judicial review of RIDEM's actions under the
APA, and declaratory relief under the UDJA. 12 The complaint
alleged that in the past RIDEM's enforcement efforts against
manufacturers had been ineffective, and that noxious odors and
contamination of groundwater and soil resulted, causing a threat
to the health and welfare of Richmond's residents. 13 On August
31, 2005, Charbert's motion to intervene in the town's case was
granted. 14
At the trial level, the Superior Court held that because the
town could intervene in the administrative hearing, it became a
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id; see also id. at n.4.
8. Id. atn. 4
9. Id. at n.4.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 153-154.
14. Id. at 154.
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full party to the proceedings. 15 As such, RIDEM and Charbert
could not exclude the town from the final resolution of the dispute,
and any attempt to do so would nullify the disposition. 16 On the
separate jurisdictional issue, the Superior Court held that it could
grant declaratory relief to the town under both the APA and the
UDJA. 17  Thus, the trial justice ordered that the town be
permitted to participate in the hearing and that the consent
agreement between RIDEM and Charbert be set aside. 18
Both defendants appealed the decision to the Supreme Court,
arguing that the Superior Court improperly interfered with
RIDEM's statutory authority to resolve matters within its
jurisdiction. 19 The Supreme Court affirmed the holding that the
Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the town's
declaratory relief claim. 20  However, the Supreme Court
ultimately vacated the lower court's order, stating the lower court
could not nullify a consent agreement because the intervenor (the
town) did not participate in the negotiations. 21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In deciding whether a town has standing to raise a
declaratory relief claim against an agency and a third party, the
Court relied on R.I. GEN. LAWS §42-35-7 (1956).22 Generally, a
party must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking
judicial review; however, the party may seek declaratory relief if
the administrative regu]ation in question interferes with that
party's rights. 23 Thus, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed
the trial justice's finding that the Superior Court was vested with
subject matter jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief.24
According to the AAD's rules, an intervenor may become a full
party to a hearing.25 Thus, the Court acknowledged that under
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 154-55.
20. Id. at 156.
21. Id. at 158.
22. Id. at 156.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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these rules, the hearing officer properly permitted the town to
intervene. 26 However, the AAD's rules further provide that only a
petitioner may withdraw his request. 2 7 Therefore, once Charbert
(the petitioner) effectively withdrew its request for a hearing, the
town did not have an independent right to a hearing.28
Consequently, because Charbert terminated the administrative
proceeding, Richmond was entitled to bring a separate suit
against RIDEM and Charbert in Superior Court because it was
not a party to the consent agreement between those parties. 29
In contrast with the AAD's rules, the RIDEM's Rules and
Regulations for Assessment of Administrative Penalties (AAP) do
not give an intervenor the right to a hearing. 30 However, under
the AAP, the director of an agency has broad authority to resolve
enforcement proceedings through informal dispositions because
the Court defers to the administrative agency in enforcement
actions that the legislature entrust to the agency. 3 1 Thus, the
Court held that the director did not have to seek approval from
the intervenor (the town) before entering into a consent
agreement.32 In other words, pursuant to RIDEM's AAP Rules,
the town had no control over the result of the informal
negotiations between RIDEM and Charbert. 33
COMMENTARY
Although the Supreme Court unanimously vacated the
Superior Court's order which set aside the consent agreement and
remanded the hearing back to the AAP, Justice Goldberg did not
refrain from chastising RIDEM on its operating practices in these
dealings. Justice Goldberg, in maternal fashion, seems to suggest
that an agency will get one warning; one free opportunity where
"grossly inappropriate" behavior and weak legal reasoning will
suffice in the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court provides
an ultimatum: "henceforth the agency will act with greater respect
26. Id. at 157.
27. Id. at 156.
28. Id. at 157
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id
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in its dealings with local officials. '34
In reference to the "slight-of-hand" maneuver by RIDEM, in
which RIDEM presented a proposed copy of the consent
agreement to the town on the same day that the agreement
between RIDEM and Charbert was finalized, Justice Goldberg
stated, "we do not condone the ham-handed treatment of a town
by this state agency. ' 35 Furthermore, she further likens RIDEM's
"grossly inappropriate" behavior to a phrase in Hamlet's famous
soliloquy: "[t]he insolence of office."' 36  By doing so, Justice
Goldberg refers to the fact that, in this instance, RIDEM has
overstepped its authority by encroaching on a state municipality
and "such behavior is not what we expect of any state agency. '37
Likewise, Justice Goldberg and the Rhode Island Supreme
Court do not fail to chastise RIDEM for its weak arguments that
the town had no standing in the courts and that Richmond was
confined to relief provided by R.I. GEN. LAWS §42-35-15 (1956). 38
In fact, the Court notes "there was no final agency decision in this
case and therefore, nothing for the trial justice to review on a
nonexistent record. The argument by DEM that Richmond's right
to relief was confined to the provisions of R.I. GEN. LAWS §42-35-
15 (1956) is bewildering; we are hard-pressed to fathom just what
DEM would have the Superior Court review. '39
Consequently, although the law permitted the Court to find
for RIDEM and Charbert, it made itself clear that in the future,
agencies (and in particular RIDEM) must act with sufficient
respect towards the municipalities of Rhode Island.
CONCLUSION
In Town of Richmond v. Rhode Island Department of
Environmental Management, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
vacated the Superior Court order to set aside the consent
agreement between RIDEM and Charbert regarding the
disposition of the NOV. In so doing, the Court noted "an
administrative agency will be accorded great deference in
34. Id. at 158.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 1)
37. Id.
38. Id. at 155.
39. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
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interpreting a statute whose administration and enforcement
have been entrusted to the agency."'40
Jessica L. Grimes
40. Id. at 157 (citing Murray v. McWalters, 868 A.2d 659, 662 (R.I.
2005)).
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Civil Procedure. Allen v. South County Hospital et al., 945
A.2d 289 (R.I. 2008). The trial court dismissed plaintiffs case for
lack of prosecution, and, on appeal, granted a motion to vacate the
previous dismissal subject to certain conditions. The plaintiff then
appealed the motion to vacate based on the alleged inequity of the
court ordered conditions. The Rhode Island Supreme Court found
that the conditions which held plaintiff responsible for defendants'
costs and fees in connection with trial, as well as a $60,000 surety
bond, were inequitable and thus an abuse of discretion.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Maridel Allen ("Allen"), had spent over four
years conducting vigorous discovery in a medical negligence and
wrongful death action, as the statutory beneficiary of her mother,
in preparation for a trial date of May 16, 2005.1 Allen had built
her case around the expert opinion of Aaron B. Waxman, M.D.
("Dr. Waxman"), who was scheduled to testify at trial for Allen. 2
Allen's litigation related problems with Dr. Waxman began on
May 8, 2005 when Dr. Waxman told Allen he would be unable to
testify on the scheduled trial date. 3 Allen filed a motion for a
continuance, and, after some deliberation by the trial justice, a
new trial date was set for November 28, 2005. 4 Thereafter, Dr.
Waxman contacted Allen through e-mail a month before the newly
scheduled trial date to inform Allen he was no longer willing to
serve as her expert witness. 5 After various futile attempts to
contact Dr. Waxman, Allen began searching for a new expert
witness. 6
Allen filed a motion to vacate the November 28, 2005 trial
date and also filed a motion for a continuance, both of which were
1. Allen v. South County Hospital et al., 945 A.2d 289, 291 (R.I. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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denied by the trial court. 7 On November 28, 2005, Allen again
moved for a continuance based on the fact that Paul Mayo, M.D.
("Dr. Mayo") was tentatively going to be her new expert witness. 8
Since Allen could not continue at trial without an expert witness,
and Dr. Mayo's commitment to Allen as her new expert witness
was speculative, the trial justice dismissed the case for lack of
prosecution under Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 41(b)(1). 9 As such, on December 2, 2005, the trial
justice dismissed the case with prejudice. 10
Shortly thereafter, Allen filed a motion to vacate the dismissal
under Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
60(b)(6), arguing relief from the judgment of dismissal was
equitable in light of the circumstances. 11  After all parties
submitted estimates for the cost of deposing Dr. Mayo, who had
agreed to be Allen's expert witness, the trial justice granted
Allen's motion to vacate subject to certain conditions. 12 Among
these conditions were Allen's responsibility to pay defendants'
"reasonable" costs and attorneys' fees incurred because of the
motion to vacate, trial preparation costs, and a corporate surety
bond of $60,000, as a security for each of the three defendants'
anticipated expenses. 13  If Allen did not comply with the
conditions by January 3, 2006, the motion to vacate would be
denied, and the dismissal would remain final. 14
After Allen told the trial court she did not have the financial
means to comply with the various conditions of the order,
judgment was entered denying Allen's motion to vacate. 15 Allen
then appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, claiming that
it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to dismiss her
complaint for lack of prosecution under 41(b)(1), and for imposing
various pre-conditions to her motion to vacate judgment. 16 The
defendants cross appealed, claiming that the trial justice abused
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 292.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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his discretion by granting Allen's motion to vacate. 17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The primary question the Rhode Island Supreme Court had to
determine was whether the conditions imposed by the trial court
on Allen's motion to vacate were unfair or unduly burdensome. 18
Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)
provides in relevant part, "On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding, for any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 19 Applying
an "abuse of discretion" standard to the motion to vacate, the
Court concluded the $60,000 surety bond, as well as the order
requiring that Allen be responsible for "all reasonable costs and
attorneys' fees incurred with respect to trial preparation," were
both an abuse of discretion and were thus stricken. 20
The Court used federal case law to analyze Rule 60(b) motions
in general, to determine when court ordered conditions should be
considered so inequitable as to be set aside. 21 In Diehl v. H.J.
Heinz Co., the Seventh Circuit found that a condition is
unreasonable if the condition can not be complied with. 22 In that
case, the court held it was an unreasonable condition to require a
plaintiffs signature within one day where the distance involved in
travel would render the condition virtually impossible. 23 In
Thorpe v. Thorpe, the D.C. Circuit Court held that if a party is
unable to comply with a court-imposed condition, questions
relating to due process of law are raised. 24 In that case, the court
held that a condition was unreasonable where the court required
the defendant to place a large amount of money in plaintiffs bank
account, twice the amount awarded in the original default
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. R.I. SUPER. Civ. P. 60(b).
20. Id. at 295-296 (citing Keystone Elevator Co. v. Johnson & Wales
Univ., 850 A.2d 912, 916 (R.I. 1999)).
21. See id. at 293.
22. Id. (citing Diehl v. H.J. Heinz Co., 901 F.2d 73, 74 (7th Cir. 1990)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 294 (citing Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364 F.2d 692, 694 (D.C.Cir.
1996)).
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judgment. 25
Here, the first condition that the Court held inequitable was
the requirement that Allen pay "all reasonable costs and
attorneys' fees incurred with respect to trial preparation."2 6 The
Court believed that although the trial judge may have had good
intentions, the language of this condition was overly broad, and
defendants could therefore include a multitude of trial expenses
that would have been necessary even if trial had proceeded at the
earlier scheduled date.2 7
The second condition that the Court determined was
inequitable was the requirement that Allen post a $60,000 surety
bond, despite Allen's alleged financial inability to do so. 28 Allen
argued it was unjust for the trial court to demand such as large
sum of money, as she had already invested years of time and
money into the case, as well as the additional costs of obtaining a
new expert witness. 2 9 The trial judge had stated that a motion to
vacate could be granted under Rule 60(b) "upon terms that are
just", and had acknowledged that Dr. Waxman abandoning Allen
at the last minute was an "extraordinary circumstance" beyond
her control. 30
Although the judge determined that the costs to each of the
three defendants would be approximately $20,000 each, he did not
take into account Allen's inability to raise this amount of money.
3 1
Therefore, if Allen could not raise $60,000, practically speaking,
the court ordered "condition" amounted to a flat-out denial of
Allen's motion to vacate. 32 This denial of Allen's right to a trial on
the merits, by conditioning her trial on an "impossible" financial
obligation, raised questions of Due Process, and therefore
amounted to an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. 33
The Court dismissed defendant's cross-appeal alleging there
were no extraordinary circumstances that would warrant
25. Id. at 293.
26. Id. at 294.
27. Id.at 295.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 296.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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dismissal under 60(b)(6). 34 The Court determined that although
the motion to vacate was interlocutory and not appealable, Allen's
loss of Dr. Waxman at the last minute was indeed an
extraordinary circumstance. 35
Finally, the Court affirmed the trial court's original dismissal
under 41(b)(1) for lack of prosecution. 36 The original judgment
was affirmed due to the fact the Court was evenly divided on this
issue, and therefore could not reach the conclusion that the
original judgment was an abuse of discretion. 37 Consequently, the
Court affirmed the trial court's December 2, 2005 dismissal of the
case for lack of prosecution, but affirmed the judgment vacating
that order subject to the Court's newly modified conditions. 38
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court effectively held that
constitutional commitments to issues such as Due Process should
be a primary consideration when a Court exercises it independent
judgment in fashioning conditions to any judicial order. By
imposing a court ordered condition that is overly burdensome on
either plaintiff or defendant, the court is essentially denying that
individual a right to a fair trial. Although one party may be
legally responsible for causing the other party to incur additional
fees and costs due to delayed litigation, an equitable solution for
both parties needs to be fashioned. This is particularly important
due to the hefty financial burden on any party in on-going
litigation. Most citizens have limits to what they can realistically
afford in litigation, and a court should be mindful of this practical
reality. This calls for a court to conduct a reasonable investigation
into the financial capacities of both parties, and fashion a remedy
that is consistent with the abilities and needs of each.
Although the Court stuck down two conditions of the Superior
Court's previous ruling, it affirmed all other conditions, including
reasonable costs expended to investigate and depose Dr. Mayo. 39
This only makes sense is light of fairness to the defendants, who
34. Id.
35. Id. at 297.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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should not have to incur additional expenses by no fault of their
own. As such, although a plaintiffs financial capabilities should
be a main concern of the Court when creating monetary
conditions, the Court also needs to consider equity to the party
who is not at fault. Therefore, it is important that if a court is
going to prolong litigation for the benefit of one party, the other
party should not have to incur additional expenses without being
compensated. Consequently, while the Court's opinion allows a
broad range of discretion to fashion what it considers to be an
"equitable" condition on any motion, this discretion does not come
without limits.
CONCLUSION
The Court held that a condition requiring plaintiff to be
responsible for defendants' costs and fees relating to trial
preparation, and a condition requiring plaintiff to pay a $60,000
bond, were both inequitable under Rule 60(b). The Court held
that relief from prior judgment is appropriate where the plaintiff
is financially incapable of complying with court ordered
conditions. Accordingly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
modified a prior order of the trial court, striking two conditions of
the trial court's motion to vacate, on the ground that the
conditions were inequitable and thus an abuse of discretion.
Kristen M. Hermiz
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Civil Procedure. Kedy v. A.W Chesterton Co., 946 A.2d
1171 (R.I. 2008). Rhode Island joined the vast majority of states
in formally recognizing the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Un-
der this doctrine, a court may use its discretion to dismiss a case,
even when jurisdiction and venue are technically proper, in two
instances; first, where the chosen forum is oppressive and vex-
atious to the defendant; second, where considerations affecting the
chosen court's own administrative and legal problems militate in
favor of dismissal.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiffs in this case are all Canadian residents who filed
39 cases in Rhode Island Superior Court alleging personal injury
and wrongful death, all caused by workplace exposure to products
containing asbestos. 1 All relevant instances of employment, expo-
sure, injury and treatment took place in Canada. 2 While all the
corporate defendants do business in Rhode Island, the only two
corporate defendants with principal places of business in Rhode
Island were dismissed before the instant appeal was filed. 3 None
of the remaining corporate defendants have their principal place
of business in Rhode Island, and none of them are incorporated in
Rhode Island.4
On October 27, 2004, one of the defendants, General Electric,
filed a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds; the
other defendants joined in this motion.5 On May 27, 2005, the
motion was denied by the Superior Court.6 The trial judge first
found that venue and jurisdiction were both proper, and went on
to say that there were no practical problems with trying the case
in Rhode Island. 7
1. Kedy v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 946 A.2d 1171, 1175-1176 (R.I. 2008).
2. Id. at 1176.
3. Id. at 1176 n.3.
4. Id. at 1176.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id at 1176-1177.
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The only official recognition of the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens had been from the Rhode Island General Assembly, hav-
ing formally adopted the doctrine solely for child custody cases
under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) in
1978.8 Since the issue of forum non conveniens had not otherwise
been recognized in Rhode Island by the Legislature or the Su-
preme Court, the trial judge denied the motion to dismiss. 9 De-
fendants appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, raising
two issues; first, should the Supreme Court expressly recognize
the doctrine of forum non conveniens and set standards for its ap-
plication; 10 second, if the doctrine is recognized, should it apply to
this case and result in dismissal? 11
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first pointed out that the
Court is free to review questions of law and to overturn existing
precedents to create new ones. 12 Such questions of law are re-
viewed de novo.13 The Supreme Court took the case to settle the
question of the applicability of forum non conveniens, because
Rhode Island trial courts have split on the issue. 14
The Applicability of Forum Non Conveniens
"The doctrine of forum non conveniens is 'an equitable prin-
ciple by which a court having jurisdiction may decline to exercise
it on considerations of convenience, efficiency, and justice."' 15 A
court may invoke the doctrine without statutory authority,16 as
forum non conveniens is part of the courts' inherent judicial pow-
ers, necessary for effective and efficient judicial administration. 17
8. Id. at 1176.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1177.
11. Id.
12. Id. (quoting Hometown Props., Inc. v. Rhode Island Dept. of Envtl.
Mgmt., 596 A.2d 841, 843 (R.I. 1991)).
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Id. at 1178 (quoting AT & T Corp. v. Sigala, 274 Ga. 137, 139 (2001)).
16. Id.
17. Id. (quoting Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in
Anglo-American Law, 29 COLuM. L.REv. 1 (1929)).
2009]
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The United States Supreme Court stated that forum non conve-
niens means that "a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdic-
tion even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general
venue statute."18 "The principle allows a court to decline to exer-
cise jurisdiction when the plaintiffs chosen forum is significantly
inconvenient and the ends of justice would be better served if the
action were brought and tried in another forum."'19
Plaintiffs argued that forum non conveniens is a flawed doc-
trine leading to confusion and inconsistencies between federal and
state courts, 20 and that the General Assembly was the appropri-
ate body to enact the doctrine. 21 Plaintiffs further contended that
the General Assembly's intent to not adopt the doctrine universal-
ly was evinced by their choice to adopt it solely for child custody
cases.22
Defendants disagreed with plaintiffs' contention that the doc-
trine is applied inconsistently between state and federal courts. 23
Rather, they argued that forum non conveniens is part of the
court's inherent power to prevent "injurious and unnecessary fo-
rum choices by plaintiffs. ' 24 Agreeing with the defendants, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court formally adopted the doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens, and then set to the task of setting standards
for its application. 25
The Court took great pains to emphasize the policy rationale
behind forum non conveniens,26 reiterating that it is founded in
"fundamental fairness." 27 Independent of statutory grant, this
inherent judicial power is "necessarily vested in courts to manage
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious dis-
position of cases."28 As for the plaintiffs' argument that the Gen-
18. Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947)).
19. Id. (citing Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir.
1991)).
20. Id. at 1179.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Adkins v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R.R. Co., 54
Ill.2d 511, 514 (1973)).
28. Id. at 1180 (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31
(1962)).
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eral Assembly's adoption of forum non conveniens in child custody
cases precludes its application elsewhere, the Supreme Court cited
persuasive authority that "[a]lthough specific statutes codifying
the doctrine will prevail over the common law, the absence of a
statute generally permitting dismissal based on forum non conve-
niens does not prohibit us from adopting the doctrine..." 29
The Legal Standard for Forum Non Conveniens
When considering modifications or additions to procedural
rules, the Rhode Island Supreme Court looks to other jurisdictions
whose rules are similarly modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 30 Thus, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held:
"[W]hen an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear [a] case,
and when trial in the chosen forum would 'establish.
.oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant.. .out of proportion to
plaintiffs convenience,' or when the 'chosen forum [is] inappro-
priate because of considerations affecting the court's own adminis-
trative and legal problems,' the court may, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, dismiss the case" on forum non conveniens
grounds, "even if jurisdiction and proper venue are established."31
Before conducting a forum non conveniens analysis, a court
must determine whether jurisdiction and venue are proper; a fo-
rum non conveniens inquiry cannot proceed where jurisdiction or
venue are improper. 32 However, in keeping with the underlying
policy of promoting judicial economy, the court may "dispose of an
action by a forum non conveniens dismissal, bypassing questions
of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, when considerations of
convenience, fairness, and judicial economy so warrant. '33
The forum non conveniens analysis consists of two parts.
First, the court must consider whether an alternative forum exists
that is available to the parties and is adequate to resolve the con-
29. Id. at 1182 (quoting AT & T Corp. v. Sigala 549 S.E.2d 373, 377-378
(GA 2001)).
30. Id. (quoting Ciunci, Inc. v. Logan, 652 A.2d 961, 962 (R.I. 1995)).
31. Id. at 1182-83 (quoting American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S.
443, 447-448 (1994)).
32. Id. at 1183 (citing Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping
Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1184, 1193 (2007)).
33. Id. (citing Sinochem 127 S.Ct. at 1192)).
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tested issues. 34 Second, the court must weigh private- and public-
interest factors to determine the relative inconvenience of continu-
ing in the present forum. 35
As to the first part of the analysis, for another forum to be
'available,' the defendant must be amenable to process in the al-
ternative jurisdiction. 36 To ensure the availability of an alterna-
tive forum, a court can condition forum non conveniens dismissal
on the defendant's consent to submit to jurisdiction in an alterna-
tive forum. 37 In assessing the adequacy of the alternative forum,
the bar is quite low - an "alternative forum is adequate as long as
the plaintiff will not be deprived of all remedies or subjected to un-
fair treatment. ' 38 An unfavorable change in law will only be con-
sidered when the potential remedy is so inadequate or unsatisfac-
tory as to be no remedy at all.3 9
The second portion of the forum non conveniens analysis con-
siders private- and public-interest factors to assess the inconve-
nience of continuing the suit in the chosen forum. 40 Private inter-
est factors include:
"...the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
the premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expedi-
tious and inexpensive." 4 1
Other considerations include the enforceability of a judgment
in the alternative forum, and considerations regarding the availa-
bility of a fair trial.42 Also, plaintiffs choice of forum may not be a
weapon used to harass or oppress the defendant by adding unne-
34. Id. (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 n.22 (1981)).
35. Id. (citing Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255)).
36. Id. (citing Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255 n.22)).
37. Id. (citing Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 674 So.2d 86, 87
(Fla. 1996)).
38. Id. at 1184 (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3828.3 at 677-82 (3rd
ed. 2007)).
39. Id. (quoting Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 247)).
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508)).
42. Id. at 1184-85 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508
(1947)).
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cessary trouble or expense to conducting a defense. 43
A court considering a motion to dismiss on forum non conve-
niens grounds must consider public-interest factors as well, 4 4 in-
cluding administrative difficulties regarding a crowded docket,
how relevant the litigation is to the chosen jurisdiction, the local
interest in having the case decided at home, the existence or lack
of local law and the difficulties associated with applying extra-
jurisdictional law, and the money and time spent in deciding a
case more appropriately tied to another forum. 45 Further, "[a] tri-
al court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss on forum
non conveniens grounds is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard."46
Forum Non Conveniens Applied to the Present Case
The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens in the exercise of its supervisory powers. 47
Here, the plaintiffs admitted to seeking jurisdiction in Rhode Isl-
and rather than Canada because of Rhode Island's favorable dis-
covery rules, and because the potential damage awards in Canada
would not be as substantial as they would in be Rhode Island. 48
Since these are not valid bases for showing the inadequacy of an
alternative forum, and since Canada has a legal system quite ca-
pable of fairly hearing and deciding the plaintiffs' case, the Court
held that a Canadian forum would be adequate. 49 To ensure
availability, dismissal was conditioned on defendants agreeing to
waive any potential statute of limitations defenses in the Cana-
dian forum. 50
Further, the Supreme Court found that private-interest fac-
tors favored dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. 5 1 All re-
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1185.
45. Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508-09)).
46. Id. at 1186.
47. Id. (citing Tanner v. Town Council of East Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784,
801 (R.I. 2005)).
48. Id. at 1186-87.
49. Id. at 1187.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1188.
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levant injuries and treatment occurred in Canada. 52 Further, all
the plaintiffs are residents of Canada, and all of the parties in-
volved had relatively tenuous ties to Rhode Island. 53 All of the
witnesses and evidence were apparently located in Canada, and
only Canadian courts could have properly compelled witnesses to
appear. 54 Finally, most of the relevant parties (excluding the at-
torneys) would have had to travel from Canada to Rhode Island
for a trial.55
The Supreme Court also found that public-interest factors fa-
vored dismissal. 56 A Rhode Island jury would have had to sit
through a long and "complicated trial that literally ha[d] no con-
nection to Rhode Island.' '57 Further, Rhode Island judges and at-
torneys would likely have had to consider and apply Canadian
law, adding an unnecessary layer of complexity to the trial. 58 The
Court was unable to find a valid justification for the expenditure
of judicial resources to hear such a case. 59 "[Tihe central question
which a court must answer when weighing the public interests in
the outcome and administration of a case. . . is whether the case
has a general nexus with the forum sufficient to justify the fo-
rum's commitment of judicial time and resources to it."' 60 Here,
the Court was unable to find any applicable nexus to Rhode Isl-
and. 61
COMMENTARY
In an age where trials have become extremely expensive for
all of the parties involved, and where courts' dockets are becoming
ever more crowded, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has taken a
common-sense approach to see to it that local courts are not over-
burdened with litigation that just does not belong here. The Court
52. Id. at 1187.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1187-88.
55. Id. at 1188.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1189.
60. Id. (quoting Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 647 So.2d 86,
87 (Fla. 1996)).
61. Id.
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recognized that parties may seek to take unfair advantage of this
state's relatively liberal discovery and/or damages rules. Rhode
Island's failure to formally recognize forum non conveniens pre-
viously may have been motivated by a desire to help all injured
parties find redress, regardless of their identity or the facts of
their particular case, so long as the jurisdictional requirements
were met. However, considerations of fundamental fairness and
judicial economy have tempered this noble desire, resulting in the
formal recognition of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
CONCLUSION
Rhode Island has now formally recognized the doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens.62 Before considering a motion to dismiss for
forum non conveniens, a court generally must ensure that jurisdic-
tion and venue are proper. 63 From there, the analysis is two-
pronged. First, the court must consider "whether an alternative
forum exists that is both available and adequate to resolve the
disputed legal issues."64 Second, the court must "determine the
inconvenience of continuing in the plaintiffs chosen forum by
weighing private- and public-interest factors." 65
Arthur DeFelice
62. Id. at 1179.
63. Id. at 1183.
64. Id. (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,255 n.22 (1981)).
65. Id. at 1183 (citing Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255)).
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Civil Procedure. Ryan, et al. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of
Providence, et al., 941 A.2d 174 (R.I. 2008). Plaintiff, a church
parishioner, brought this action against a church, alleging a priest
had sexually abused her approximately thirteen years prior to
filing suit. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the
Providence County Superior Court's grant of summary judgment,
confirming the suit was barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. The Rhode Island Supreme Court also upheld the
Superior Court's denial of plaintiffs motion to vacate the
judgment, motion to recuse, and the acceptability of the lack of a
hearing with respect to the three aforementioned motions.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In October 1978, plaintiff Mary Ryan (hereinafter "plaintiff'),
then seventeen years old, began a consensual sexual relationship
with Roman Catholic priest Monsignor Louis Dunn (hereinafter
"Dunn").1 The relationship, which consisted of sexual activities
including digital penetration and oral sex, lasted four years before
it came to an abrupt end in June 1982 due to a forced act of
intercourse between Dunn and plaintiff, against her will. 2
Plaintiff did not talk about her relationship with Dunn, nor
the June 1982 sexual assault, until 1986, when she made general
statements about the relationship to her friend Gene Pistacchio. 3
Plaintiff did not provide this friend with any specific details until
seven years later, in December 1993. 4 Around this time, the
plaintiff discovered that Dunn had been sexually involved with
other women, and realized he was a "fraud" who had "abused"
her.5 Following this realization, in 1994, the plaintiff began to tell
various people about the sexual assault. 6 Plaintiff testified that
1. Ryan, et al. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, et al., 941 A.2d
174, 177 (R.I. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 177-78.
5. Id. at 178.
6. Id.
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she did not mention the sexual incidents to anyone for such a long
time because she believed Dunn possessed the power of God and
therefore feared what he could do to her. 7 Plaintiff initiated this
civil action against multiple defendants on December 6, 1995.8 A
separate criminal action against Dunn concluded in 1999 when
the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed his sexual assault
conviction.9
In addition to this case, alleged acts of sexual abuse by Rhode
Island priests resulted in thirty-seven other civil actions being
filed.' 0  The Superior Court justice assigned to these cases
(hereinafter the "motion justice")" i became aware of statute of
limitation problems, and urged all parties to engage in settlement
proceedings.12 Plaintiff was the only party who chose not to
participate in the settlement and, after she made this decision,
her counsel was allowed to withdraw. 1 3 The motion justice then
granted five continuances, giving plaintiff another chance to
mediate the case and time to find new counsel; however,
mediation discussions failed, as did plaintiffs effort to secure new
counsel, resulting in her decision to continue on a pro se basis. 1 4
In November 2002, the defendants moved for summary
judgment, asserting the claim was time barred by the applicable
statute of limitations.' 5 The motion justice granted summary
judgment upon finding that the statute of limitations for a sexual
abuse civil action is three years,1 6 plaintiff did not file suit until
years after the June 7, 1985 deadline, 17 and no valid tolling theory
7. Id.
8. Id. at 178 n.8.
9. Id. at 178 n.4.
10. Id. at 178. To help ease the management of the many cases, all
thirty-eight were assigned to a single justice of the Superior Court. Id.
11. Id. at 177 n.1.
12. Id. at 178.
13. Id. at 179. After three months of mediation, all participating parties
settled. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. "Actions for injuries to the person shall be commenced and sued
within three (3) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not
after." R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-1-14(b) (2008).
17. June 7, 1985 was the last date upon which suit could properly be
commenced, being three years after the June 7, 1982 sexual assault that was
the basis for this civil action. Ryan, et al. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of
Providence, et al., 941 A.2d 174, 179 (R.I. 2008).
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extended the statutory period. 18 Accordingly, in September 2003,
the Superior Court entered final judgment dismissing all the
plaintiffs claims against defendants. 19 Plaintiff filed a motion to
reconsider the summary judgment, which was denied, resulting in
the appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court in mid-September
2003.20 In early 2004, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the
judgment and a motion to recuse the motion justice, both of which
were denied. 2 1
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the motion justice erred in:
(1) granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment; (2)
denying the motion to recuse; (3) denying the motion to vacate
judgment; and (4) not having a hearing with respect to the three
aforementioned motions. 22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Statutes of Limitation, Summary Judgment
The Court reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo23
and recognized the important public policies served by statutes of
limitation. 24 'Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of
society . . . giving security and stability to human affairs' 25 and
'preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.' 26 The Court held
that the proper statute of limitation for a Rhode Island case
seeking damages from a nonperpetrator defendant for injuries
resulting from sexual abuse of a minor, pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-
1-14(b), is three years. 27 Agreeing with the motion justice, the
Court explained that the sexual assault occurred on June 7, 1982,
making June 7, 1985 the last date on which the plaintiff could
18. Id. at 179-80.
19. Id. at 180.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 180-81 (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879)).
26. Id. at 181 (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. R.R. Express
Agency, Inc., 329 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)).
27. Id. at 181.
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file. 28 Plaintiff did not file until December 1995, more than ten
years after the statutory period had lapsed, barring the claim. 29
The plaintiff relied on three tolling theories to extend the
statutory period. 30 First, plaintiff argued that the defendants had
fraudulently concealed their criminal conduct and, pursuant to §
9-1-20, the statute of limitations should have tolled until the
plaintiff discovered the existence of the claim. 31 This, however,
requires the plaintiff to show the defendant made an actual
misrepresentation of material facts; mere silence or inaction will
not suffice. 32  The Court found no evidence that an actual
misrepresentation was made, and thus the tolling period was
inapplicable. 33 Second, plaintiff argued the discovery rule in § 9-
1-51 should toll the statute of limitations until December 1993,
when plaintiff learned that Dunn was a fraud. 34 The Court held
that because § 9-1-51 was inapplicable to claims against
nonperpetrator defendants, it was not a valid tolling theory. 35
Finally, plaintiff contended that defendants waived any statute of
limitations defense by not raising it as an affirmative defense. 36
The record reveals that plaintiff never argued this theory in
Superior Court, and it is well established that the Rhode Island
Supreme Court will not review issues that are raised for the first
time on appeal; thus, the plaintiffs argument was rejected. 37
With no valid tolling theories, the suit was time barred and
summary judgment was affirmed in favor of the defendants. 38
28. Id.; see supra note 17.
29. Id. at 179-81.
30. Id. at 181-82.
31. Id. at 182.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 183.
34. Id.
35. Id. The Court emphasized that even if the statute applied to
nonperpetrator defendants, the statute was enacted in 1993 and would not
apply retroactively to revive claims that were already time barred, including
the instant claim. Furthermore, the discovery rule tolls a claim only until a
plaintiff in exercise of reasonable diligence would discover a claim, and it was
agreed that a reasonable twenty-one year old would surely have known
Dunn's forced sexual actions were wrong prior to the expiration of the three
year statute of limitations period. Id. at 183-84.
36. Id. at 184.
37. Id. at 184-85.
38. Id. at 185.
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The Motion to Recuse
Plaintiff also argued that the motion justice should have
granted the motion to recuse because he had "an agenda to settle
the cases" that was indicative of personal bias or prejudice. 39
Judicial officers must recuse themselves if they cannot make an
impartial decision, but they have an equally great duty to not
disqualify themselves where there is no sound reason to do so. 40
The Court acknowledged the worthy purposes that settlements
serve, including lessening the strain on judicial resources and
preventing litigants from sustaining high costs. 4 1  Therefore,
instead of being recused, the Court thought the motion justice
should be commended for actions taken to help the parties avoid
prolonged litigation 42 and stated it "borders on the offensive" for a
party to claim a justice should be recused for adhering to the well-
favored policy of promoting settlements. 43 The motion justice's
efforts to encourage settlements were in no way indicative of
personal bias or prejudice, and thus the denial of the motion to
recuse was affirmed.44
The Motion to Vacate Judgment
Plaintiff further argued that the motion to vacate the
judgment should have been granted. 45 The Court noted that a
motion to vacate is in the discretion of the Superior Court justice
and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 46 Plaintiff
claimed the motion justice erred by ignoring evidence that showed
other plaintiffs had entered into binding arbitration with various
defendants. 47  The Court, however, could not think of any
39. Id. The Court commented that while they realized plaintiff was
proceeding on a pro se basis, they were compelled to note that the plaintiff
completely misunderstood the profound importance of the settlement and
mediation processes in making this argument. Id. at 185 n.20.
40. Id. at 185 (citing Kelly v. Rhode Island Public Transit Auth., 740 A.2d
1243, 1246 (R.I. 1999)).
41. Id. at 186.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 186-87.
44. Id. at 187.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id
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rationale for how such evidence would have bearing on a motion to
vacate summary judgment and thus upheld the denial of the
motion.48 It was noted that plaintiff raised additional arguments
in the motion to vacate judgment, but the arguments were not
briefed properly. 49 The issues were only stated, without any
meaningful discussion or legal briefing, which constitutes a waiver
of those issues. 50
Absence of Oral Argument
Plaintiff finally argued on appeal that when the motion
justice decided the motion for summary judgment, motion to
vacate judgment, and motion to recuse, without oral arguments or
a hearing, it was a denial of due process. 51 There is, however, no
constitutional right to oral argument on questions of law, and the
lack of an opportunity to supplement written submissions with
oral advocacy is not a due process violation. 52 Moreover, no abuse
of discretion will be found if the plaintiff cannot point to a part of
its argument that cannot be adequately represented in writing.53
The Court found that because plaintiff was able to make multiple
written submissions, and could not point to an argument that was
not adequately represented in writing, the lack of hearings was
acceptable and not a constitutional violation. 54
COMMENTARY
In reaching the conclusion that plaintiffs claim was to be
dismissed, the Rhode Island Supreme Court was clearly
sympathetic to plaintiffs situation, and was therefore careful to
thoroughly explain the great need to abide by the procedural rules
of our finely-tuned American judicial system. 55  The Court
admitted that the plaintiff was a victim of heinous criminal
conduct, who should have the right to relief; however, the Court
48. Id.
49. Id. at 187 n.24.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 187-88.
52. Id. at 188.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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recognized that some wrongs and injuries simply do not lend
themselves to full redress due to the overall nature and needs of
our judicial system. 56 This underlying sentiment can be seen
throughout the opinion. It is first apparent when the Court made
a great effort to elaborate on the important societal purposes that
statutes of limitation serve, and thus the need to not overlook
them in morally troublesome cases, such as this case. 57 This
theme can again be observed when the Court took an unusual
amount of time to justify the importance of encouraging
settlements, and the vital role that settlements have come to fill in
our judicial system.58 While the Rhode Island Supreme Court
expressed sympathy towards plaintiff, the Court remained very
levelheaded in applying the proper rules of law to reach the
difficult yet necessary decision, as all courts should aim to do.
Additionally, this case demonstrates a plaintiffs ability to
represent oneself in our legal system and proceed on a pro se
basis. While it is encouraging to see the continued allowance of
this practice and the ability of a lay person to advance as far as
the Rhode Island Supreme Court on their own, the blatant
disadvantages of not having a lawyer's knowledge came to light in
this case. Plaintiffs argument regarding the defendants' waiver of
a statute of limitations defense, and her arguments concerning the
motion to vacate judgment, were all barred due to procedural
errors that a lawyer would have been less likely to make. 59 The
possibility that these lost arguments could have saved the case
from dismissal makes one wonder if it is ever really fair to allow a
party, unaware of many legal technicalities, to represent
him/herself.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendants due to the claim
being time barred, noting the importance of abiding by the
procedural constructs of our justice system. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court additionally upheld the Superior Court's denial of
56. See id.
57. See id. at 180-81.
58. See id. at 186-87.
59. See id. at 184-85, 187 n.24.
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the motion to recuse, motion to vacate judgment, and the decision
not to hold oral hearings in regard to such motions. Thus, the
decision of the Superior Court was affirmed in all respects, and
although potentially emotionally bothersome, it was determined
that the plaintiff could not have her day in court and there is now
nothing left to litigate.
Melissa M. McGow
Constitutional Law/Standing. Bowen v. Mollis, 945 A.2d
314 (R.I. 2008). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
plaintiff, seeking a declaration that an upcoming election was not
a "general election" within the meaning of the term as used in
Article XIV, Section 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution, lacked
standing because his status as a taxpayer was insufficient to
establish a unique and cognizable injury that could be effectively
resolved by judicial decision.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brought suit against the Secretary
of State' and the Rhode Island Board of Elections seeking a
declaratory judgment that the 2004 election was not a "general
election." 2 If the 2004 election were so declared, plaintiff argued
that the question of whether the Rhode Island Constitution should
be amended must be presented to the State's voters at the next
general election in 2006 pursuant to Article XIV, Section 2 of the
Rhode Island Constitution. 3
The Secretary of State moved to dismiss the claim for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 4 The trial
court, issuing its opinion on October 25, 2006, denied defendant's
motion and held that plaintiff had stated a valid claim. 5 However,
the court indicated it was unwilling to consider any claims
regarding the 2006 election. 6 This was most likely due to the
proximity of the upcoming election in early November. 7
1. Plaintiff originally brought suit against Matthew A. Brown, Rhode
Island's former Secretary of State. The trial court updated the caption to
instead include current Secretary of State, A. Ralph Mollis. Bowen v. Mollis,
945 A.2d 314, 315, n.2 (R.I. 2008).
2. Id. at 315.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 316.
5. Id. The court also stated that the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate were indispensible parties, and allowed plaintiff to
file an amended petition to rectify this omission. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Rhode Island Board of Elections, Elections & Voting: 2006
394
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Plaintiff, thus unable to get a question on a constitutional
convention on the 2006 ballot, filed an amended petition with a
supporting memorandum containing an argument regarding the
definition of "general election" as used in Article XIV, Section 1 of
the Rhode Island Constitution, and a claim for a declaratory
judgment that the upcoming 2008 election was not a general
election.8 The trial court did not explain plaintiffs motivation in
seeking to have the 2008 election declared to not be a general
election. Plaintiffs original action sought to declare that the
question of a constitutional convention had not been posed to
voters in ten years, and was thus required to be voted on in 2006. 9
With this argument foreclosed by the trial court, one would think
plaintiff would seek to get this question put on the 2008 ballot.
However, the Court stated that plaintiff argued against having
2008 considered a "general election" without further
explanation. 10
The trial court found that plaintiff had standing to bring this
claim. It stated that if plaintiff was unable to bring this claim, no
one would be able to because the issue is one of general
applicability that affects all taxpayers equally. 11 On the merits of
the case, the court declared that the 2008 election was a general
election, rejecting plaintiffs argument that the election of Rhode
Island "general officers" is a necessary element of a general
election. 12 Plaintiff then appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. 13
BACKGROUND
The Rhode Island Constitution, adopted in 1842, contained an
article providing a method of amendment for the State
Constitution. 14 In 1883, in an advisory opinion to the Governor,
General Election, http://www.elections.state.ri.us/elections/results/2006/
generalelection/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
8. Id. Plaintiff also two brought a claim based on Article XIV, section 2
of the Rhode Island Constitution, but pursued only the claim based on section
1 on appeal. Id.
9. Id. at 315.
10. Id. at 316.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. In re Opinion to the Governor, 178 A. 433, 438 (R.I. 1935). The
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the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that this was the exclusive
method for Constitutional amendment. 15 Fifty-two years later,
however, the Rhode Island Supreme Court changed its mind and
opined that the Rhode Island legislature was empowered to
propose and enact additional methods of Constitutional
amendment if it so desired. 16 Pursuant to this authority, the
Assembly enacted Article XIV of the Constitution, which
established new procedures for proposing amendments and
convening constitutional conventions.17 Article XIV, Section 1
describes the process for proposing and approving amendments. 18
The General Assembly proposes amendments which, if approved
by a majority vote of the Assembly, are submitted to the electorate
to vote on at the next "general election." 19 Section 2 details the
procedure for convening a constitutional convention, which is
similar to the aforementioned proposal process: the General
Assembly proposes a convention and, upon majority approval, the
same question is posed to voters. 20
Section 2 imposes three additional requirements. 2 1 First, the
General Assembly (or the Governor, if the Assembly does not act)
must organize a "bi-partisan preparatory commission" to gather
information on constitutional issues.22 Second, if voters agree
that a constitutional convention should be held, there are
additional measures which must be taken. 23 Finally, if the
question of whether there should be a constitutional convention
has not been posed to voters in ten years, the Secretary of State
method under former Article XIII was more cumbersome than the present
method and required a three-fifths majority of voters in order to secure a
constitutional amendment. See id. at 437.
15. Id. at 439.
16. Id. at 437-8.
17. R.I. CONST. art. XIV, § 2.
18. R.I. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
19. Id.
20. R.I. CONST. art. XIV, § 2.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The most significant measure is that the General Assembly must
provide for the election of delegates to the convention. The number of
delegates must equal the number of members in the House, and they must
also be elected by the same process by which House members are elected. If
there are amendments sought after the constitutional convention has
concluded, the amendments must once again be presented to the electorate
and approved by a majority of voters. Id.
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must submit this question at the next "general election. '24
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court unanimously 25 held that
plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his claim for two related
reasons. 26 First, the Court held that plaintiff did not suffer an
injury in fact.27 Second, even if plaintiffs alleged injury satisfied
the injury in fact requirement, the Court held that it is
"indistinguishable from the interests of the general public" and
unlikely to be redressed by a favorable outcome. 28 Under Rhode
Island law, plaintiffs lacking standing may be allowed to pursue a
claim if they can demonstrate that the claim involves an issue of
"substantial public interest. ' 29 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
has previously held that "whether the public has a right to vote at
a public referendum" on simulcast out-of-state horse racing was
an issue of substantial public interest, 30 as was the legitimacy of
Vincent "Buddy" Cianci's mayoral campaign. 31 Here, however,
the Court did not find that plaintiffs claim involved a "substantial
public interest. '32
In addition to the Court's holding, the Court also expressed
approval of the trial court's definition of general election: "one that
is regularly scheduled on the same day - 'the first Tuesday next
after the first Monday in November in even numbered years."' 33
COMMENTARY
Rhode Island's judicially-crafted rule, allowing an issue of
"substantial public interest" to effectively circumvent traditional
standing requirements, is generous compared to the United States
24. Id.
25. Bowen v. Mollis, 945 A.2d 314, 318 (R.I. 2008). The Court's opinion
was unanimous; however, Justices Suttell and Robinson did not participate.
Id.
26. Id. at 317.
27. See id. at 317: "[Plaintiff] has failed to allege a particularized injury.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I. 1992).
31. Gelch v. State Bd. of Elections, 482 A.2d 1204, 1207 (R.I. 1984).
32. Bowen v. Mollis, 945 A.2d 314, 317 (R.I. 2008).
33. Id. at 317-8.
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Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence. 34 Indeed, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court has, on numerous occasions, allowed
plaintiffs to proceed with their claims based on the "substantial
public interest" involved. 35  However, as proved here, the
"substantial public interest" requirement is not automatically 
- or
easily - met.3 6
While the Court did not provide a precise definition of
"substantial public interest," the Court's reversal of the trial
court's holding sheds some light on the issue. The trial judge
likely held that plaintiffs claim implicated a substantial public
interest because it involved a procedure mandated by the Rhode
Island Constitution. 37 Also, the trial court opined that plaintiff
should be allowed to bring this claim because, if he were not able
to, it is unlikely that anyone else could. 38 This conception of
"substantial public interest" suggests a "standing by necessity"
argument: if no one will be allowed to litigate a public issue due to
his or her inability to establish standing, a court should allow a
willing litigant to do so. 39 The Rhode Island Supreme Court,
however, rejected this argument in whole when it stated:
"Although on rare occasions this Court has overlooked the
question of standing so it can reach the merits of a controversy, we
do so only in cases of substantial public interest. We respectfully
decline to do so today."40
The short shrift given plaintiffs arguments regarding
standing raises three implications. First, it suggests that the
word "substantial" in the phrase "substantial public interest" is
more than a mere superlative. Whether or not Rhode Island
34. See e.g. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found. Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2553
(2007), where the Supreme Court further narrowed Flast v. Cohen's already
narrow exception for taxpayer standing in challenges under the
Establishment Clause.
35. See Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I. 1992); Gelch v. State
Bd. of Elections, 482 A.2d 1204, 1207 (R.I. 1984); Sennott v. Hawksley, 241
A.2d 286 (R.I. 1968).
36. See Bowen, 945 A.2d at 317; See also Blackstone Valley Chamber of
Commerce v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 452 A.2d 931, 932 (R.I. 1982) (change in
structure of agency's residential rate for utilities not an issue of substantial
public interest).
37. Bowen, 945 A.2d at 317.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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voters will be allowed to vote for a constitutional convention - and,
if so, when - is undoubtedly of public interest. However, it was
not sufficiently "substantial" to satisfy the Court. 41 Perhaps this
was because the issue of whether the constitution should be
amended is but the first step towards amendment. 42 Regardless,
the Court's dismissal of this argument suggests that the
"substantial public interest" requirement is not easily met. 43
Second, the Court's finding that plaintiff lacked standing
rejects the trial court's "standing by necessity" finding. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court made this explicit when it stated that:
"[Plaintiff] has failed to... demonstrate that he has a stake in the
outcome that distinguishes his claims from the claims of the
public at large." 44
Finally, while it is unclear from the Court's brief opinion, the
rejection of plaintiffs standing to pursue his claim may indicate a
desire to accord with the relatively more restrictive federal
standing rules. 45 However, the Court's failure to cite any recent
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue refutes
this argument. 46
After dismissing plaintiffs claim for lack of standing, it seems
unnecessary that the Court offered its opinion on the merits of the
case and endorsed the trial court's definition of "general
election."47 However, the Court did not go far out of its way in
issuing this dicta because an instructive definition was close at
hand. Section 17-1-2(2) of the Rhode Island General Laws offers
the definition given by the trial court and quoted by the Supreme
Court.48 While this statute defines the term as used in Rhode
Island election law, and is not binding on constitutional issues, the
Court implied that the definitions are synonymous, and thus the
"general election" spoken of in the constitution has no additional
41. Id.
42. R.I. CONST. art. XIV, § 2.
43. Bowen v. Mollis, 945 A.2d 314, 317 (R.I. 2008).
44. Id.
45. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found. Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2553
(2007).
46. See Bowen, 945 A.2d at 317. The most recent Supreme Court case on
the issue cited by the Court is Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992).
47. Bowen, 945 A.2d at 317-8.
48. R.I. GEN LAWS. § 17-1-2(2) (1956).
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meaning. 49 This language, though dicta, is likely to be applied to
similar actions given its unqualified approval by the Court. 50
Nevertheless, the Court's discussion of the merits of plaintiffs
case is a formalistic peculiarity. Courts often couch their opinions
on non-essential matters in hypothetical terms, or refuse to
discuss such matters entirely. Here, however, the Court
effectively circumvented the requirements of standing by opining
on the merits of the case. 5i Plaintiff sought only declaratory relief
as to whether the 2008 election would be a general one and,
though he was found to lack standing, he received this
information.52 However, while the Court's approach may betray
formalistic judicial conventions, it is eminently practical. The
definition of "general election" as used in the Rhode Island
Constitution has been effectively conveyed to future litigants,
potentially avoiding future disputes. 53
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that plaintiffs injury
as a taxpayer was insufficient to establish an injury in fact and
that a judicial decision would not redress his complaint.
Additionally, the Court refused to overlook plaintiffs lack of
standing because plaintiffs claim did not meet Rhode Island's
"substantial public interest" exception. Implicit in the Court's
opinion is that the issue of whether or not voters will be allowed to
vote on the question of whether a constitutional convention shall
be convened or not is not sufficiently "substantial" as to qualify as
an exception to normal requirements of standing.
Additionally, the Court cited with approval the trial court's
formulation of "general election," which revolves around when an
election is held, not who seeks to be elected. The Court's
unambiguous approval of this definition clarifies that the
definition of "general election" provided by 17-1-2(2) of the Rhode
Island General Laws is identical to the definition contained in
Article XIV § 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution.
49. Bowen, 945 A.2d at 317-8
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 316.
53. Id. at 317, 318.
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Constitutional Law. State v. Faria, 947 A.2d 863 (R.I.
2008). A Rhode Island statute establishing a classification
between felons and non-felons implicates neither a suspect class
nor a fundamental right. Thus, Rhode Island General Laws § 12-
1-12, which prohibits individuals acquitted or exonerated of a
criminal charge from expunging related criminal records if they
have had a prior felony conviction, does not violate fourteenth
amendment equal protection rights.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In February 2006, Brian Faria (hereinafter "Defendant") was
arrested and charged in District Court with two counts of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 1 Concluding that
there was insufficient evidence to warrant a felony prosecution,
the Attorney General declined to file a criminal information. 2
Pursuant to § 12-1-12, 3 Defendant thereafter moved to destroy all
records of his arrest and exoneration. 4 In a separate filing,
Defendant additionally requested that the court records be sealed
and/or expunged.5 This request apparently was reliant upon § 12-
1. See State v. Faria, 947 A.2d 863, 864 (R.I. 2008).
2. See id.
3. R.I. GEN. LAwS § 12-1-12 states in pertinent part: (a) Any fingerprint,
photograph, physical measurements, or other record of identification,
heretofore or hereafter taken by or under the direction of the attorney
general, the superintendent of state police, the member or members of the
police department of any city or town or any other officer authorized by this
chapter to take them, of a person under arrest, prior to the final conviction of
the person for the offense then charged, shall be destroyed by all offices or
departments having the custody or possession within sixty (60) days after
there has been an acquittal, dismissal, no true bill, no information, or the
person has been otherwise exonerated from the offense with which he or she
is charged, and the clerk of court where the exoneration has taken place
shall, consistent with § 12-1-12.1, place under seal all records of the person in
the case including all records of the division of criminal identification
established by § 12-1-4; provided, that the person shall not have been
previously convicted of any felony offense.
4. See Faria at 864.
5. See id. at 864-65.
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1-12.1.6 In essence, §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1 allow for the
destruction of certain police records and expungement via sealing
or destruction of certain court records. 7 However, neither section
permits relief for persons previously convicted of a felony offense.8
Defendant had in the past been convicted of a felony offense. 9
Defendant argued before the District Court that, because §§ 12-1-
12 and 12-1-12.1 precluded the destruction or sealing of records
relating to his two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, his constitutional rights had been violated.10
Specifically, Defendant argued that §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1
denied him equal protection under the law as guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 11
Arguing that such classifications bear no reasonable relationship
to the public health, welfare, or safety, Defendant contended the
statutes unconstitutionally discriminate against persons with
previous felony convictions. 12
The state objected to the Defendant's motion and argued that
the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. 13  Additionally, the state asserted that where the
constitutionality of a statute is attacked, it is the moving party's
burden (here the Defendant) to overcome every conceivable basis
that might support the legislative classification. 14 The state
contended that the Defendant failed to meet this burden. 15
Moreover, the state maintained that the legislative classification
advanced a legitimate state interest by supporting the
maintenance of a comprehensive history of a felon's contacts with
6. R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-1-12.1 states in pertinent part: (a) Any person
who is acquitted or otherwise exonerated of all counts in a criminal case,
including, but not limited to, dismissal or filing of a no true bill or no
information, may file a motion for the sealing of his or her court records in
the case, provided, that no person who has been convicted of a felony shall
have his or her court records sealed pursuant to this section.
7. See State v. Faria, 947 A.2d 863, 865 (R.I. 2008).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
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the criminal justice system. 16
On July 18, 2006, the District Court issued a written decision
which held that §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1 violated the Defendant's
constitutional equal protection rights. 17 Specifically, the court
noted that the statutory scheme in §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1
established two categories of people - those with felony
convictions on their record and those without felony convictions on
their record.18  The court found no rational basis for
distinguishing between felons and non-felons in the statutory
language of §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1.19 Additionally, the court
rejected the state's contention that the comprehensive
maintenance of all criminal records relating to felons might help
law enforcement professionals to identify patterns of criminal
activity and apprehend criminals. 20
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
accepted review of the District Court's decision.21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Supreme Court stated that review was limited to
examining the record to determine if an error of law had been
committed. 22 When reviewing a constitutional challenge to a
statute, the Court stated that it would use the "greatest possible
caution."23 In beginning such a review, the Court embraced the
principle that legislative enactments are presumed valid and
constitutional. 24 Additionally, a statute must be capable of being
characterized as palpably and unmistakably in excess of
legislative power to be deemed unconstitutional. 25 Finally, the
Court stressed, "Unless the party challenging the constitutionality
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 865-66.
19. See id. at 866.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 867.
22. Id. (citing Crowe Countryside Realty Ass'n. Co. v. Novare Eng'rs,
Inc., 891 A.2d 838, 840 (R.I. 2006)).
23. Id. (citing State v. Hall, 940 A.2d 645, 657 (R.I. 2008)) (quoting
Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 822 (R.I. 2004)).
24. Id. (citing Newport Court Club Assoc. v. Town Council of
Middletown, 800 A.2d 405, 409 (R.I. 2002)).
25. Id. (citing Cherenzia, 847 A.2d at 822).
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of a statute can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the act
violates a specific provision of the [Rhode Island] [C]onstitution or
the United States Constitution, this court will not hold the act
unconstitutional. 26
The issue was whether the distinction between felons and
non-felons codified for the purposes of §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1
violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which "provides that a state shall not 'deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 27
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that the
constitutionality of the legislation was properly analyzed under a
minimum-scrutiny test because the felon/non-felon classification
involved neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class of
persons. 28
"To ascertain whether a rational relationship exists, the
proper inquiry is not whether [a] court can find a rational basis for
the statute, but whether 'the General Assembly rationally could
conclude that the legislation would resolve a legitimate
problem."' 29 A statute will survive a constitutional challenge
provided the Court can conceive of any reasonable statutory
justification or any legitimate objective. 30 For this reason, the
burden is high upon the party seeking to overcome the
constitutional validity of a statutory classification. To wit, the
moving party "has the burden 'to negate every conceivable basis
which might support [the legislative classification] .",31
In applying rational-basis review to §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1,
which "draw a distinction between those persons acquitted or
exonerated of a crime without a previous felony conviction on their
record and those acquitted or exonerated with a previous felony
conviction," the Court looked to the practical purpose of the
26. Id. (citing Cherenzia, 847 A.2d at 822) (citing City of Pawtucket v.
Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 44-45 (R.I. 1995)).
27. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, sec. 1); see also id. at n.4 (the
Court noted that the Defendant's equal protection claim as it relates to the
Fifth Amendment was inapplicable here because the Fifth Amendment
applies to federal action only).
28. See id. at 868 (citing Riley v. The Rhode Island Dept. of Envtl.
Mgmt., 941 A.2d 198, 206 (R.I. 2008)).
29. See id. (citing Mackie v. State, 936 A.2d 588, 596 (R.I. 2007)).
30. See id. (citing Mackie, 936 A.2d at 596).
31. See id. (citing Mackie, 936 A.2d at 597).
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statutory distinction.32 The statutes allow persons with no
previous felony convictions "to have certain records of
identification destroyed and court records sealed, whereas
convicted felons are denied similar relief." 33 Noting that the
District Court correctly represented the rational-basis review as "a
'relaxed standard' that is 'easily satisfied,"' the Court concluded
that it needed only to find a reasonable rationale for
distinguishing between felons and non-felons sufficient to justify
prohibiting felons from having records of acquittals or
exonerations sealed and destroyed. 34
The state contended that the District Court erred in finding
no permissible basis to support §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1's
felon/non-felon classification. 35  The Supreme Court agreed. 36
Though the Court did not explicitly state the position, the holding
avers that a permissible basis to justify the classification need not
exist, but only a conceivable basis. 37 Outlined in the Attorney
General's brief, the state's interest in effective law enforcement
was accepted by the Court as one conceivable basis for §§ 12-1-12
and 12-1-12.1's felon/non-felon classification. 38 Defendant failed
to negate this rational basis.39
In reaching its decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
cited the affirmed constitutionality of a Louisiana statute similar
to the one at issue. 40 There, reasoning "that arrest records were
'useful in uncovering criminal conduct, aid[ed] in setting bond,
and facilitate[d] the work of correctional institutions,"' 41 the
Louisiana Supreme Court "held that retaining records of felony
arrests served a valid state interest. ' 42 Additionally, the Rhode
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. (citing Mackie v. State, 936 A.2d 588, 597 (R.I. 2007)).
38. See id at 868-69.
39. See id at 868.
40. See id. at n.5. (citing LA.REV.STAT.ANN. § 44:9(E)(1)(a) (2007))
(allowing for the destruction of misdemeanants' arrest records, but
prohibiting the destruction of the arrest records for persons arrested for
felony offenses).
41. See id. at 868-69.
42. See id. at 868. (citing State v. Expunged Record, 881 So.2d 104, 105-
06 (La. 2004)) (quoting State v. Nettles, 375 So.2d 1339, 1342 (La. 1979)).
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Island Supreme Court cited to a recent Supreme Court of Georgia
ruling that "recognized law enforcement as a state interest
sufficient to satisfy the rational-basis review."43  There the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that the legislative interest in
creating a permanent identification record of convicted felons for
law enforcement purposes "was justified 'based on the difference
between the types and seriousness of the offenses as well as the
severity of punishment involved' and the fact that 'convicted felons
are more likely to violate the law than ordinary citizens.' 44
Relating these decisions to §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1, the
Court held that the Rhode Island legislature could rationally
justify the proposition that denying convicted felons the privilege
of having specified court records sealed or destroyed promotes the
state's interest in effective law enforcement. 45 Moreover, the
Court cited its own past ruling in support of the principle that
procedural controls and safeguards that promote effective law
enforcement logically serve an important state interest. 46 Here,
the Court concluded, '"We are satisfied that maintaining records of
felons' arrests aid the state's legitimate interest in law
enforcement, and further, the statutory classification between
felons and non-felons rationally relates to this interest. ' 47
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court reversed the
District Court rulings and remanded. 48 The Supreme Court was
satisfied that the felon/non-felon classifications of §§ 12-1-12 and
12-1-12.1 are rationally related to a legitimate state interest in
law enforcement, and therefore do not violate equal protection
guarantees. 49
COMMENTARY
This decision is most remarkable for an absence of
43. See id. at 869. (citing Quarterman v. State, 651 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga.
2007)).
44. See id. (quoting Quarterman, 651 S.E.2d at 34).
45. See id.
46. See id. (citing State v. Anil, 417 A.2d 1367, 1370 (R.I. 1980))
(concluding that the state must be able to withhold the identity of persons
who provide information of criminal activity so as to protect the "public
interest in effective law enforcement").
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
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remarkableness. In State v. Faria, the Court sets forth no dicta
but progresses by way of a diligence intent upon leaving no sign of
the craftsman behind. Each component of the Court's rationale
and holding is tightened into place within the pre-drilled and
defined narrows of stare decisis.
The Defendant argued that the felon/non-felon classification
leaves felons unfairly exposed to social stigma and economic
disability.50 The state argued that the classification promotes
effective law enforcement because it positions law enforcement
personnel to better identify patterns of criminal activity, which
will aid swifter apprehension of criminals. 51  The neat
counterpoise of such socially-based arguments tempts comment,
but the Court refrains. Instead, the Court conducts a sober
calculation of the judicial standard requiring that the Court defer
to the General Assembly's power to make rational determinations
aimed at solving legitimate social problems. But even here, the
Court is not content to rely upon itself as the sole reference point
for scoring its mark. Following the timeworn adage that it is
better to measure twice and cut once, the Court cites to sister-
state models demonstrating judicial restraint in relation to the
fulfillment of the separation of powers principle. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court cites favorably to Louisiana and Georgia
Supreme Court decisions that illustrate how the minimal-scrutiny
test operates when operating well. It is a measure that implies
great deference to the legislature's prerogative in applying its
discretion; it is a measure that respects the unique position of the
elected legislature as the truest and nearest implementer of the
will of the citizenry in matters that do not implicate the
Constitution.
In Faria, the Court affirms not the propositions implicit in the
General Assembly's enactment of § 12-1-12, but only the General
Assembly's right to enact such a proposition. What this
proposition is remains subject to varying interpretations. What is
not open to interpretation is the straight-line simplicity of the
decision's design. Remarkable for what it does not say and does
not do, in both outcome and method, this case provides a model of
the workmanlike self-restraint that underscores principled,
50. See id. at 866.
51. See id.
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unassuming adherence to the separation of powers doctrine.
CONCLUSION
In State v. Faria, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that
§§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1 survived the Defendant's constitutional
challenge on equal protection grounds. Absent implication of a
suspect class or a fundamental right, the constitutional validity of
a statutory classification is properly analyzed under a minimal-
scrutiny test. The statute will survive the constitutional challenge
so long as the Court can conceive the existence of a rational
relationship flowing from the statutory classification in service of
a legitimate state interest. To successfully advance an equal
protection challenge within this limited context, the moving party
bears the high burden of negating every conceivable rational basis
which might justify the statutory legislation. Here, because 1) a
rational state interest in effective law enforcement animates the
legislation, and 2) the Defendant failed to negate this rationale,
the Rhode Island statute establishing felon/non-felon
classifications that thereby prohibit the former class of individuals
acquitted or exonerated of a subsequent criminal charge from
expunging related criminal records did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Brian Fielding
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Constitutional Law. State v. Tiernan, 941 A.2d 129 (R.I.
2008). The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
guaranteeing an accused the right to confront the witnesses
against them, includes the right to meaningful cross-examination
with regard to potential witness bias. In determining what
constitutes "meaningful" cross-examination, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that cross-examination of a witness with
regard to potential civil suits on the same issue as the criminal
proceeding is allowed as a matter of right for the purpose of
establishing potential bias, under both the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the
Rhode Island Constitution. Thus, a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights are violated when his or her ability to cross-examine the
complaining witness is excessively restricted to the point where it
acts as a denial of the right to explore potential bias of the
witness.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On March 27, 2005, Peter Tiernan and his wife became
involved in an argument with a bicyclist while on their way to
church in their automobile. 1 While driving along a two lane road
they came upon two bicyclists traveling along side each other, one
of which was Kevin Finnegan. 2 The bicyclists were traveling on
the same side of the road and in the same direction as the
Tiernans. 3 As Mr. Tiernan sounded his horn and passed the
bicyclists, an argument erupted between Mr. Tiernan and Mr.
Finnegan, after which Mr. Tiernan stopped his vehicle. 4 With the
two bicyclists positioned alongside the vehicle, Mr. Finnegan on
the driver's side and the other on the passenger side, Mr. Tiernan
and Mr. Finnegan continued their heated conversation. 5
Mr. Finnegan alleges that once the conversation had ended
1. State v. Tiernan, 941 A.2d 129, 130 (R.I. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 131.
5. Id.
410
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and while Mr. Tiernan was driving away, the automobile struck
him causing him to fall to the ground.6 The Tiernans continued
on their way to church and only after parking their vehicle did
they notice a scratch on their driver's side door.7 They decided to
go to the police station.8 However, on their way to the station
they were pulled over by a police officer who questioned them
about the earlier incident. 9
In July 2005, Mr. Tiernan was charged with felony assault in
violation of R.I.G.L. § 11-5-2.10 At his criminal defense trial,
defense counsel attempted to cross-examine Mr. Finnegan with
regard to the nature and extent of the injuries he sustained, and
the prosecution objected on the grounds of relevance. 11 Defense
counsel argued that information about Mr. Finnegan's alleged
injuries was necessary to show witness bias; specifically, that Mr.
Finnegan was biased in that he was motivated to testify in a
certain way because he was seeking to pursue a civil suit against
Mr. Tiernan for monetary damages. 12 Such bias, the defense
argued, was evident by the presence of an attorney retained by
Mr. Finnegan, as well as Mr. Finnegan's notification to
defendant's insurance that he was a potential party to a civil
action.13 Furthermore, information about Mr. Finnegan's injuries
went towards witness credibility given the fact that Mr.
Finnegan's statements about his injuries had changed over time. 14
The trial justice allowed defense counsel to question Mr.
Finnegan with regard to his intention to file a civil suit stemming
from the March 2005 incident. 15 However, the defense counsel
was limited to only one question. 16 The trial justice barred all
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The statute reads, in pertinent part: "Every person who shall
make an assault or battery, or both with a dangerous weapon, or with acid or
other dangerous substance, or by fire, or an assault or battery which results
in serious bodily injury shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than
twenty (20) years." R.I GEN.LAws §11-5-2(a) (2008).
11. Tiernan, 941 A.2d at 131.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 132.
14. Id. at 131.
15. Id. at 132.
16. Id. The trial justice's limitation on defense counsel's cross-
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cross-examination as to "damages for injuries, pain and suffering,
discomfort or any of those things."' 7
A jury found Mr. Tiernan guilty of assaulting Mr. Finnegan
with a deadly weapon to wit, an automobile, and he was sentenced
to four years probation.' 8 Further, the trial court ordered Mr.
Tiernan to have no contact with Mr. Finnegan, attend anger
management classes and make restitution. 19 Mr. Tiernan filed a
timely appeal. 20
HOLDING AND ANALYSIS
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice
excessively limited his cross-examination of Mr. Finnegan by
allowing only one question on the issue of Mr. Finnegan's
potential civil action against the defendant. 21 In doing so, he
argued, the trial justice violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confront the witness against him, by precluding the opportunity
for him to explore the issue of potential bias. 22
Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article 1, Section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution afford
an accused the right to be confronted by the witnesses against him
or her in a criminal proceeding. 23 The courts have continuously
interpreted the right of confrontation broadly; not as simply
examination of Mr. Finnegan resulted in the following exchange:
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Finnegan, is it your intention to seek
monetary damages from Mr. Tiernan for damages that you say you
sustained as a result of this incident on March 27, 2005?"
"[Mr. Finnegan]: Yes."
Id. at 132.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 130.
22. Id. at 132.
23. Id. at 132-133. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him .. "); R.I. CONST. Art. I, § 10 ("In all criminal
prosecutions, accused persons shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with
the witnesses against them. . . ."); see also State v. Pettiway, 657 A.2d 161,
163-64 (R.I. 1995); State v. Freeman, 473 A.2d 1149, 1153-54 (R.I 1984);
State v. Parillo, 480 A.2d 1347, 1356 -59 (R.I 1984); State v. DeBarros, 441
A.2d 549, 551-53 (R.I. 1982).
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limited to physical confrontation but to the right of cross-
examination of an accusing witness. 2 4
Drawing upon its earlier holding in State v. Parillo, the Court
reiterated the importance of the right of cross-examination as "it
is the principal means by which the credibility of the witness and
truthfulness of his [or her] testimony can be tested. ' 25 Not only
does cross-examination go toward witness credibility, but also to
bias, both of which are relevant and significant to the finders of
fact for weighing evidence. 2 6
The Court held that while trial justices possess broad
discretion in placing limitations on cross-examination for the
purpose of preventing harassment, prejudice, confusion or
repetitive testimony, restricting testimony elicited to show bias is
outside the bounds of a trial justice's discretion. 2 7 A justice's
authority to limit testimony with regard to bias applies only after
the defendant has been afforded sufficient cross-examination to
satisfy the Sixth Amendment. 28
In the present case, the defendant was afforded the
opportunity to ask only a very basic question concerning the
witness's potential civil action. 29 The trial justice's restriction to
one question on the issue of whether the witness was
contemplating a civil suit had the effect of foreclosing the
opportunity of the defendant to explore the witness's bias and thus
was a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
confront his accuser. 30
The Court relied heavily on the reasoning put forth in United
States v. Gambler by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, and in other federal and state appellate jurisdictions,
which allow the cross-examination and presentation of evidence of
a witness's pending or contemplated suit against a defendant
arising from the same incident as the criminal charges. 31 Such
24. Tiernan, 941 A.2d at 133 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315
(1974)).
25. Id. (citing Parillo, 480 A.2d at 1357).
26. Id. at 134 (citing 3A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 940 at 775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)).
27. Tiernan, 941 A.2d at 134.
28. Id. (quoting Parillo, 480 A.2d at 1357).
29. Tiernan, 941 A.2d at 135.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 135-136.
2009] 413
414 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:410
evidence, they noted, invariably goes to credibility and potential
bias as it demonstrates a financial interest in the outcome of
criminal proceedings. 32
Applying the Court's prior interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment, the Court held that cross-examination of a witness
with regard to potential civil suits on the same issue as the
criminal proceeding is allowed as a matter of right for the purpose
of establishing potential bias. 33 Limitations on cross-examination
which preclude the exploration of potential bias through the
introduction of evidence of a civil suit is a violation of defendant's
rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Rhode Island
Constitution.34
COMMENTARY
The Sixth Amendment and its counterpart in the Rhode
Island Constitution establish the right of a defendant to be
confronted by the witnesses against him. 35 This has been broadly
interpreted to encompass not merely the right to physical
confrontation, but also the right to question witnesses. 36 Cross-
examination is thus a pivotal tool, and in many instances the only
tool, in a defendant's arsenal by which to scrutinize and explore
the motives and reasons behind a witness's accusation. It
provides the fact-finder with the opportunity to evaluate witness
testimony as a whole and not in a vacuum, allowing the fact-finder
to take in the witness's body language, emotions and mannerisms.
In correctly finding a violation of Tiernan's Sixth Amendment
right, when cross-examination was unnecessarily restricted by
barring exploration of the witness's contemplated civil suit, the
Court has, once again, reinforced the importance of the right to
32. Id. at 136 (citing State v. Whitman, 429 A.2d 203, 205 (Me. 1981)).
33. Tiernan, 941 A.2d at 137.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 132-133. See supra note 22.
36. Id. at 133. See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (the
right to confrontation encompasses not just physical confrontation of the
witness but the opportunity for cross-examination); Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986) (reiterating Davis that Sixth Amendment of United
States Constitution affords opponent both physical confrontation as well as
opportunity for cross-examination).
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cross-examination. 37 Citing to its previous opinions in Parillo and
State v. Anthony, 38 the Court described the role of cross-
examination as a primary means of evaluating witness
creditability, prejudice, bias and ulterior motives and, as such, a
defendant should be allowed "reasonable latitude" in cross-
examination to explore those issues further.39
Thus, the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding allowing
evidence of pending or contemplated civil suits that relate to the
case being tried is directly in line with the Court's protections of a
defendant's right to cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Civil suits have a tendency to illustrate a witness's financial stake
in the outcome of criminal proceedings, which in turn acts as a
strong motive for a witness with a civil action to testify a certain
way in the hope of affecting the outcome of their civil action.
Two possible ways exist by which a civil suit can be influenced
by criminal proceedings. The most obvious is the outcome: if the
defendant is convicted in a criminal proceeding of a charge that is
the basis of a civil proceeding, the conviction essentially secures a
judgment against him in the civil proceeding. The higher burden
of proof required in a criminal case will most certainly carry
significant weight with the fact-finder in a civil proceeding where
the burden of proof is considerably lower. 40
Second, testimony in the criminal proceeding can be used in
the civil proceeding to impeach the witness if testimony in the
criminal case varies from the testimony in the civil case. 41 Thus
the witness's civil action is fundamental to the establishment of
potential bias by the defendant, and limitations on cross-
examination that preclude a defendant from exposing a source of
potential bias are violations of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation.
37. See Tiernan, 941 A.2d at 133 (quoting State v. Parillo, 480 A.2d 1347,
1357 (R.I. 1984)).
38. Parillo, 480 A.2d 1347; State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921 (R.I. 1980).
39. Tiernan, 941 A.2d at 133-134 (citing Parillo, 480 A.2d at 1357;
quoting Anthony, 422 A.2d at 924).
40. Compare R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-1-2.1 (2008) ("[the standard of proof for
a criminal case shall be beyond a reasonable doubt]") with § 9-1-2 (2008)
("[the standard of proof for a civil case shall be by a preponderance of
evidence]").
41. See, e.g., State v. Espinal, 943 A.2d 1052, 1059 (R.I. 2008).
2009]
416 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:410
CONCLUSION
This case established the limits of a trial justice's discretion in
imposing restrictions on the defendant's ability to cross-examine
witnesses regarding pending or potential civil actions that relate
to a criminal proceeding. While a trial justice has discretion to
limit cross-examination, this applies only after there has been
sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.
Thus, under the Sixth Amendment and Rhode Island Constitution
Article I, Section 10, a defendant must be afforded the opportunity
to cross-examine witnesses about related civil suits for the
purpose of exploring bias on the part of the witness.
Christina A. Hoefsmit
Contract Law. National Refrigeration, Inc. et al. v. The
Travelers Indem. Co. of America et al., 947 A.2d 906 (R.I. 2008).
In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a petition
for arbitration under an insurance contract is a legal action for the
purposes of a limitations period. Additionally, the Court held that
the insurer's promise to continue investigation of the insured's
claim did not preclude the insurer from asserting the defense of a
time bar, nor did it toll the limitations period.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This past year the Rhode Island courts likely heard legal
arguments from hundreds of plaintiffs regarding insurance
contracts and their terms and conditions. In one such case, an
insured plaintiff pursued a petition in Superior Court to compel
the insurance company to arbitrate a claim under the contract,
despite the fact that the time limitation clause of the contract had
apparently run its course some six years earlier.I In deciding that
plaintiff had waited too long and that defendant had done nothing
wrong, the Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed with the Superior
Court, and the record of the case was remanded.2
In the summer of 1996, plaintiff National Refrigeration
("National" or "plaintiff") bought an insurance coverage plan from
defendant The Travelers Indemnity Company of America
("Travelers" or "defendant") to insure its building, and any lost
income and expenses arising from damages to the building.3 The
insurance contract included an appraisal clause, to be employed "if
the parties could not reach an agreement" on the value of claims
made under the policy.4 Under these circumstances, the clause
allowed either party to make a written demand for an appraisal,
at which point both parties could select an appraiser, the two of
1. See Nat'l Refrig., Inc. v. The Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., No. KC/05-
0107, 2007 WL 1658609 (R.I. Super. May 22, 2007).
2. See Nat'l Refrig., Inc. v. The Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 947 A.2d
906, 912 (R.I. 2008).
3. See id. at 907-8.
4. Id. at 908.
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which would select "an umpire."' 5  Any difference in the
appraisers' opinions as to the value of the loss would be submitted
to the umpire, and "[a] decision agreed to by any two [would] be
binding."6
The contract also included a limitations clause which stated
that "[njo one may bring a legal action against [defendant] under
this Coverage Form unless: a. There has been full compliance with
all of the terms of this Coverage Form; and b. The action is
brought within 2 years after the date on which the direct physical
loss or damage occurred."' 7 The contract did not define "legal
action."8
On June 22, 1997, plaintiffs Cybermation Machine 9 was
damaged in an electrical storm. 10 Plaintiff made a claim with
defendant for $102,951.54 to cover the replacement cost of a new
Cybermation Machine. 1 1 In 1997 and 1998, defendant paid
plaintiff $20,000.00 and $8,291.91, respectively. 12  Shortly
thereafter, a dispute arose; plaintiff thought that it should be
reimbursed for the full replacement cost of the machine, while
defendant was under the impression that it was only responsible
for the cost to repair the machine. 13
This dispute was not revisited until 2002, when plaintiff
requested that defendant reopen the investigation into their
claim, as well as their loss of business claim.14 Defendant agreed
to do so, and in October denied the claims. 15 In July 2003,
plaintiff again contacted defendant, requesting the higher
replacement cost and reimbursement for the lost business. 16
Plaintiff also informed defendant that they were prepared to
invoke the policy's appraisal clause if they could not come to an
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 910.
9. See id. at 908. A Cybermation Machine is "a machine used for
cutting and fabricating ductwork in air cooling and heating systems."
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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agreement on the amount. 17 Defendant responded to plaintiffs
correspondence in August, again agreeing to investigate the
claims but making it clear that doing so "in no way constituted a
waiver of any defenses or rights to which defendant was entitled
under the policy.' 8 Later that month, defendant notified plaintiff
that the claims were once more denied and "emphasized that it
had informed the plaintiff in October 2002 that no additional
payments would be made for the damage [...] and that the
defendant's position had not changed."'19
Plaintiff again contacted defendant in February 2004,
requesting invocation of the appraisal clause in the contract. 20
Defendant denied this request, reminding plaintiff that the policy
did not allow legal actions to be brought by those who have not
complied with the terms of the contract, nor for those who wait
more than two years from the date of the loss. 21 Plaintiff waited
almost a year to file a petition for arbitration with the Superior
Court "seeking to enforce the contract's appraisal clause."22
* Both parties filed motions for summary judgment prior to the
start of the trial. 23  Defendant argued that it was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because plaintiffs 2005 petition for
arbitration constituted a legal action, barred by the contract's two-
year limitations clause, which began to run in 1997 and expired in
1999.24 The Superior Court judge agreed, granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs, adding that
"the defendant's conduct had not tolled the policy's limitations
clause, as the two-year period had expired long before defendant
agreed to reopen the investigation into plaintiffs claims. ' 25 The
trial court ruled that "the plain language of the contract between
the parties foreclosed plaintiff from thereafter challenging the
insufficiency of the reimbursement it had received for damages
more than seven years earlier."26 Plaintiff filed a timely appeal
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 908-9.
25. Id. at 909.
26. Id.
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with the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 27
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the plaintiff
argued that the trial justice erred in granting defendant's motion
for summary judgment. 28 Specifically, plaintiff argued that the
contract's limitations provision, barring legal action after two
years from the date of injury, did not apply to petitions for
arbitration. 29 Defendant countered by arguing that a petition for
arbitration is, in fact, a legal action, and therefore is barred by the
limitations provision. 30 Plaintiffs alternative argument on appeal
was that defendant should be estopped from being allowed to
assert the limitations clause as a defense because defendant's
conduct led plaintiff to believe that settlement was imminent,
thus preventing plaintiff from filing a petition for arbitration on
time. 31
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the summary
judgment decision of the Superior Court de novo. 32 First in its
analysis, the Court noted that it construes contested insurance
contract clauses in accordance with the general rules of contract
law. 33 This rule of construction, the Court said, dictates that the
parties' rights and liabilities to an insurance contract are to be
"ascertained in accordance with the terms as set forth therein. ' 34
Secondly, the Court set forth its preference for "affording the
terms of the policy their plain and ordinary meaning" and
construing the terms with the "ordinary reader and purchaser in
mind," not with the insurer's subjectively intended meanings. 35
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 910-11. Note that plaintiffs alternative argument of
impossibility is discussed later in this survey.
32. See id. at 909. This standard of review allows the Court to decide
which party was entitled to prevail as a matter of law if it is clear, based on
the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits,
that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
33. See id. (citing Metro Props, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 934 A.2d
204, 208 (R.I. 2007)).
34. Id. (citing Dilorio v. Abington Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 402 A.2d 745, 747
(R.I. 1979)).
35. Id. at 910. Here, the Court shows a willingness to favor the
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Finally, the Court noted that it has already decided in several
cases that limitations periods in insurance contracts are terms to
which the Court will specifically bind the parties. 36
The merits of plaintiffs contract construction argument were
addressed first.3 7 The Court examined the limitations clause
language, which states that "'[n]o one may bring a legal action
against us under this Coverage Form unless: * * * 'b. The action is
brought within 2 years after the date on which the direct physical
loss or damage occurred.' 38 Noting that the contract itself does
not define "legal action," and that the Court has never before
defined it, the Court decided that a petition for arbitration is
squarely within the realm of a legal action. 39
To support this conclusion, the Court turned to Black's Law
Dictionary, which defines "action" in the following way:
An action has been defined to be an ordinary proceeding in a
court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another party for
the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or prevention
of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense. But in some
sense this definition is equally applicable to special proceedings.
More accurately, it is defined to be any judicial proceeding, which,
if conducted to a determination, will result in a judgment or
decree.40
Petitions for arbitration seek enforcement of a contract
provision, which, if the petitioner is successful, result in the
issuance of a court order directing the parties to arbitrate. 41
Therefore, a request for a court to adjudicate a claim is created
when the petition is filed. 4 2  Because plaintiffs petition for
arbitration is a legal action, the Court saw no other option but to
reasonable, perhaps less legally sophisticated, party.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 31 (8th ed. 2004)).
41. See id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-4 (1956)).
42. See id. The Court drew out this logic by relying on the Black's Law
Dictionary definition of "the similar term 'legal act,"' which is "[an action * *
* that creates a legally recognized obligation; an act that binds a person in
some way." (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY at 912). According to this
definition, when the trial justice rules on a petition for arbitration, it is
creating a legally recognized and enforceable obligation, making a petition for
arbitration a legal action. Id. at 910.
20091
422 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:417
hold that, by its terms, the limitations provision barred the
petition, which was brought almost seven years after the electrical
storm damaged the machine. 43
Plaintiffs second argument on appeal was that defendant's
behavior toward plaintiff barred defendant from invoking the
limitations clause as a defense to the petition for arbitration, as
defendant led plaintiff to believe that settlement was imminent. 44
Additionally, plaintiff alleged that the terms of the contract made
it impossible to comply with the two-year time limit to bring
suit.45 The Court disagreed. 4 6
In laying out the law of estoppel, the Court noted several
circumstances where a party would be estopped from invoking the
limitations clause as a defense due to the nature of the settlement
negotiations. 47 These circumstances would have to be exceptional,
and be accompanied by "certain statements or conduct calculated
to lull the claimant into a reasonable belief that his claim will be
settled without a suit."' 48 Regardless of these guidelines, however,
the Court had once before stated that negotiation settlements,
without more, cannot serve as a valid basis for estoppel. 49
On the facts before the Court, however, none of these
exceptional circumstances were present.50 When, in 1998,
defendant allowed a reopening of the claim, it also rejected
plaintiffs claim for more damages. 51  After this took place,
plaintiff could have filed the petition for arbitration, which it had
43. See id.
44. See id. at 910-11.
45. See id. at 911.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Id. (citing McAdam v. Grzelczyk, 911 A.2d 255, 259 (R.I. 2006)).
49. See id. There are two circumstances in Rhode Island jurisprudence
that could, however, serve as a basis for estoppel, preventing the invocation
of a limitations clause. First, if the insurance company says or does anything
that assures the claimant of the imminence of settlement, and the claimant
does not file on time because of the assurance, the insurance company is
estopped from invoking the limitations clause when the claimant does file
suit. Secondly, if the insurance company has "intentionally continued and
prolonged the negotiations in order to cause the claimant to let the limitation
period pass without commencing suit," the insurer is estopped from invoking
the defense. Id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
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until June 1999 to do, in light of the two-year limitations clause.52
However, plaintiff waited until 2002 to contact defendant and ask
again for a reopening of the claim, well after the two-year period
had run.53
The Court addressed the argument that the letters from
defendant agreeing to reopen the investigation constituted an
attempt to improperly draw out the negotiations in an effort to
prevent plaintiff from filing on time.54 The Court squarely
disagreed with this notion, noting that these agreements 55 to
continue the investigation took place well after the two-year limit
had run, in 2002 and 2003.56
To address plaintiffs allegation of impossibility of
performance within the limitations period, the Court looked to
plaintiffs argument that the Court was bound by its holding in an
earlier case which held that a one-year limitations period had
tolled. 57 Plaintiffs reasoning in that case was that, by the
contract's terms, it would be impossible to act "diligently and in
good faith to comply with the provisions of the policy with
sufficient dispatch to enable him to bring suit within twelve
months" after the loss.58 However, the insurance contract in the
present case, the Court held, was not impossible to carry out, nor
was it impossible to file within two-years after the electrical
storm. 59
To conclude, the Court emphasized the policy rationale behind
its decision to deny plaintiff relief, citing the need for finality. 60
52. See id.
53. Id. at 912.
54. Id. at 911.
55. The Court noted also that letters of this kind, agreeing to reopen
investigations, do not constitute improper prolonging of negotiations, per its
decision in Hay v. Pawtucket Mutual Ins. Co., 824 A.2d 458, 460-61 (R.I.
2003).
56. See id. Defendant at no time led plaintiff to believe that settlement
was imminent, before or after the two-year limitations period had passed, so
there was no blame to be placed on defendant for plaintiffs almost eight-year
late filing.
57. See Messler v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co., 108 A. 832 (1920).
58. Nat'l Refrig., Inc. v. The Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 947 A.2d 906,
911-12 (R.I. 2008) (citing Messler, 108 A. 832, 834 (1920)).
59. See id. at 912. Plaintiff merely failed to act diligently upon
defendant's denial in 1997, after which plaintiff could have requested an
appraisal, and if that too had been denied, it could have filed the petition.
60. See id. (citing Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941
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Strict enforcement of the limitations periods in contracts serves
the best interest of the individuals who seek legal redress, and
also those of society and the courts, who have a special interest in
'finality-for a closing of the books."'61
The Court held that the Superior Court judge did not err in
granting the defendant summary judgment. 62 The results of the
case turned on the fact that plaintiff was too late to file its petition
for arbitration under the contract's terms, and that defendant did
nothing to prevent the contract's time limitation from running. 63
The decision of the lower court was affirmed.64
COMMENTARY
This decision is a fine example of a court attempting to do
everything it can within its power to help out the proverbial little
guy in a contractual situation. National Refrigeration, 65 the
plaintiff, had gone to The Travelers Indemnity Company of
America, 66 the defendant, to insure its building and business.
Travelers enters into similar transactions every day, but such a
transaction was a relatively rare occurrence for National.
Insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion, which are
typically construed against the party who drafts them. 67 This is
how the Rhode Island courts have dealt with them, as noted by
the Court in this decision. 68 Construing contracts against the
A.2d 174, 181 (R.I. 2008)). In Ryan, the Court "recognized that [...] statutes
of limitation 'are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."' Id.
61. Ryan, 941 A.2d at 181.
62. See Nat'l Refrigeration, 947 A.2d at 912.
63. See id.
64. See id. The record was remanded to the Superior Court.
65. According to National Refrigeration's website page entitled "About Us
- Who We Are," the company employs over 100 people in several states,
grossing over $20 million a year. See National Refrigeration, Who We Are,
http://www.nhvac.com/whoweare.htm (last visited October 29, 2008).
66. According to the Travelers' website "Travelers at a Glance" page, the
insurance company employs over 33,000 people and maintains about $115
billion in assets. See Travelers Insurance, Travelers at a Glance,
http://www.travelers.comIiwcm/trv/docs /factsheet.pdf (last visited October
29, 2008).
67. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §206
(1981).
68. See Nat'l Refrigeration, 947 A.2d at 910.
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insurance company forces the insurance company to swallow any
ambiguities, driving them to be the more responsible and careful
party in the transaction.
The Court's theory seems to be that plaintiffs like National
Refrigeration are bound to misread policies, infer erroneous lay
meanings from legal wording, or not realize their rights and/or
obligations under the contract. On the other hand, insurance
companies like Travelers employ hundreds of attorneys devoted to
writing and enforcing the policies. Thus, the Court allows more
plaintiff missteps and gives plaintiffs a wide berth in construing
these contracts. Under these circumstances, it seems next to
impossible for a reasonable plaintiff, acting diligently and in good
faith, to lose in Rhode Island courts on an insurance contract
issue.
National, unfortunately, figured out how to lose. Their
problem with punctuality apparently struck a chord with the
Court. 6 9  National lost because they "sat on [their] right to
commence" the petition for arbitration for almost eight years. 7 0 In
contracts with limitations clauses, as in life, the early bird gets
the worm; National was six years late and $74,659.63 short.
CONCLUSION
For the purposes of insurance contracts, petitions for
arbitration are considered legal actions, which may be barred by
time limits. Under Rhode Island law, defendant insurance
companies, in agreeing to investigate claims they have already
denied and deny again, are not acting improperly with the
purpose of delaying the insured's timely filing of a legal action per
the policy. While the state's jurisprudence may favor plaintiff
insurance claimants generally, plaintiffs may not disregard
strictly construed and socially beneficial time limitations.
Kelly E. Noble
69. See id. at 912.
70. Id.
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Criminal Law/Family Law. State v. Greenberg, et al., 951
A.2d 481 (R.I. 2008). The July 1, 2007 amendment to Rhode
Island General Laws 1956 section 14-1-6, which was in existence
for four months prior to being repealed, purported to transfer
jurisdiction over seventeen-year-olds who had committed offenses
that would otherwise be considered a felony or misdemeanor had
an adult committed them, from Family Court to Superior and
District Court. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the
amendment did not waive jurisdiction over these individuals and
that defendants who had been charged with felonies or
misdemeanors under this amended law were guaranteed a
hearing to determine if a waiver of jurisdiction from the Family
Court was appropriate. The Court noted that because only two
defendants were before it, it would not provide a decision for all
juveniles who were affected by the amendment. It did however
state that it would provide a framework to be applied to pending
and adjudicated cases, and asked that the Public Defender and
state attempt to resolve those cases based on the Court's holding.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On July 1, 2007, the Rhode Island General Assembly
amended General Law 1956 §14-1-6 in order to remove
jurisdiction from Family Court over defendants who allegedly
committed certain criminal offenses when they were seventeen
years old. 1  When the crime committed would have been
considered a felony had an adult committed it, jurisdiction was
given to the Superior Court, while if the crime would be
considered a misdemeanor had an adult committed it, jurisdiction
was conferred upon the District Court.2 Almost immediately after
1. State v. Greenberg, 951 A.2d 481, 485-86 (R.I. 2008).
2. Id. Article 22 of House Bill 2007-H 5300, Substitute A, entitled "An
Act Making Appropriations For the Support of the State for the Fiscal Year
Ending June 30, 2008" amended this law. The governor vetoed the bill, also
known as the "Budget Bill." However, the House of Representatives overrode
the veto and the Senate sustained the override. Though effective on June 21,
2007, all parties involved in this matter believed it became effective July 1,
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the amendment went into effect, the Senate tried to "undo" it by
passing the Senate Bill 2007-S1141 which would restore
jurisdiction over these defendants to the Family Court. 3 However,
because the House of Representatives had already recessed before
it could vote on the Senate's measure, it was not until four months
later, on November 8, 2007, that the Assembly was able to pass an
amendment which placed jurisdiction over seventeen-year-olds
back in Family Court. 4 During the four months when seventeen-
year-olds were treated as adult offenders, known as the "gap
period," a number of juveniles were arrested and charged with
criminal offenses, including the defendants here. 5
Defendants Ryan Greenberg (Greenberg) and Harold Chartier
(Chartier) were seventeen years old at the time of their alleged
offenses, and were among the juveniles referred to as the "gap
kids" because they were arrested between the July and November
amendments. 6 Greenberg was arrested and charged with murder
in the second degree, as well as additional felony and
misdemeanor offenses in the Superior Court. 7  Greenberg
challenged the July and November amendments on constitutional
grounds. 8
While the trial court held that the legislation did not violate
the state or federal constitutions, it ruled that the Family Court
had retained original jurisdiction over the defendant and similarly
situated juveniles. 9  The Superior Court held that the July
Amendment had not modified certain jurisdictional prerequisites,
specifically those that required the state to file a petition for a
waiver of jurisdiction and that the Family Court waive its
2007, so the court referred to the amendment as the "July amendment." Id. at
n.4-5.
3. Id. at 487.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 488.
6. Id. at 484. (The defendants were involved in completely separate
incidents and had separate trials. Their cases were consolidated at the
Supreme Court level because they were both charged during the "gap period,"
but this is the only shared aspect of their cases. Any time this survey refers
to the Superior Court opinion, this is regarding Greenberg. Any time the
survey mentions the District Court opinion, it is regarding Chartier.)
7. Id. at 485.
8. Id. at 488.
9. Id.
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jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. 10 The judge ordered that any
criminal informations and complaints pending in Superior Court
be dismissed, but that any indictments, including the indictment
against Greenberg, be held in abeyance pending waiver hearings
in Family Court.11 Both Greenberg and the state sought review of
this decision on petition for certiorari and cross-petition for
certiorari, respectively. 12  The case ultimately came to the
Supreme Court on appeal. 13
Defendant Chartier, separately, was arrested and charged
with simple assault, a misdemeanor, in District Court. 14 The
District Court judge ordered all pending misdemeanor complaints
that were filed against any juvenile during the relevant period,
including the defendant's, to be transferred to Family Court. 15
The judge also declared that he would grant, on an individual
basis, motions to transfer to Family Court any adjudicated
misdemeanor case that had been filed during the gap period in
which the sentence had not been completed. 16 Chartier and the
state both sought review of the decision. 17  Greenberg and
Chartier's cases were consolidated for decision by the Supreme
Court. 18
10. Id. (A petition for waiver is required under title 14 of the General
Laws, entitled "Delinquent and Dependent Children.")
11. Id. The Superior Court decision declared that the decision applied to
all defendants aged seventeen during the gap period. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court rejected that portion of the decision, holding that it would not
address the status of any defendant who was not appropriately before the
Court. Id. at 484, n.3
12. Id. at 484.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 488.
16. Id. at 488-89. The Court noted that the District Court judge seemed
to base this decision on §14-1-28, which requires the immediate transfer of
any case to Family Court in which it is ascertained that the accused was
under the age of eighteen at the time of the alleged offense. The District
Court judge also grounded his decision on disparate treatment of juvenile
offenders, finding that different prosecutions and punishments for juveniles
based on when they were arrested created an impermissible classification.
As with the Superior Court case, the Supreme Court held that those
unnamed individuals were not before the Court and it would only rule on
those defendants who were properly before the Court. Id. at 484, n.2
17. Id. at 484.
18. Id.
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Standard of Review
When the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews a case on
certiorari, it is limited to an examination of "the record to
determine if an error of law has been committed."' 19 It does not
weigh the evidence; rather it conducts its review only to examine
questions of law raised in the petition.20 When reviewing an
appeal based on an alleged error of the law, the Court uses a de
novo standard to determine if the trial justice committed legal
error.
21
It also uses a de novo standard when reviewing questions of
statutory interpretation. 22 The Court held that it is the final
arbiter in questions of legislative construction and it is the Court's
responsibility to interpret an enactment and effectuate the
Legislature's intent, and to attribute to the enactment the
meaning most consistent with its policies or obvious purposes. 23
"If the language is clear on its face, then the plain meaning of the
statute must be given effect, and this Court should not look
elsewhere to discern the legislative intent. '24 Further, when the
statute is unambiguous, the Court must apply the statute as
written.25
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Family Court
Rhode Island's Family Court, created by statute, is a court of
limited authority, with its authority restricted to those powers
that the legislature confers upon it.26 Because the Family Court's
"authority over the welfare of children is among the court's core
functions," the Supreme Court has "consistently, and jealously,"
protected the Family Court as a "sanctuary and critical refuge for
19. Id. at 489 (citing Gaumond v. Trinity Repertory Co., 909 A.2d 512,
516 (R.I. 2006)).
20. Id. (citing Malachowski v. State, 877 A.2d 649, 653 (R.I. 2005)).
21. Id. (citing State v. Jennings, 944 A.2d 171, 173 (R.I. 2008)).
22. Id. at 489 (citing Henderson v. Henderson, 818 A.2d 669, 673 (R.I.
2003)).
23. Id. (citing Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I. 1987)).
24. Id. (quoting Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Clark, 714 A.2d 1172, 1177 (R.I.
1998).
25. Id. (citing State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251, 253 (R.I. 1998)).
26. Id. at 490.
20091
430 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:426
the state's troubled children."27 When a juvenile comes before the
Family Court for committing a crime that would otherwise be
considered a felony or misdemeanor, he or she gets the benefit of
receiving a rehabilitative, rather than retributive, detention. 28
Because the Family Court's objective of rehabilitation is so
important, and because that court is the child's last barrier from
the adult justice system, the decision to waive jurisdiction over a
defendant should not be taken lightly.29
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized that the
Family Court has exclusive personal jurisdiction over juveniles
appearing before it on delinquency petitions, and that the only
way Superior and District Courts are authorized to hear such
cases is through a jurisdiction waiver. 30 Such a waiver must be
adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. 31 The July amendment did
not waive such jurisdiction; it merely expanded the instances in
which the Family Court was mandated to waive its jurisdiction,
assuming the waiver was in accordance with Chapter 1 of title
14.32 The Court held that the defendants here should have been
afforded probable-cause hearings and findings by the hearing
justice that waiver of jurisdiction was appropriate and consistent
with the statute. 33
Waiver of Jurisdiction
A juvenile offender might be subject to the Family Court's
waiver of personal jurisdiction in several kinds of situations. 34
The Attorney General may motion the Family Court to waive
27. Id.
28. Id. at 490-91.
29. Id. at 491. The Court explains the long-lasting consequences of a
waiver of jurisdiction: "the child no longer will remain at the Rhode Island
Training School, and he or she may face imprisonment in a high-security
facility, alongside the state's most hardened felons. For these reasons, the
Family Court's waiver of jurisdiction over a child accused of conduct that
would be criminal if committed by an adult should be critically examined and
cautiously decided."
30. Id. Section 14-1-40(a) of title 14 of General Laws states that Superior
Court has general jurisdiction but it lacks personal jurisdiction over juveniles
accused of committing criminal conduct.
31. Id.
32. Id at 491-92.
33. Id. at 492.
34. Id. at 492-93
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jurisdiction over a juvenile based on either the age of the juvenile
or the gravity of the alleged offense. 35 Specifically, if the juvenile
is accused of an offense that is punishable by life imprisonment if
committed by an adult, or is sixteen years old or older when
charged with an offense that would be considered a felony if
committed by an adult, the Family Court "shall" conduct a hearing
to determine whether or not it should waive jurisdiction. 36
There is no statute or rule of waiver dealing with juvenile
conduct that would be considered a misdemeanor if an adult
committed it. 37 The Court affirmed the portion of the District
Court order that directed the transfer of Chartier's case to Family
Court. 38 Further, with respect to any District Court case that was
pending where a juvenile was charged with misdemeanor conduct,
the Court held that the case shall be transferred to Family Court
and adjudicated as a wayward petition.39
Felony Cases
The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that the Family
Court did not conduct a waiver hearing for Greenberg and the fact
that the indictment was not filed prior to the November
amendment becoming law controlled the results in the case, based
on the Court's recent holding in State v. Jennings.40 In Jennings,
the Court dealt with the question of whether the Superior Court
or the Family Court had jurisdiction over violations of a law where
a jurisdictional statute was amended, subsequent to the
defendant's arrest but before the Attorney General filed a criminal
information in the Family Court. 41  After the statute was
amended and the Family Court was divested of jurisdiction, the
defendant's case was removed to Superior Court, which the state
appealed, arguing that the Family Court retained jurisdiction over
the defendant because it was pending there when the statute was
amended. 42 There, the Court held that because the state had
35. Id. at 493.
36. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAws §§14-1-7(a), 14-1-7(b) (2007)).
37. Id. at 493.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 493-94 (citing State v. Jennings, 944 A.2d 171, 173 (R.I. 2008)).
41. Id. at 494.
42. Id.
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failed to file a criminal information in Family Court before the
effective date of the amendment, the case was not pending in
Family Court and jurisdiction had been vested in Superior
Court. 43 The Court held that its resolution in Jennings did not
turn on a retroactive versus prospective application of the
legislative enactment, but rather it held that because a
prosecution for a crime must be preceded by a formal accusation, 44
the operative filing in that case was a charge by information. 45 A
felony complaint alone is insufficient. 46
The Court noted that while Greenberg was the only defendant
properly before it who had been charged with a felony, there were
numerous seventeen-year-old offenders who had been arrested
and were prosecuted in the Superior Court pursuant to the July
amendment. 47 It stated that because the Family Court was not
divested of its jurisdiction by the July amendment, such
individuals were entitled to a hearing in Family Court and a
judicial determination of whether a waiver of the Family Court's
jurisdiction over them is appropriate. 48
The Court further noted that Greenberg's indictment was
being held in abeyance as opposed to being dismissed because
there was no legal distinction between an indictment and a
criminal information. 49 Greenberg argued before the Court that
under the common-law rule of abatement, when a penal statute is
repealed without a savings clause, "all criminal proceedings
instituted thereunder abate," and therefore that his indictment
should be abated.50 The Court found, however, that because it
was dealing with a jurisdictional amendment, not a penal
statement amendment, abatement was not the answer: "when a
trial justice determines that original subject-matter jurisdiction
over an offense resides in another court within our unified court
system, he or she shall order the case transferred to that Court."'51
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 495
51. Id at 495-96. (In State v. Boucher, 468 A.2d 1227 (R.I. 1983), the
defendants were charged with the felony of habitual cruelty to a child, which
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The Court held that State v. Mastracchio,52 where a seventeen-
year-old defendant was convicted of homicide in Superior Court,
was controlling. 53  There, the Court refused to vacate the
defendant's conviction and remanded the case to Superior Court
with directions to determine whether the Family Court would
have waived jurisdiction over the defendant because Superior
Court is a court of general jurisdiction over felonies. 54
Accordingly, it must be determined whether the Family Court
would have waived jurisdiction over Greenberg rather than
having his case be dismissed. 55
Adjudicated Cases
In the District Court decision, the trial judge stated that he
would entertain and grant a motion to transfer to the Family
Court any adjudicated case of a defendant who was sentenced in
the adult penal system under the July amendment of the statute if
the sentence or probationary term had not been completed. 56 The
Court held that this was error. 57 It held that cases where final
judgments were entered cannot be subject to transfer to another
court, unless a conviction is vacated. 58
The Court also addressed the portion of the November
amendment regarding the manner in which court records were to
was transferred to Family Court, though the trial court refused to transfer
the accompanying misdemeanor counts to District Court. The Supreme
Court vacated the defendants' convictions and ordered that the case be
transferred to District Court because after the felony charge was transferred
to Family Court, the Superior Court no longer retained jurisdiction over the
misdemeanors; instead the District Court had jurisdiction over the case. In
State v. Sickles, 470 A.2d 220 (R.I. 1984), the defendant was convicted of the
misdemeanor offense of willful and malicious injury to property in Superior
Court. The Supreme Court vacated the conviction and ordered that the case
be transferred to District Court, which had original jurisdiction over
misdemeanor offenses. In In Re Edward, 441, A.2d 543 (R.I. 1982), the Court
held that the Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
defendant and because no other court had jurisdiction over a petition for
delinquency, the case had to be dismissed.)
52. Id. (citing State v. Mastracchio, 546 A.2d 165, 168 (R.I. 1988)).
53. Id. at 496. (citing Mastracchio, 546 A.2d at 168.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 496.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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be maintained for cases prosecuted under the July amendment
where final judgments had been entered. 59 The legislature stated
that all court records from such cases shall be sealed, including
sentence, probation and parole records. 60 The Court held that the
legislature overstepped its powers and did not have the authority
to exercise legislation like this that purports to affect court
judgments. 61
Finally, the Court held that because no cases were brought on
behalf of any person whose case was adjudicated, those
adjudicated cases were not actually before the Court. 62 The
remedy of postconviction relief is available to such defendants. 63
COMMENTARY
The July and November amendments to General Laws 1956
section 14-1-6 were widely publicized legislation that affected
many people throughout Rhode Island. It is apparent that both of
the trial court justices in this case, Judge Daniel A. Procaccini of
the Superior Court and Chief Judge Albert E. DeRobbio of the
District Court, tried to render decisions that would affect all
individuals who had been charged with misdemeanors or felonies
under the short-lived statute. While Judge Procaccini laid down
an opinion that would affect all pending cases, Judge DeRobbio
went even further and stated that he would grant transfers to
Family Courts in cases where final judgment had already been
entered.
The Court made a point to explicitly state that its decision
only applied to the two named defendants who were properly
before the Court. However, the Court did appreciate the fact that
these defendants were not the only individuals affected and stated
that it would provide a framework that could be applied to felony
and misdemeanor cases involving other "gap kid" individuals.64
The Court asked the Public Defender and the state to attempt to
resolve the other cases by stipulation and agree on those that may
59. Id.
60. Id. at 497 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-6.1(a)(ii) (2007)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 490.
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be adjudicated in the Family Court. 65 Further, with respect to
any case that the Attorney General files a motion pursuant to
chapter 1 title 14, the Court stated that a waiver hearing shall be
scheduled in the Family Court as soon as is practicable. 66
The Court's ruling was well received by the defendants and
similarly situated juveniles. John J. Hardiman, the chief public
defender said that he was "very pleased" with the Court's ruling
because it "puts the cases back where they belong in Family Court
and it gives [seventeen-year-old defendants] the same due process
that any other child would have received prior to enactment of the
initial legislation."67 Attorney General Patrick C. Lynch stated
that the decision was "unsettling" for the victims of felony
offenses, but seemed to suggest that the problem lay with the
legislature for making an uninformed legislative decision and not
the Court's ruling on the matter. 68
CONCLUSION
As stated above, the Court affirmed in part and vacated in
part the trial court decisions. Regarding Defendant Greenberg,
the decision that held his Superior Court indictment in abeyance
pending a Family Court waiver was affirmed. The Court declined
to address or issue an opinion as to the remainder of the Superior
Court case and order. 69 Regarding Defendant Chartier, the Court
affirmed the portion of the District Court's decision and order that
transferred the case against the defendant to Family Court but
vacated the portion which stated that the District Court would
address any case in which final judgment has been entered. 70 The
cases were remanded to Superior and District Court,
respectively. 71
Jessica Schachter
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Edward Fitzpatrick, 'Gap Kids' fate to be decided in Family Court,
The Providence Journal, July 11, 2008 at 1.
68. Id.
69. State v. Greenberg, 951 A.2d 481, 497 (R.I. 2008).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Criminal Law. State v. McManus, 941 A.2d 222 (R.I. 2008).
A defendant convicted of first-degree murder may be sentenced to
life in prison without the possibility of parole regardless of
whether the crime is classified as among the most heinous, so long
as the Court finds that aggravated battery or other aggravating
factors occurred during the killing. Also, a defendant is not
entitled to have a prosecutor removed from the case because the
defendant threatened the prosecutor's life. Further, a defendant
is not entitled to a new trial when the state failed to provide
evidence not material to the defense, the state did not have intent
to deceive, and the defendant knew or should have known all of
the evidence in question. Finally, a mistrial is not clearly
warranted when a prosecutor asks a witness a question that is so
inappropriate as to prejudice the jury.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
A Washington County jury convicted Joseph McManus Jr. of
first-degree murder for killing his wife Kelly and sentenced him to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 1 The facts of
the case detail an extremely violent relationship highlighted by
numerous threats of bodily harm and death on the part of the
defendant toward his wife. 2 However, central to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's opinion are the moments prior to death - found
by the jury to have constituted aggravated battery and torture. 3
These findings formed the basis of the sentence which was the
main issue on appeal, and which prompted one dissenting vote. 4
McManus and Kelly had a longstanding relationship,
producing three children, but a short marriage. 5 Witnesses
1. State v. McManus, 941 A.2d 222, 225 (R.I. 2008).
2. See id. at 225-226.
3. See id. at 226. The torture issue was ultimately not reached on
appeal. Id. at 236.
4. See id. at 228. Appellant appeared pro se and all of his personal
arguments were flatly rejected by the Court. The final issue - whether his
crime deserved life without parole - was argued by his standby appellate
counsel. See id.
5. Id. at 225.
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testified to the violent tendencies of the defendant against his
wife. 6 Some of the threats and violence that witnesses testified to
stemmed from the defendant's suspicions that Kelly was having
an affair. 7 Eventually, Kelly forced the defendant to leave the
family's home.8 However, McManus returned, simultaneously
pleading for Kelly to take him back and threatening her life if she
did not.9 After she refused to admit him back, the defendant
made his way into the house and stabbed her numerous times. 10
Throughout the event, all of the McManus children were inside or
immediately outside of the home.11 Indeed, the eldest son at one
point sought to help his mother by striking his father with a coffee
table. 12
The assistance was too late; Joseph McManus had stabbed
Kelly six times, puncturing her heart and lungs. 13 The McManus
children called emergency services for help, but Kelly ceased
breathing and was later pronounced dead. 14 In the meantime,
police found McManus nearby. 15 He had cuts on his wrists and
was repeating, "I'm sorry."16
While McManus was awaiting trial in jail, a confidential
informant alerted prosecutors that McManus was attempting to
solicit the murder of Kelly's lover, Keith Knapton, as well as the
Attorney General and a prosecutor in the case. 17 McManus was
later charged with solicitation of murder. 18
McManus was convicted of first-degree murder for the death
of his wife. 19 The jury sentenced him to life in prison without the
6. Id.
7. Id. McManus' suspicions seemed to be correct. The alleged lover,
Keith Knapton, admitted to a sexual relationship with Kelly in a written
statement. See id. at 228.
8. Id. at 226.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 224. McManus cut the home's telephone line, making it all the
more difficult for the children to get help for their mother. Id.
14. Id. at 226-27.
15. Id. at 227.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 228.
18. Id. at 228-29.
19. Id. McManus mounted a diminished capacity defense at trial, but did
not appeal any issues specifically relating to this defense. See id. at 225.
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possibility of parole. 20 McManus appealed this conviction. 21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed four arguments,
which McManus brought pro se, as well as one contention of error
argued by his standby appellate counsel. 22 The Court
unanimously rejected the four pro se arguments. However, on the
fifth issue, the majority affirmed, but Justice Flaherty
dissented. 23
Discovery
First, McManus argued that prosecutors in his first case
withheld a transcript of a police interview of Kelly's lover, Keith
Knapton, taken during McManus' second case. 24 He claimed that
withholding this piece of evidence violated Rule 16 of the Rhode
Island Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Due Process
Clause under Brady v. Maryland,25 and that he was thus entitled
to a new trial. 26
The Court explained that the purpose of both Rule 16 and
Brady is to provide the defendant with a fair trial and to reduce
the element of surprise at trial.27 If a defendant requests that the
state provide information favorable to the defendant's case, then
the state is required to comply so long as the evidence sought is
material. 28 A defendant's due process rights may also be violated
if the prosecutor withholds information in bad faith, regardless of
the materiality of the evidence withheld. 29 The Court stated that
the standard for overturning a trial court's denial of a new trial,
based on a Rule 16 or Brady violation was clear error. 30
Here, the trial court had previously denied the new trial
20. Id.
21. Id. at 225.
22. Id. at 228.
23. Id. at 238.
24. Id at 228. Although McManus sought this particular transcript, he
was in possession of an earlier statement made by Knapton. Id.
25. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
26. State v. McManus, 941 A.2d 222, 229 (R.I. 2008).
27. Id.
28. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
29. Id.
30. McManus, 931 A.2d at 229.
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motion based on the nondisclosure claim and thus the Supreme
Court could only overturn the decision if the trial court committed
clear error. 31 The Supreme Court found that the state had not
deliberately withheld the transcript from McManus, partly
because McManus could not show that the prosecutor had the
transcript during the first case or that the prosecutor had
provided similar information which would tend to show an intent
to keep the evidence secret. 32 Secondly, the evidence was not
material because it did not obviously bear on McManus' claim of
diminished capacity.33 Also, the Court stated that the defendant
knew or should have known about the facts contained in the
withheld evidence. 34  Thus, the Supreme Court held that
McManus was not entitled to a new trial.35
Disqualification of the Prosecutor
Second, McManus argued that a prosecutor in his first case
should have been disqualified. 36 Although the Court stated that
the precise issue on appeal was of first impression, it made short
work of McManus's argument. 37
McManus claimed that the disqualification was necessary
because he was alleged to have solicited a contract on the
prosecutor's life. 38  The Court rejected this claim, citing an
Indiana case 39 with facts "strikingly similar" to McManus's case,
reasoning that allowing the defendant to prevail would encourage
criminal defendants in general to threaten their opponents in
31. Id. at 229.
32. Id. at 231.
33. Id.
34. Id. The trial justice concluded that the transcript only included
information such as the defendant's and Knapton's relationships with Kelly
and the defendant's state of mind prior the murder. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 231. The Court logically pointed out that, without proof that
the prosecutor had the disputed evidence at the time the defendant alleges it
was withheld, any attempt to claim the transcript was withheld would be
fruitless. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 228.
39. Kindred v. State, 521 N.E.2d 320, 327 (Ind. 1988) (defendant not
entitled to special prosecutor after he was alleged to have threatened to kill
the prosecutor; no conflict of interest present).
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order to gain an advantage. 40
Conflict of Interest
Third, McManus claimed a conflict of interest existed between
his trial counsel and the state, amounting to a violation of his
right to effective counsel. 41 However, the Court did not address
the substance of the claim because it held that McManus should
have argued the point in a post-conviction hearing or at trial. 42
Without either of these events, the Supreme Court was unable to
review the claim for error because the claim was not ripe. 43
Inappropriate Question by Prosecution
Fourth, McManus claimed that the trial justice committed
error by not ordering a mistrial after the prosecutor asked an
inappropriate question on redirect examination of a testifying
officer. 44 The prosecutor asked the officer: "Do you know of any
law in the State of Rhode Island that says if you have blood
alcohol level of .10, you can't go out and kill somebody?" 45 The
question was asked in response to inquiries on direct and cross-
examination regarding the presence of alcohol and drugs in
McManus' blood immediately after his wife's murder.46 McManus
objected and the trial justice ordered that the question be
stricken. 47 However, the trial justice found the comment "not so
inappropriate or prejudicial to taint the jury."' 48
On review, the Supreme Court analyzed the issue under the
clearly erroneous standard. 49 Upon reviewing the record, the
Court held that the question was inappropriate, but not so much
so that it warranted a mistrial. 50
40. State v. McManus, 941 A.2d 222, 232 (R.I. 2008).
41. Id. at 233.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 234.
48. Id. at 233.
49. Id. at 234.
50. Id.
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Life Imprisonment Without Possibility of Parole
The central challenge posed by the McManus defense was
that the facts underlying the crime of first-degree murder were
not such to support a sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole.51 The majority disagreed, holding that the
jury was reasonable in finding the murder involved an aggravated
battery and that finding was sufficient to warrant the
punishment. 52
The Court explained that the rule for upholding a jury
decision to sentence a criminal defendant to life without parole
was governed by the presence of certain aggravating factors -
specifically, the murder must have included facts supporting
aggravated battery, torture or other criminal acts. 53 However, the
Supreme Court's de novo review is broader than just affirming the
presence of an aggravating factor. 54 The Court seeks instead to
"determine the appropriateness" of the sentence. 55 Moreover, the
Court will look at mitigating factors. 56
In this case, the Court found several aggravating factors.
First, the Court noted that the defendant had threatened his wife
for weeks leading up to her death.57 Also, the facts showed that
McManus committed the murder in the presence of the couple's
children. 58
Most crucial, however, was the Court's analysis of the term
aggravated battery itself, which to the Court meant inflicting
injury beyond that which is necessary to kill or render the victim
helpless. 59 In this case, the Court determined that McManus'
continuous stabbing constituted aggravated battery because it was
more force than necessary to kill Kelly or render her unable to
51. See id.
52. Id. Because the majority determined the aggravated battery element
was properly found by the jury, the Court did not examine whether the
murder involved torture, which the jury also found. Id. at 236.
53. See id. at 234. The Court notes that there are seven aggravating
factors that may make a murder eligible for life without possibility of parole.
See id.
54. See id. at 235.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 236.
58. Id.
59. See id. (citing State v.. Travis, 568 A.2d 316, 323 (R.I. 1990)).
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resist him. 60
The defendant's primary argument against the imposition of
life without parole was that death by stabbing, without more,
should fall below the level of the particularly heinous crimes
reserved for the state's ultimate punishment. 61 Here, the Court
divided. The majority dismissed the argument by reasoning that
just because other more heinous crimes have been committed does
not necessarily preclude McManus's crime, even if less heinous,
from meeting the same fate.62
Justice Flaherty filed a brief dissenting opinion on this
issue. 63 He stated that there was a narrow class of cases to which
life without parole is an available punishment. 64 This case,
Flaherty reasoned, was simply not within that group. 65 To get the
ultimate punishment, one must commit a murder more brutal
than McManus' crime. 66
COMMENTARY
The majority saw the sentence of life without parole as one
available whenever one or more of the various factors are found as
noted above. 67 The dissent, on the other hand, saw the factors
above as crucial, but would have still limited the sentence to only
those murder convictions which had substantively more brutal
underlying facts. 68
Further, although it is apparent the two sides disagreed as to
the legal requirements for the state's harshest sentence, it is also
apparent that the majority and dissent disagreed as to the nature
of this particular crime. The majority went to great pains to
deplore the stabbing.69 On the other hand, although the dissent
did not explicitly downplay the conduct of the defendant, it is clear
60. Id.
61. See id. at 237.
62. Id. at 237-238.
63. Id. at 238 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 239.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 237.
68. See id. at 239 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
69. See id. at 224 ("heinous and horrific"); id. ("[Kelly McManus] endured
excruciating pain and terror"); id. at 236-237 ("we pause to note with disgust
how truly heinous was the murder of Kelly...").
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that Justice Flaherty could not lump a domestic stabbing with
other more graphic and horrifying murders. 70
There is clearly a distinction in depravity between the murder
of Kelly McManus and other murders the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has recently upheld for life without parole. 71 However, it is
unclear if that distinction matters. Here, McManus apparently
attempted a diminished capacity defense at trial, perhaps
believing that the facts of his case could not result in a sentence of
life without parole. 72 Perhaps he was justified in this belief; one
could reasonably conclude that McManus' conduct indicated that
he was deranged, but he did not take the further steps often
indicative of a heinous crime such as sexual abuse or crude
destruction of a body.
Moreover, the majority seemed to stretch the aggravated
battery factor, which can be present upon rendering a part of the
body inoperative or going beyond what is necessary to render the
victim helpless, to the extreme. 73 Under this formulation, the
aggravated battery factor would be present in any first-degree
murder case, excluding those involving only one gun shot or a
single fatal blow. Thus, this liberal interpretation could make
almost every murder conviction eligible for life without parole.
This broad reading is especially problematic for criminal
defendants, who must make the important decision of whether to
argue a difficult defense to a jury or plead guilty prior to trial in
hopes of receiving a lighter sentence. Without knowledge of the
standard by which their conduct will be judged, those defendants
will be unable to make an informed decision. It may also be the
case that the McManus decision has effectively made that decision
for those defendants: nearly every first-degree murder conviction
may be subject to life without parole. Thus, it would be foolish for
defendants to hope they are insulated from such harsh
punishment.
70. See id. at 239. Justice Flaherty did not cite any cases or give any
examples of crimes deserving life without possibility of parole.
71. See, e.g., State v. Motyka, 893 A.2d 267, 291 (R.I. 2006) (first-degree
murder and sexual assault of 66 year-old woman in her home).
72. See State v. McManus, 941 A.2d 222, 225 (R.I. 2008). McManus did
not confess to the crime but, as noted above, he did not contest that he had
killed Kelly. Thus, his trial was primarily focused on his sentence if his
diminished capacity defense did not prevail.
73. See id. at 236.
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CONCLUSION
The sentence of life without the possibility of parole is
available to any convicted first-degree murderer if the jury finds
an aggravating factor. Although one Justice on the Rhode Island
Supreme Court believes life without parole should be left to a
narrow group of cases standing for the most brutal or heinous, it is
clear from this case that either a majority of the Court completely
disagrees with this view of the law, or sees most murders as
falling into this ever-broadening category.
Timothy L. Cook
Criminal Law. In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204 (R.I. 2008).
The evidence against Respondent was sufficient to support
juvenile delinquency adjudication on the charge of second-degree
child molestation. In addition, the Sex Offender Registration and
Community Notification Act ("Registration Act"), as applied to
juvenile sex offenders, does not impinge on the confidentiality of
juvenile proceedings. Finally, the Registration Act's requirement
that a juvenile adjudicated delinquent must register as a sex
offender does not give rise to a constitutional right to a jury trial.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Respondent appealed his delinquency adjudication following a
bench trial for the second-degree child molestation' of his 9-year-
old cousin Jennifer 2 in 2003.3 Both Respondent and Jennifer,
along with their juvenile cousin Junior, were lying on the floor in
Jennifer's grandmother's spare room when Jennifer alleged that
Respondent sexually assaulted her.4  Jennifer testified that
Respondent placed his hands inside her underwear, touched her
breasts underneath her shirt, and placed her hand inside his
underwear. 5 In addition, Jennifer claimed that there were at
least two additional occasions when she was sexually assaulted by
Respondent. 6 As is routine in juvenile proceedings, a trial justice
in Family Court, sitting without a jury, decided the case. 7 The
trial justice decided that Jennifer was a very credible witness and
adjudged Respondent delinquent on the charge of second-degree
child molestation. 8
1. R.I. GEN. LAw §11-37-8-3 (1956) (provides "A person [commits]
second-degree child molestation sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual
contact with another person fourteen (14) years of age or under.")
2. Jennifer is not the real name of the victim.
3. In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204, 206 (R.I. 2008).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 207.
7. Id. at 208.
8. Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Respondent made three contentions on appeal to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court: (1) There was insufficient evidence to
support the delinquency adjudication; (2) the Registration Act
compromises the confidentiality inherent in the juvenile justice
system; and (3) the Registration Act's non-confidential and
punitive nature renders the delinquency adjudication equivalent
to an adult criminal conviction, thereby giving Respondent the
right to a trial by jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and article 1,
sections 2 and 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution.
9
Sufficiency of Evidence
The Rhode Island Supreme Court gives great deference to the
Family Court when reviewing juvenile delinquency
adjudications. 10 The Court will only intervene when there is no
"legally competent evidence" to support the findings of the trial
justice, the trial justice has overlooked or misconceived material
evidence, or was otherwise clearly wrong.1 1 The Court has also
afforded high regard to credibility determinations made by a trial
justice, so long as those determinations were reasonable, logical,
and flowed from established facts. 12
Confidentiality of Juvenile Justice System
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has historically given great
discretion to the Rhode Island General Assembly and will only
invalidate legislation that "palpably and unmistakably could be
characterized as an excess of legislative power."'13 In fact, the
party challenging the legislation must show that it violates a
specific provision of either the Federal Constitution or the Rhode
Island Constitution beyond a reasonable doubt.14 Contrary to the
punitive character of the adult justice system, the confidentiality
9. Id. at 209.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 211 (quoting City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 44-45
(R.I. 1995)).
14. Id. (citing Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 822 (R.I. 2004)).
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of the juvenile justice system serves to promote the primary goals
of protection, rehabilitation, and treatment of juvenile offenders. 1 5
However, the juvenile system's confidential nature is "not
absolute," and may be relaxed if outweighed by a legitimate public
concern. 16
The intention of the Rhode Island General Assembly when it
enacted the Registration Act and made it applicable to juveniles,
thereby requiring them to register their home addresses with
their town's police department, was to protect the public, not to
punish the juvenile offender. 17 This is despite the Act's incidental
inconveniences and potential burdens to juvenile sex offenders. 18
Those burdens are outweighed by the need of police departments
to have at their disposal the home addresses of all sex offenders
within the town. 19 Moreover, the Court pointed out that the
juvenile sex offender's information is not released to the public,
further lessening any potential inconvenience or burden.20
Right to a Jury Trial
The United States Supreme Court has held that federal Due
Process rights do not guarantee the right to a jury trial in the
adjudicative phase of a state juvenile-delinquency proceeding. 2 '
Furthermore, the Rhode Island Constitution has been interpreted
to mean that a juvenile delinquent is not entitled to a jury trial.2 2
The Respondent's argument that this particular delinquency
adjudication is different because it requires him to register as a
sex offender was not persuasive to the Court.23 Other
jurisdictions have already determined that, because the
registration requirement is primarily for protecting public safety,
it is not punitive. 2 4 Further, because the requirement is not
punitive, it does not give rise to a right to a trial by jury, which
15. Id. at 210.
16. Id. at 212.
17. Id. at 213.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 214.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 212.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 213.
24. Id.
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would normally be afforded a defendant in the adult criminal
justice system. 25
In response to Respondent's three arguments, the Court held
that (1) the trial justice did not act unreasonably in concluding
that there was sufficient evidence to adjudicate Respondent
delinquent on the charge of second-degree child molestation; (2)
the Registration Act does not compromise the confidential nature
of the juvenile justice system because its purpose is protecting the
public, not punishing the juvenile; (3) and because the Act's
registration requirements are not punitive, Respondent is not
entitled to a jury trial under either the Federal or Rhode Island
Constitution.26
COMMENTARY
The Court's decision walks a very fine line between the
constitutional rights of a juvenile offender and the constitutional
rights of an adult offender. The issue is whether requiring a
juvenile sex offender to register his name and address with police,
which adult sex offenders are also required to do under the
Registration Act, strips the juvenile proceeding of its confidential
nature, and places it within the adult system, thereby giving the
juvenile a right to a trial by jury. The Court's answer to this
question is no.
The Registration Act does impose the same requirements on
juvenile sex offenders as it does on adult sex offenders, but only
for the purposes of public safety. The Court reasons that in order
for a proceeding to be "pulled" out of the juvenile system and
placed within the adult system, there would have to be some
punitive element imposed on the juvenile offender that would also
be imposed on adult offenders. However, the Registration Act
does not impose any punishment at all; it merely requires
registration with police in order to further the ability of public
safety officials to track sex offenders. Without a punitive
provision within the Registration Act, there is no reason for the
juvenile proceeding to be placed within the adult criminal justice
system. Consequently, because the proceeding remains in the
juvenile justice system, the Respondent is not entitled to a trial by
25. Id.
26. Id. at 214.
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jury.
CONCLUSION
The Court held the Registration Act, as applied to juveniles,
was constitutional under both the Federal and Rhode Island
Constitutions. The Registration Act neither destroyed the
inherent confidentially of the juvenile justice system, nor imposed
any punishment on the juvenile sex offender. The Registration
Act was specifically enacted by the Rhode Island Legislature to
protect the public, and that concern outweighs any inconvenience
or burden to the sex offender. Given that there are no punitive
consequences, juvenile sex offenders who are required to register
their home addresses under the Registration Act are not entitled
to the jury trial afforded defendants in the adult criminal justice
system.
Michael Edwards
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Criminal Procedure/Evidence. State v. Barkmeyer, 949
A.2d 984 (R.I. 2008). Where an individual conducts a private
search in their own home and consent is given to a police officer to
come into the home to collect evidence, the Fourth Amendment
has no application. The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is
not violated when a trial justice closes the courtroom to
unnecessary personnel before a victim testifies about child
molestation, and where no one was actually excluded. A
statement is admissible and not considered hearsay if it is used by
a declarant as a prior consistent statement to rebut an allegation
of improper influence on the part of the declarant. Finally,
prejudicial statements made by a prosecutor in closing arguments
can be remedied by a comprehensive limiting instruction by the
trial justice.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On May 22, 2004, while Jennifer Barkmeyer (hereinafter,
"Jen") was bathing her 8-year-old daughter Jane, Jen noticed
blood in Jane's underwear. 1 When the bleeding continued, Jen
consulted a pediatrician who found bruising in Jane's vaginal area
and, suspecting sexual abuse recommended they visit a hospital. 2
"The pediatrician also notified the Department of Children, youth,
and families (DCYF) about his suspicion that Jane had been
molested" and DCYF assigned Laurie Houle (hereinafter, "Houle")
to the case. 3 When Jen called Ronald Barkmeyer (hereinafter,
"Defendant") - her husband and Jane's stepfather - to tell him
about the pediatrician's findings, he said "they're going to suspect
me."4
The family arrived at the hospital on May 25, 2005, where
Defendant told Houle that he had not harmed Jane in any way.5
1. State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984, 989 (R.I. 2008). To protect the
privacy of the victim, she was given a false name.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 989-90.
4. Id. at 990.
5. Id.
450
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Jane was examined by Dr. Amy Goldberg (hereinafter, "Dr.
Goldberg"). 6 "During the examination, Jane indicated to Dr.
Goldberg that she had been touched in her pee-pee with a finger." 7
Dr. Goldberg determined that the injuries to Jane's genitals that
were so severe that they required surgery to fix the damage. 8
Subsequent to the surgery, detective William Swierk (hereinafter,
"Detective Swierk") was notified of the suspected sexual
molestation and went to the hospital to speak to Jane, Jen, and
Dr. Goldberg about the incident, where he was told by Jane that
she was "tied up with a rope" during the assault. 9
"Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with one
count of first degree child molestation sexual assault, in violation
of R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-8.1 (1956) and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-
8.2 (1956)." 10 Subsequent to the arrest, Jen's father, William
Wilson (hereinafter, "Will") and his wife Barbara came to Rhode
Island from California to provide Jen with support; they stayed in
Jen's home. 11 Pursuant to instructions from Jen, both Will and
Barbara helped her throughout the ordeal by cleaning the house
and packing Defendant's belongings so they could be shipped to
Marine barracks. 12 Several days after the Defendant's arrest,
Will met with Detective Swierk to discuss the case and to give the
detective items that he found while cleaning Defendant's room,
which included handcuffs. 13 Will also found a rope in the closet of
the master bedroom while he was cleaning and, suspecting it
might be evidence, invited Detective Swierk to come to the house
to pick up the rope. 14 The trial justice denied Defendant's pretrial
motion to suppress the rope on Fourth Amendment grounds. 15
At trial, Jane testified that Defendant picked her up while he
was naked and brought her to the master bedroom where he used
a rope to tie her hands and feet and proceeded to touch her
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 990-91.
15. Id. at 991.
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"private spot" with his finger. 16 Further, Houle testified that
during a prior conversation with Jane, she identified Defendant as
the assailant and said Defendant caused her injuries while her
mother was at work. 17 Houle's testimony was admitted at trial
over an objection by Defendant that it constituted inadmissible
hearsay.18 Dr. Goldberg testified that Jane's injury was "one of
the most severe injuries she had seen." 19
The Defendant was convicted of first degree child molestation
sexual assault. 20 Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied
and he was sentenced to fifty years at an Adult Correctional
Institution; thirty of those years would be served and the rest
suspended with probation.2 1
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial justice erred when
he: (1) denied the Defendant's motion to suppress the rope, (2)
ordered the courtroom partially closed during Jane's testimony, (3)
allowed Houle to testify that Jane identified Defendant as her
assailant, and (4) denied Defendant's motion to pass the case on
allegedly prejudicial comments made during the state's closing
arguments.22
Admissibility of the Rope
Defendant argued that the rope was the fruit of a warrantless
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment because Will had no
apparent authority to authorize a search in a home that was not
his, the state failed to prove that Jen consented to the seizure, and
argued that the inevitable-discovery doctrine should not apply. 23
The state, on the other hand, argued that Jen consented to the
seizure, that Will had apparent authority to consent, and that the
inevitable-discovery doctrine did apply. 24  The state had the
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Defendant's other post-verdict motions were all denied as well.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 991-992.
24. See id. at 992.
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burden of proving that, based on the totality of the circumstances,
the evidence was not obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 25
The Court first examined the nature of a private search. 26
"When deciding whether to admit the fruits of a private search, it
is incumbent upon the court to determine whether the law
enforcement agency's involvement was a significant expansion of
the search. ' 27 The Court held that the rope was the fruit of a
private search to which the Fourth Amendment has no application
because Detective Swierk was invited to search the closet, shown
where the item was, and did not rummage or expand the search in
any way.28 However, since Detective Swierk entered the house
and seized the rope without a warrant, analysis was required
beyond the scope of private search.
The Superior Court determined that Detective Swierk had
seized the rope with Jen's consent, and the Supreme Court
agreed. 29  The Fourth Amendment prohibition against
warrantless searches and seizures does not apply "to situations in
which voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the
individual whose property is being searched, or from a third party
who possesses common authority over the premises." 30  Thus,
based on the totality of the circumstances, Jen voluntarily
consented to the seizure of the rope by Detective Swierk. 31
Although it was Will who invited Detective Swierk into the
home, both men encountered Jen in the common area upon
entering the home, where they exchanged pleasantries. 32
Notably, Jen neither questioned nor objected to Will or Detective
Swierk going into the bedroom upon being told that they were
going to inspect something that Will had found. 33 Based on these
facts, the Court held that Detective Swierk seized the rope with
Jen's consent, and thus the Fourth Amendment did not apply to
25. Id. at 995.
26. Id.
27. Id (quoting State v. Von Bulow, 475 A.2d at 1015 (R.I. 1984)).
28. Id. at 996.
29. Id. at 997.
30. Id at 996 (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990)).
31. Id. at 997.
32. Id.
33. Id.
2009]
454 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:450
suppress the rope. 34
The Court also held that even if there was a Fourth
Amendment violation, the rope would have been admissible under
the inevitable-discovery doctrine. 35 Even if evidence is obtained
illegally, "the inevitable-discovery exception permits it to be
admitted upon a showing that the evidence would have been
discovered legally had the legal means not been aborted because of
the illegal seizure. '' 36 Here, the Court inferred that if the rope
was actually obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment, it
would have been discovered legally had the legal means not been
aborted. 37  The Court made this inference because they were
confident that, had Detective Swierk not obtained the rope by
retrieving it from the house, the rope would have been legally
obtained because Will would have voluntarily given it to Detective
Swierk in the same manner in which he voluntarily gave the
handcuffs to Detective Swierk. 38 Thus, the inevitable-discovery
exception applied. 39
Lastly, the Court examines apparent authority. The Court
held that while Will did not have apparent authority to consent to
a search of the house, this was irrelevant because no Fourth
Amendment violation occurred. 40
Courtroom Closure
Defendant also argued that the Superior Court denied him his
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when the trial justice
ruled that the courtroom would be closed to exclude unnecessary
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 998 (citing State v. Cobb, 743 A.2d 1, 39 (Conn. 1999)). The
state must meet this burden of proof by establishing verifiable historical
facts, not by mere speculation.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. The test for apparent authority is whether, based on the
information in an officer's possession, the officer reasonably believed that the
consenting individual had the authority to authorize a search. That is clearly
not the case in this situation because during Will's first discussion with
Detective Swierk, he indicated to Detective Swierk that he was simply a
guest in Jen's house. Thus, Detective Swierk could not have reasonably
believed Will had the authority to consent.
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personnel. 4 1 The state argued that the closure was proper based
on two statutory provisions, both of which the Court rejected. 42
However, the Court accepted the state's argument that in light of
Jane's age, the nature of the allegation, and her expected
testimony, the courtroom closure was appropriate. 4 3  The
Supreme Court has held that that courtroom closures are an
effective means to protect children from the psychological harm
that stems from testifying as a witness under difficult
circumstances. 4 4 Furthermore, Defendant failed to prove that
anyone was actually excluded from the courtroom, and the Court
refused to hold that a trial justice's closure was a reversible error
when the record does not establish the same. 4 5 Given the policy of
protecting minors from the psychological harm of testifying about
sexual assault, and the fact that the record did not show that
anyone was actually excluded, the Supreme Court held that the
Superior Court did not abuse their discretion by ruling that
Defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial. 46
DCYF Investigator Testimony
Defendant next argued that Houle's testimony regarding her
conversation with Jane where Jane identified Defendant as the
assailant was inadmissible hearsay and should have been
suppressed. 4 7 At trial, the defense counsel elicited from Jane that
she had practiced what she was going to say at trial, implying that
the state coached her by providing her with answers to give about
the incident.4 8 To rebut this evidence, Houle offered the evidence
41. Id. at 1001.
42. See id. at 1001-03. R.I. GEN. LAws §12-28-8 (1956) and R.I. GEN.
LAws § 11-37-13.2 (1956). Both of these statues simply express the fact that
a child who testifies at trial presumptively suffers harm, and that the court
should alleviate that harm. However, these statutes say nothing about
courtroom closure.
43. Id. at 1001.
44. Id. at 1002. (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for
Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
45. Id. at 1002-03. (citing State v. Fayerweather, 540 A.2d 353, 354 (R.I.
1988)).
46. Id. at 1004.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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of the conversation she had with Jane at the hospital where she
identified Defendant as the assailant. 49 "The trial justice held
that the statement was admissible: (1) under the medical-
diagnosis-and-treatment-hearsay exception, R.I. R.Evid. 804(4);
(2) as an identification of an assailant, R.I. R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(C);
and (3) as a prior consistent statement, R.I. R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B),
to rebut an implied charge of improper influence. '' 50 The Supreme
Court held that Houle's testimony was not admissible under the
medical-diagnosis-and-treatment hearsay exception or as a
statement of identification, but was admissible as a prior
consistent statement. 51
The R.I. Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) provides that a
statement does not qualify as hearsay if the declarant is subject to
cross-examination regarding a statement made at the
hearing/trial, the declarant's testimony and statement are
consistent and the testimony is offered to rebut an accusation of
recent fabrication or improper influence of motive on the part of
the declarant. 52  The admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements is conditioned on the fact that they must predate the
occurrence of the alleged improper influence. 53 Here, there was a
direct and indirect implication of improper influence where the
defense counsel lead Jane into stating that she had met with the
prosecution to practice what she would say at trial and where the
defense counsel implied that Jane was provided with scripted
answers. 54 Also, because the record clearly provided that Jane's
meeting with the police was subsequent to Jane's statement to
Houle, the trial justice correctly held that the statement was
subject to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and thus, was admissible. 55
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id at 1005. The statement was not admissible under the medical-
diagnosis-and-treatment hearsay exception because Houle is a social worker.
The statement was also not admissible as a statement of identification
because identification was not an issue in the case.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id at 1004.
55. Id at 1006.
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Prosecution's Closing Argument
Finally, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by not
granting a new trial after the prosecution made a prejudicial
statement during his closing argument. 56  During closing
arguments, the prosecution characterized Defendant as a
"predator" who "preys on weak people. '57  To remedy the
situation, the trial justice gave an instruction to the jury
informing them that closing arguments are not evidence, that
what the prosecution said was highly improper, and directing
them to disregard the comments. 58 The state argued that this
instruction cured any prejudice, and the Supreme Court agreed. 59
The Supreme Court has held that "a prosecutor is given
considerable latitude in their closing arguments so long as they
are based upon the evidence. '60 When a prejudicial comment is
made, the burden is on the trial justice to assess the probable
effect of the comment. 61 If the trial justice provides a cautionary
instruction, "the court must assume the jury complied with it
unless it clearly appears otherwise. ' 62 While the Supreme Court
stated their condemnation of attacks that solely serve to demonize
a defendant, the Court held that any prejudice that the Defendant
would have suffered as a result of the prosecution's comments was
remedied by the prompt and comprehensive cautionary
instruction provided by the trial justice.63
COMMENTARY
On the surface, it seems as though the Court reached the
correct conclusion in this case. However, this decision establishes
a dangerous precedent that is contrary to the law in many other
jurisdictions. 64 The Court set a very low bar for what constitutes
consent sufficient to qualify as an exception to the application of
the Fourth Amendment by holding that consent exists simply by
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id at 1007.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 1008-09 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
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demonstrating a lack of objection to the seizure. 65
The Supreme Court acknowledged that for the consent
exception to the Fourth Amendment to apply, the party seeking to
invoke the exception must provide proof that the consent was
given voluntarily. 66 In the present case, the Court determined
that Jen voluntarily consented based on her failure to object both
when Detective Swierk entered the home and when she was told
the detective was going into her bedroom. 67 Besides this set of
facts, the Court offered no further evidence to support the notion
that Jen voluntarily consented to the seizure of the rope. The
Court simply relied on her silence.
Contrary to the holding in this case, a number of other
jurisdictions require consent to a search and seizure to be
"unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by
duress of coercion." 68 These courts have refused to infer consent
simply from the fact that "a suspect remained silent, absent the
presence of accompanying gestures." 69  Such gestures include
gestures by the suspect for the police to enter, or the suspect
assisting in the search. 70 These accompanying gestures suggest
that the consent is unequivocal and specific. 71 Here, Jen's consent
was inferred simply from her silence and lack of objection, as
there were not any accompanying gestures to suggest consent. 72
While the Court claimed that the present factual scenario should
not be seen as an "open sesame to predicating a finding of consent
upon silence," the ruling suggests otherwise. 73 This low standard
for establishing consent "exceeds the scope of any recognized
exception to the Fourth Amendment. 74
65. See id.
66. Id. at 996.
67. Id. at 997.
68. Id. at 1008 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (quoting Robinson v. State, 578
P.2d 141, 144 (Alaska 1978)).
69. Id (citing United States v. Shiabu, 920 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9 th Cir.
1990)).
70. Id. at 1008-09 (citing United States v. Albreksten, 151 F.3d 951, 955(9th Cir. 1998)).
71. Id. at 1008.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 997.
74. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior
Court's rulings that: (1) admitting the rope into evidence did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because it was the product of a
private search and the officer received subsequent consent to
retrieve it, (2) defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial
was not violated when the courtroom was closed to unnecessary
personnel to protect the victim from the emotional trauma of
testifying about her sexual molestation, (3) the DCYF agent's
statement was not inadmissible hearsay because it fell within the
scope of the prior consistent statement exception, and (4) the
prosecutor's closing arguments cured any prejudicial effect they
may have had where the trial justice provided a comprehensive
cautionary instruction. 75
Paul M. Grocki
75. See id. at 997, 1002, 1005, 1007.
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Family Law. In Re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198 (R.I. 2008). The
Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) has a duty
to make reasonable efforts to achieve reunification between a
parent and his or her child prior to filing a petition terminating
parental rights. Reasonable efforts include any program with the
potential of remedying the problem that DCYF seeks to correct in
the parent before reinstating parental rights.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In August of 1999, Stephanie Calise (Stephanie) had her
eleven-month-old daughter, Natalya, removed from her care due
to Stephanie's continued problems with drug abuse. 1 The DCYF
offered Stephanie services to treat her drug abuse and mental
health issues, subsequently reunited her with Natalya, and closed
the case. 2  In 2004, Natalya (then six years of age) made
statements that suggested Stephanie was abusing drugs. 3 In
response, DCYF took action, but caseworker Bridgett Crook
(Crook) ultimately expressed no concerns about Natalya's welfare
and did not remove her from Stephanie's custody. 4
Stephanie's suspected substance abuse in September of 2004
prompted the DCYF to file a petition in Family Court under G.L.
1956 §14-1-11 for neglect. 5 Following the petition, Stephanie
refused to submit to a urine test and declared that she would test
positive.6 By order of the Family Court, Natalya was removed
from her mother's care and placed with a foster parent. 7 DCYF
caseworker Crook and Stephanie agreed on a case plan that would
start in November 2004 and end in May 2005, which was intended
1. See In Re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198, 199 (R.I. 2008).
2. Id.; see also id. at n.5 ("Stephanie has had a history of depression
since she witnessed the murder of her mother and a train conductor while
she was a passenger on an Amtrak train when she was a young girl.")
3. Id. at 199.
4. Id. at 199-200.
5. Id. at 200; see also id. at n.6 (describing the relevant parts of R.I.
GEN. LAWS §14-1-11 (1956) and how it applies to the case.)
6. Id.
7. Id.
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to end Stephanie's drug use. 8 The case plan further required
Stephanie to "remain drug free, participate in substance abuse
treatment, and submit to supervised random urine screens."9 The
case plan, however, did not provide for mental-health treatment or
psychological evaluations. 10
By the end of 2004, Stephanie had attended multiple drug
treatment programs but had relapsed back to her drug abuse. 11
Stephanie was arrested for possession of a controlled substance
and was incarcerated. 12 Upon her release, Stephanie met with
DCYF caseworker, Mary Thuot (Thuot), concerning future
treatment and Stephanie's lack of transportation. 13 Finally on
October 31, 2005, as a result of Stephanie's continued failure to
attend treatment, DCYF filed a petition to terminate parental
rights (TPR) under §15-7-7(a)(3) and (a)(2)(iii). 14 The testimony
during the hearing established that Stephanie was not engaged in
any drug abuse treatment and that she had been diagnosed with
depression. 15  The record further revealed that there was a
possible link between Stephanie's depression and her drug
abuse. 16
Upon review of the testimony and records, the Family Court
terminated Stephanie's parental rights in accordance with the
statute. 17 The Judge found that "(1) Stephanie was an unfit
mother because of her failure to adequately address her chronic
substance abuse; (2) DCYF took reasonable efforts to reunite
Stephanie and Natalya before it filed a TPR petition, and (3)
Natalya's best interests were served by terminating her mother's
parental rights because of Stephanie's inability to properly care
for her daughter."' 8 The Trial Court further noted that Stephanie
was offered services for her drug abuse, but never availed herself
of such services and failed to make a good faith effort to obtain
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id
12. Id.
13. Id. at 201.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 201-02.
18. Id. at 202.
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treatment.19 Stephanie appealed the termination of parental
rights decree and argued that the trial court erred in finding that
DCYF met its burden of proving that it made reasonable efforts to
obtain reunification prior to the filing of the TPR petition.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was quick to point out the
natural and fundamental rights of parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child. 21 The Court stressed that a
parent's rights do not "evaporate if they are not model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child. ' 22 The Supreme Court
reiterated the standard that until parental unfitness has been
proven by clear and convincing evidence, the parents and child
have a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their
relationship. 23
The key issue that the Court resolved in this case was
whether DCYF reasonably attempted reunification prior to the
termination of parental rights. The Court defined reasonable
efforts as "a subjective standard subject to a case-by-case analysis,
taking into account, among other things, the conduct and
cooperation of the parents."24 The Court noted that the services of
DCYF must be offered regardless of the likelihood of success and
must be services that "address or correct" the problem that has led
to removal of custody.25
The Court held that DCYF made reasonable efforts to cure
Stephanie's drug abuse problem and was not required to offer any
additional drug counseling.26 However, DCYF was "wholly
unreasonable" when it did not include any mental-health
treatment in Stephanie's case plan. 27 The Court reasoned that
DCYF had access to and reviewed Stephanie's medical records and
therefore knew or should have known of the drug counselor's
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 203.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 204.
27. Id.
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concern about the effect of Stephanie's depression contributing to
her increased chance of relapse. 28 The Court found that this was
a case where DCYF completely failed to address a problem in
which a parent's recalcitrance precluded reunification. 29 The fact
that Stephanie's depression was linked to her drug abuse and
DCYF's failure to address the depression made reunification
highly unlikely.30  The Court rejected the argument that
Stephanie's lack of desire or request for psychiatric treatment was
relevant in the determination of DCYF's reasonable efforts. 31
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that DCYF is
responsible for creating case plans that will attempt to enable
reunification. 32 The Court stated that it is the burden of DCYF
and its caseworkers to adjust the plan to the needs of the parent
because the parent lacks the necessary expertise and perspective
to fashion an effective case plan. 33
COMMENTARY
The Supreme Court in this case assumed the role of protector
of fundamental parental rights. In the beginning of the opinion,
the Court established the burden DCYF must be overcome before
parental rights may be terminated. The Court further articulated
an interest in maintaining the parent/child relationship. This
decision establishes that the Court will not readily strip a parent
of his or her rights because he or she is not a "model parent" or
because he or she has made mistakes in the past. Further, it
places a duty on DCYF to attempt reunification as opposed to
termination.
The Court reasoned that DCYF is responsible for making
effective case plans regardless of their potential for success.
Further, the case plans must address the problem that DCYF
seeks to correct. In this case, the problem was drug abuse that
was addressed with substance abuse treatment programs.
However, the plan completely neglected to address the depression
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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that was linked to her drug abuse. The decision effectively
guarantees that DCYF will address the sub-causes that contribute
to removal of custody when establishing a case plan. However, it
may ultimately lead to increased appeals by parents on the
ground of failure to correct all necessary sub-causes that
contribute to the custody removal. Future claims may lead to
sweeping inquiries into potential contributing factors ranging
from physical to mental health and ultimately place a heavy
burden on DCYF's case planning options.
CONCLUSION
The case is an important statement by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, establishing the duties of the DCYF to parents.
DCYF must make reasonable efforts towards reunification prior to
applying for a petition to terminate parental rights. Reasonable
efforts mean formulation of an effective case plan that adequately
remedies the problem DCYF seeks to correct, regardless of the
likelihood of success of reunification and parental participation.
Joseph D. Chimienti
Insurance Law. Imperial Cas. and Indem. Co. v. Bellini, 947
A.2d 886 (R.I. 2008). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
a plaintiffs claim of bad faith on the part of an insurance company
will be held to the "fairly debatable" standard, emphasizing that a
bad faith claim must demonstrate an absence of a reasonable
basis in law or fact for denying the claim or that the insurer
intentionally or recklessly failed to properly investigate the claim.
Additionally, the Court maintained its long-standing preference
for simple interest instead of compound interest on damage
awards.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On October 8, 1985, Michael DeSantis (DeSantis), a United
States Postal Service employee, fell and was injured when a step
collapsed underneath him while delivering mail at 24 Atwood
Street in Providence, Rhode Island. 1 In May, the owner Amitie
Bellini (Bellini) had conveyed her interest in the property to
Norbell Realty Corporation (Norbell), a corporation of which she
was the principal and owner. 2 Subsequently, Imperial Casualty
and Indemnity Company (Imperial) issued an insurance policy to
Bellini, covering several properties including the Atwood Street
property. 3  Norbell was not listed as an insured under that
policy. 4 On October 31, 1985, Imperial added Norbell to the
above-referenced policy as an additional insured on another
property, making no reference to the Atwood Street property. 5
DeSantis filed a lawsuit in Superior Court against Norbell,
seeking damages for personal injury. 6 Imperial issued a letter
reserving its rights, which questioned whether Norbell actually
qualified as an additional insured.7 In fact, if Norbell was not an
1. Imperial Cas. and Indem. Co. v. Bellini, 947 A.2d 886, 887 (R.I. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 887-88.
7. Id. at 888.
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additional insured on the Atwood property, Imperial would not be
obligated to compensate DeSantis for his injuries.8 In July of
1991, Imperial sent Bellini a letter demanding she pay a $250
deductible, which she paid with a check in August of 1991. 9
The previous events lead to three separate legal actions:
DeSantis' personal injury action against Norbell (the Norbell
Personal Injury Action), a declaratory judgment action Imperial
brought to obtain a ruling as to its potential liability under the
insurance policy (the Declaratory Judgment Action), and a direct
action by DeSantis against Imperial (the Imperial Action),
asserting that Imperial was required to compensate him pursuant
to his victory against Norbell in the Norbell Personal Injury
Action. 10 Regarding the Declaratory Judgment Action, Imperial
contended that the policy did not provide coverage to Norbell
regarding the October 1985 incident. 11 Norbell and Bellini were
named as defendants, and DeSantis intervened. 12
Subsequently, DeSantis brought the Norbell Personal Injury
Action, and Imperial defended Norbell. 13 A jury returned a
verdict awarding damages to DeSantis in the amount of $235,000,
which was reduced to $155,000.14
While the Declaratory Judgment Action was still pending,
Bellini assigned her rights as the insured to DeSantis, and he
commenced the Imperial Action, in which he filed a direct action
against Imperial and sought to hold it liable for the judgment
against Norbell. 15 In the action, he alleged Imperial breached its
duty of good faith. 16 Imperial's motion seeking consolidation of
the Imperial Action and the Declaratory Judgment Action was
granted. 17  Imperial filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island on the issue of severance, and the
bad faith claim was severed from DeSantis' other claims in the
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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consolidated action. 18
The case was remanded to the Superior Court for a bench
trial, and the judge ruled in favor of Imperial. 19 DeSantis, Bellini,
and Norbell appealed. 20 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
Imperial had waived its rights to deny coverage when it demanded
and accepted Bellini's payment of the $250 deductible in August of
1991.21 The Court "disagree[d] with the logic that an insurance
company may avoid waiver by, on the one hand, insisting
compliance with an insurance contract, and on the other hand,
insisting that the insurance contract affords no coverage to the
party claiming defense or indemnity under the provisions of the
policy." 22
The case was remanded again, and on remand, DeSantis
moved for partial summary judgment on his debt on judgment
claim, contending that compound post-judgment interest should
be added to that amount based on section 9-21-10.23 With
compound interest, Imperial would owe DeSantis approximately
$1.3 million; however, computed with simple interest, Imperial
would owe DeSantis approximately $739,000, which Imperial had
already paid. 24 The Superior Court granted DeSantis' motion for
partial summary judgment, but ruled that simple interest, not
compound interest, would be added to the sum Imperial owed. 25
Imperial moved for summary judgment on the bad faith
claim. 26 Imperial relied on section 9-1-33(a) of the Rhode Island
General Laws, claiming the statute confers on the insured the
right to bring a claim of bad faith against an insurer, and that
"DeSantis is not the insured. ' 27 Imperial argued that it had paid
18. Id. (citing Imperial Cas. and Indem. Co. v. Bellini, 746 A.2d 130 (R.I.
2000)).
19. Id. at 889.
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing Imperial Cas. and Indem. Co. v. Bellini, 888 A.2d 957 (R.I.
2005)).
22. Id. (citing Imperial, 888 A.2d at 964).
23. Id. at 889 n.2 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-21-10(a) (1956), which states
in pertinent part "Post-judgment interest shall be calculated at the rate of
twelve percent (12) per annum and accrue on both the principal amount of
the judgment and the prejudgment interest entered therein.").
24. Id. at 889 n.1.
25. Id. at 890.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 890 n.3 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-33 (1956), which states in
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the full amount of DeSantis' judgment, and because they had not
acted in bad faith, there was no remaining claim Norbell could
have assigned, even if the assignment was permitted under the
statute. 28 The hearing justice ruled that DeSantis did not have
the right to assert a claim of bad faith based on section 27-7-229,
which "does not contemplate an action of the insured party in bad
faith. ' 30 Additionally, a bad faith cause of action is not generally
assignable except where an insurer's bad faith refusal to settle
results in a judgment in excess of policy limits. 31  The
aforementioned exception was set out in Mello v. General
Insurance Co. of America.32 However, the facts of that case did
not apply to DeSantis' claim. 33 DeSantis, Bellini, and Norbell
appealed. 34
On appeal, the appellants argued that the hearing justice
erred in granting Imperial's motion for summary judgment based
on the ruling that Norbell did not possess an outstanding bad
faith claim against Imperial. 35 Additionally, appellants argued
that the hearing justice erroneously concluded that DeSantis, as
an assignee, did not have the right to pursue a bad faith claim
under section 27-7-2, and that Bellini had standing to pursue a
bad faith claim in her own name. 36 Lastly, appellants argued the
justice erred in granting only simple interest and not compound
interest. 37
pertinent part "[A]n insured under any insurance policy as set out in the
general laws or otherwise may bring an action against the insurer issuing the
policy when it is alleged the insurer wrongfully and in bad faith refused to
pay or settle a claim made pursuant to the provisions of the policy).
28. Id. at 890.
29. Id. at 890 n.4 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-7-2 (1956), which states in
pertinent part "[T]he injured party... after having obtained judgment against
the insured alone, may proceed on that judgment in a separate action against
the insurer, provided, the payment in whole or in part of the liability by
either the insured or the insurer shall, to the extent of the payment, be a bar
to recovery against the other of the amount paid.").
30. Id. at 890.
31. Id. at 891.
32. 525 A.2d 1304 (R.I. 1987).
33. Id. (citing Mello, 525 A.2d at 1304).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 891.
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BACKGROUND
Rhode Island's statute on the calculation of prejudgment
interest states "in any civil action in which a verdict is rendered or
a decision made for pecuniary damages, there shall be added by
the clerk of the court to the amount of damages interest at the
rate of twelve percent (12) per annum thereon from the date the
cause of action accrued, which shall be included in the judgment
entered therein."38  In regard to post-judgment interest, the
statute states in pertinent part "post-judgment interest shall be
calculated at the rate of twelve percent (12) per annum and accrue
on both the principal amount of the judgment and the
prejudgment interest entered therein." 39  Further, the General
Assembly has specifically mandated that interest should be
compounded on certain municipal retirement plans.
40
On the issue of bad faith claims, the statute states "an
insured under any insurance policy as set out in the general laws
or otherwise may bring an action against the insurer issuing the
policy when it is alleged the insurer wrongfully and in bad faith
refused to pay or settle a claim made pursuant to the provisions of
the policy, or otherwise wrongfully and in bad faith refused to
timely perform its obligations under the contract of insurance."
4 1
On the issue of assignability, the statute states "the injured party.
. .after having obtained judgment against the insured alone, may
proceed on that judgment in a separate action against the insurer,
provided, the payment in whole or in part of the liability by either
the insured or the insurer shall, to the extent of the payment, be a
bar to recovery against the other of the amount paid."
4 2
In Mello, the Rhode Island Supreme Court analyzed whether
a claim of bad faith against an insurer is assignable. 43  In
analyzing § 9-1-33, the Court concluded that though it does not
advocate a general policy of allowing assignment of the right to
sue an insurance company for bad faith, it was 'convinced that in
certain limited circumstances the insured's right may be
38. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-21-10(a) (1956).
39. Id.
40. R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-11.1-6(e) (1956).
41. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-33 (1956).
42. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2 (1956).
43. Imperial Cas. and Indem. Co. v. Bellini, 947 A.2d 886, 892 (R.I. 2008)
(citing Mello v. General Insurance Co. of America, 525 A.2d 1304 (R.I. 1987)).
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assigned"' and that the facts of the case constituted such a
circumstance. 44 The applicable facts were that after failed
settlement negotiations, where plaintiff twice offered to settle
within policy limits, 45 a verdict was rendered in plaintiffs favor
against the car wash business, and defendant paid the plaintiff up
to the amount of the policy limits, but refused to pay the part of
judgment exceeding that amount. 46 Based on the specific facts of
Mello, the Court held 'an insured may assign its bad-faith claim
against its insurer to the injured claimant for the limited purpose
of recovering the difference between the judgment received
against the insured and the insurance-policy limits.' 47
The Court previously held that a claim of "bad faith 'is
established when the insurer denied coverage or refused payment
without a reasonable basis in fact or law for the denial."'48 The
standard employed is the "fairly debatable" standard, meaning
"an insurer 'is entitled to debate a claim that is fairly
debatable."' 49 Ultimately, a bad faith claim is only established
where 'the insurer acted unreasonably and either knew or was
conscious of the fact that its conduct was unreasonable. '"' 50 The
Supreme Court emphasized that not every instance where an
insurance company refuses to pay constituted bad faith. 51
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In evaluating the facts of Bellini, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that Imperial's position did not constitute bad faith
because it "easily me[t] the 'fairly debatable' standard. ' 52 The
Court found that the facts did not show 'an absence of a
reasonable basis in law or fact for denying the claim' or that...
the insurer intentionally or recklessly failed to properly
investigate the claim." 53 The Court stated that "the complex-and-
protracted-history of the case" indicated that Imperial did not act
44. Id. at 892 (quoting Mello, 525 A.2d at 1306).
45. Id. (citing Mello, 525 A.2d at 1306).
46. Id. (citing Mello, 525 A,2d at 1306).
47. Id. (quoting Mello, 525 A.2d at 1306).
48. Id. (quoting Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 799 A.2d 997, 1010 (R.I. 2002)).
49. Id. (quoting Skaling, 799 A.2d at 1011).
50. Id. (quoting Skaling, 799 A.2d at 1011).
51. Id. (citing Skaling, 799 A.2d at 1012).
52. Id. at 894 (quoting Skaling, 799 A.2d at 1011).
53. Id. at 893 (quoting Skaling, 799 A.2d at 1012).
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in bad faith. ' 54 Therefore, the Court upheld the hearing justice's
grant of summary judgment dismissing the bad faith claims
against Imperial 55 without having to decide whether a bad faith
claim was assignable. 56
On the issue of compound interest, the Court "wholeheartedly
agree[d]" with the ruling of the hearing justice finding that post-
judgment interest would be calculated as simple interest, and not
compound interest. 57 The Court reiterated that it "has always
interpreted the prejudgment interest statute as referring to
simple, not compound, interest" and employed an analysis of the
"virtually identical statutory language" governing prejudgment
and post-judgment interest. 58 Additionally, the Court evaluated
the express language of section 42-11.1.-6(e) allowing for
compounded interest, and found that "such a specific
authorization [was] notably absent from § 9-21-10(a), the statute
governing post-judgment interest. ' 59 The Court ruled there was
"absolutely no reason why [it] should deviate from [its] long-
standing preference for simple interest rather than compound
interest on damage awards, except when there is a specific
statutory mandate to the contrary." 60
Ultimately, the Court affirmed the ruling of the Superior
Court on the issues of bad faith and compound interest.61
COMMENTARY
Although the Court chose not to decide whether the bad faith
claim was assignable to DeSantis, 62 the decision is important
because the Court further defined the "fairly debatable" standard
set out in Skaling v. Aetna Insurance Co. 63 In particular, the
Court found that the claim was fairly debatable, and that "the
sheer duration of the litigation in [the] case constitutes [an]
54. Id. at 894.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 893.
57. Id. at 894-95.
58. Id. at 894 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-21-10(a) (1956)).
59. Id. at 894 n.7.
60. Id. at 895.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 893.
63. 799 A.2d 997, 1011 (R.I. 2002).
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indicat[ion] that Imperial's conduct [did] not constitute bad
faith. ' 64 Overall, the Court's decision reinforces the idea that "not
every instance where an insurance company refuses to pay
constitutes bad faith. ' 65  The claim arose in 1985, Imperial
litigated the case for more than a decade, and timely paid
DeSantis for the damages arising from the consolidated action. 66
The Court's conclusion is beneficial to insurers in particular, and
the courts in general, because it prevents prolonged litigation
where an insurance company has fully cooperated with both the
plaintiff and the decisions of the courts. Ultimately, the Court
decided that after almost two decades of litigation, "'[t]he time has
come for this litigation to end.' 67
Regarding the issue of simple versus compound interest, the
Court gave deference to decisions of the legislature. 68 Instead of
deviating from its "long-standing preference for simple interest
rather than compound interest,"69 the Court continued its practice
of applying simple interest absent a statutory mandate to the
contrary. The Court ultimately decided that the issue of favoring
compound interest on damage awards was best suited for the
legislature, rather than the judiciary. 70
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a claim of bad
faith will be held to the "fairly debatable" standard, meaning an
insurance company will not be guilty of bad faith as long as the
claim is fairly debatable. Here, Imperial did not act in bad faith
because the issue of whether a bad faith claim can be assigned to
an uninsured party was fairly debatable. Without a showing of
unreasonable delay or improper investigation of a claim, an
insurer's action does not constitute bad faith.
Additionally, the Court upheld its policy of favoring simple
interest, instead of compound interest, on damages, unless a
64. Imperial Cas. and Indem. Co. v. Bellini, 947 A.2d 886, 894 (R.I. 2008).
65. Id. at 893.
66. Id. at 889 n.1.
67. Id. at 895 (quoting Northern Trust Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Review of
Westerly, 899 A.2d 517, 520 (R.I. 2006)).
68. See id.atn.11.
69. Id. at 895.
70. Id.atn.11.
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statutory provision mandates the contrary. In particular, the
statutory language on prejudgment and post-judgment interest
mandates the same calculation of both amounts, and the Court
has always interpreted the prejudgment interest statute as
mandating simple interest only.
Diane Shea
Property Law. Carrozza v. Carrozza, 944 A.2d 161 (R.I.
2008). In this family dispute over the ownership of property, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court re-examined state law concerning
adverse possession and the signature and notary requirements
inherent in a valid deed transfer. 1 Specifically before the Court
was whether the plaintiffs name written in block letters qualifies
as a signature, whether failure to notarize a deed is a fatal flaw in
a deed transfer, and finally, whether a grantor can successfully
bring a claim of adverse possession against a grantee. 2 The Court
held that a signature printed in block letters and a failure to
notarize do not invalidate a deed, and further held that a grantor
cannot later claim title to property that he has validly transferred
by adverse possession because of the warranty of quiet enjoyment
implied in all Rhode Island property transfers. 3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case involves a dispute over ownership of real property
located at 168-172 Atwells Avenue in Providence, Rhode Island.
The property had been in the hands of the Carrozza family since
1948, and was transferred to the plaintiff, Frederick Carrozza Sr.
(hereinafter "Frederick Sr."), in 1986. 4 Frederick Sr. acquired a
one-third interest in the property by way of a quitclaim deed from
Frederick Sr.'s brother Samuel, Samuel's wife Ellen, and
Frederick Sr.'s mother Edith, who had owned the property as
tenants in common. 5 Thus, Frederick Sr. owned a 33 percent
interest in the property along with Samuel and Ellen, who each
owned a similar 33 percent interest.6
Six years later, Frederick Sr. transferred his one-third
interest in the property to his mother Edith by warranty deed. 7
1. Carrozza v. Carrozza, 944 A.2d 161, 163 (R.I. 2008).
2. Id. at 164.
3. Id. at 165, 166.
4. Id. at 162.
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. Id.
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This transfer was not notarized, and instead of signing the
document, Frederick Sr. printed his name in block letters.8 The
next day, Edith transferred her one-third interest that she had
acquired from Frederick Sr. to her grandson Frederick Jr. by
warranty deed. 9 Similar to the transfer to Frederick Sr., Edith
printed her name on the signature line. 10 Apparently aware of
their mistakes, both Frederick Sr. and Edith filed corrective deeds
on December 7, 1992, that recited the prior transfers. 11  On
August 19, 2002, Frederick Jr. died, and Chevron Investors, LLC
(hereinafter "Chevron") acquired his one-third interest in the
Atwells Avenue property. 12
On September 21, 2004, Frederick Sr. filed suit against
Samuel, Ellen, and Chevron, seeking to set aside the deed
transfers to his mother Edith, and in the alternative, to ask the
court to grant him title by adverse possession. 13  Chevron
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment which
Frederick Sr. opposed by submitting an affidavit claiming that the
signature on the deed was not his.14 The District Court granted
Chevron's motion, holding the deed valid and Frederick Sr.'s
adverse possession claim fatally flawed because of the warranties
of quiet enjoyment and defense of title contained in the valid
transfer. 15  The plaintiff timely appealed and was granted
certiorari. 16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On certiorari, Frederick Sr. argued that a genuine issue of
material fact existed so as to survive the defendant's summary
judgment motion because the deed transfer was not properly
signed and notarized. 17 The Court ruled, however, that his
printed name on the signature line was sufficient.18 Further, the
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 163.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 165.
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Court ruled that the failure to notarize the deed was not fatal to a
valid transfer of title from Frederick Sr. to his mother Edith. 19
Rhode Island General Law § 34-11-1 states that a conveyance
"shall be void unless made in writing duly signed, acknowledged
as hereinafter provided, delivered, and recorded in the records of
land evidence in the town or city where the lands.. .are situated..
,"20 As to the § 34-11-1 signature requirement, the Court was
persuaded by Black's Law Dictionary's broad definition of
"signature" as "written by hand, printed, stamped, typewritten,
engraved, photographed, or cut from one instrument and attached
to another."21 Thus, a signature will be valid even if it is only a
mark, "as long as that mark is adopted as one's own."'2 2 The
plaintiffs argument failed, because Frederick Sr.'s printed name
on the signature line was sufficient under the Court's broad
understanding of the signature requirement. 23
The Court took a similar view of the plaintiffs argument that
the deed was invalid because it was not notarized. 24 Frederick Sr.
essentially argued that because the deed was not notarized, it was
not "acknowledged" under § 34-11-1.25 The Court stated,
however, that under § 34-11-1, "the conveyance, if delivered, as
between the parties and their heirs... shall be valid and binding
though not acknowledged or recorded. ' 26 Here, the deed was
delivered and recorded in the Providence Land Records, thus
negating the need for the deed to be notarized in order to be
valid. 27
The Court then turned to the plaintiffs final argument, that if
in fact the deed transfer was valid, he nonetheless maintained
title to the property by adverse possession. 28 Under Rhode Island
law, to establish title by adverse possession a plaintiff must prove
that his possession was actual, open, notorious, hostile, under
19. Id.
20. Id. at 164 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-11-1 (1956)).
21. Id. at 165 (quoting BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, 1415 (8th ed. 2004)).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-11-1 (1956)).
27. Id. at 162.
28. Id. at 166.
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claim of right, continuous, and exclusive for at least ten years. 2 9
However, reconciling the elements of adverse possession to the
facts of this case became quite complicated because it is actually
the grantor who sought title of the same real property that he
transferred to the grantee. 30 The Court reasoned that because the
September 24, 1992 warranty deed was effective as a valid
transfer, several enumerated protections were guaranteed to the
grantee according to § 34-11-15.
"Specifically, the grantor guarantees: (1) That at the time of
the delivery of such deed he or she is lawfully seised in fee simple
of the granted premises, (2) That the granted premises are free
from all incumbrances, (3) That he or she has then good right, full
power, and lawful authority to sell and convey the same to the
grantee and his or her heirs and assigns, (4) That the grantee and
his or her heirs and assigns shall at all times after the delivery of
such deed peaceably and quietly have and enjoy the granted
premises, and (5) That the grantor will, and his or her heirs,
executors, and administrators shall, warrant and defend the
granted premises to the grantee and his or her heirs and assigns
forever against the lawful claims and demands of all persons."31
Of these implied warranties inherent in Rhode Island real
property transfers, the fourth and fifth bear directly on Frederick
Sr.'s adverse possession claim. Essentially, at the moment
Frederick Sr. delivered the deed granting title to his mother
Edith, he simultaneously warranted that he would "defend and
protect the [grantee] against the rightful claims of all persons
thereafter asserted. '' 32 This includes Frederick Sr. himself, which
means he could not prevail on a claim of adverse possession
against the grantee whom he warranted he would protect against
lawful claims and demands.
COMMENTARY
A recurring theme in the Court's decision is the exaltation of
substance over form. The approach taken by the Court serves to
29. Id. at 166 (quoting Acampora v. Pearson, 899 A.2d 459, 466 (R.I.
2006)).
30. Id.
31. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-11-15 (1956)).
32. Id. (quoting Lewicki v. Marszalkowski, 455 A.2d 307, 309 (R.I. 1983)).
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acknowledge the intent of the parties to a transfer of real property
as being more important than the requirements of putting a
transfer between mother and son into proper legal form. The case
is significant because it tests a very common set of facts against
the requirements for a deed to be valid in Rhode Island. Still left
undetermined, however, is whether the Court's relaxed signature
and notary requirements extend to arms-length transactions as
well, as the Court explicitly stated that weighing on its decision
was the important fact that "the General Assembly has
anticipated the tendency of land transfers among family members
to observe fewer formalities."33
CONCLUSION
The Court held that, under Rhode Island law, a printed name
in block letters satisfies the signature requirement for a valid
warranty deed. 34 Additionally, if a deed is not notarized, it will
not automatically be invalid, so long as the deed was actually
delivered. 35 Thus, Frederick Sr. effectively transferred his one-
third interest in the Atwells Avenue property to his mother,
despite the printed signature and lack of notarization. 36  It
followed that Frederick Sr. could not prevail on an adverse
possession claim on the same property that he effectively deeded
away because of the implied warranty of quiet enjoyment inherent
in the valid transfer.37
Kyle E. Posey
33. Id. at 165.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 166.
Property Law. Pleasant Mgmt., LLC v. Carrasco, 960 A.2d
216 (R.I. 2008). The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the
Superior Court committed clear error on remand by ruling on
issues not before it, but affirmed on other grounds the lower
court's vacation of the default entered against defendants for their
breach of redemption agreement. The Court held that defendant's
failure to appear at a hearing was the result of excusable neglect
due to plaintiffs counsel's violation of the anti-contact rule (Article
V, Rule 4.2 Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct). The
Court also held that defendant had a prima facie meritorious
defense to breach of redemption agreement, sufficient to set aside
default judgment on grounds of excusable neglect. Finally, the
Court held that, since plaintiffs redemption costs were governed
by agreement and not by statute, plaintiff was only entitled to the
amount specified in the redemption agreement.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On November 10, 1999, after Maria Carrasco ("Carrasco") and
Jose Ortega ("Ortega") (collectively "defendants") defaulted on
sewage usage fees owed to the Narragansett Bay Commission (the
"Commission"), the Commission conducted a tax sale of their
tenement house located at 31 Atlantic Avenue in Providence.1
Pleasant Management, LLC (plaintiff) purchased the property at
the tax sale, and a year later filed a petition to foreclose on
defendants' right of redemption. 2 Defendants objected to the
petition, claiming that "they did not receive notice of the tax sale
from the City of Providence or from plaintiffs counsel."3 Prior to
any judgment on the petition, however, the parties entered into a
court-approved "redemption agreement," which allowed
defendants to redeem the property in exchange for $5,300 at 12
1. Pleasant Mgmt., LLC v. Carrasco, 960 A.2d 216, 218 (R.I. 2008).
2. Id. "General Laws 1956 § 44-9-25(a) provides" that title holder "'may
bring a petition in the superior court for the foreclosure of all rights of
redemption under the title [after] one year from a sale of land for taxes."' Id.
at 218 n.1.
3. Id. at 218n.1.
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percent interest rate, to be paid at a monthly rate of $200. 4 Per
the agreement, if defendants defaulted on their payments,
plaintiff could then foreclose on defendants' right to redeem the
property. 5
In March 2003, defendants allegedly violated the redemption
agreement by defaulting on their payment obligations, and
plaintiffs counsel Steven Murray ('Murray") asked that
defendants' right of redemption be foreclosed. 6 On April 1, 2003,
Carrasco received notice of the April 10 hearing in the Superior
Court.7 Carrasco then telephoned Murray and told him she would
deposit adequate funds into her account.8 According to Carrasco's
testimony, her belief was that the telephone conversation and the
deposit of funds into her account settled the matter because
Murray told her to "forget about court."9  Based on this belief,
neither defendants nor their attorney showed up to the April 10
hearing.' 0 There was a discrepancy in the amount of outstanding
funds, however, because Carrasco deposited only enough funds for
what "she thought was one outstanding check," but two checks
were actually outstanding, and as a result Murray was unable to
deposit one of two checks.' 1 Because of this situation, which led
to the non-appearance of defendants at the scheduled hearing, the
Superior Court entered a default decree against defendants. 12
Defendants filed a motion to vacate the decree, alleging that
they did not attend the hearing as a result of 'Murray's
assurances, during his telephone conversation with Carrasco, that
the hearing would not proceed" and to "forget about court."1 3
Defendants' motion to vacate was denied, and they timely
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 14
On April 12, 2005, the Supreme Court held that Murray
4. Id. at 218. The agreement also stipulated that defendants not contest
the validity of the tax sale and waive any defenses with respect to the sale,
including lack of notice. Id. at 218 n.2.
5. Id. at 218.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 218-19.
9. Id. at 219.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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violated Article V, Rule 4.2 of the Supreme Court Rules of
Professional Conduct ("anti-contact rule") by engaging in a
substantive telephone conversation with Carrasco while Carrasco
was represented by counsel. 15 Thus, the Supreme Court vacated
the default decree and remanded back to the Superior Court for a
"determination of whether plaintiffs counsel's violation of the
anti-contact rule amounted to excusable neglect." 1 6
On remand, the Superior Court did not rule on the precise
issue mandated by the Supreme Court, but did hold an
evidentiary hearing that further explored the circumstances
surrounding Carrasco and Murray's telephone conversation. 17
The hearing included a review of whether or not Murray violated
the anti-contact rule, even though that issue was already clearly
settled by the Supreme Court. 18 Contrary to the Supreme Court's
ruling, the Superior Court held that Murray did not violate the
anti-contact rule because it found that defendants' counsel gave
Murray permission to speak with Carrasco. 19 The hearing also
included Carrasco's testimony that the reason she deposited
enough funds for only one check was because Murray never told
her that there were two checks outstanding. 20 The Superior Court
inexplicably held that Murray's conduct did not amount to
excusable neglect (even though the excusable neglect at issue was
15. Id. (citing Pleasant Mgmt. v. Carrasco, 870 A.2d 443, 447 (R.I. 2005)
(Pleasant Mgmt. 1)). "Article V, Rule 4.2 of the Supreme Court Rules of
Professional Conduct provides: 'In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or
a court order."' Id. at n.6.
16. Id. at 220 (citing Pleasant Mgmt. I, 870 A.2d at 447). "General Laws
1956 §9-21-2(a) provides" that 'a court may relieve a party or his or her legal
representative from a final judgment, order, decree or proceeding entered
therein for the following reasons: (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect."' Id. at n.7 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 220.
18. Id. at 220-21.
19. Id. at 220 n.8 and 221. This finding came despite defendants'
counsel's testimony "that she never gave Murray permission to speak with
her clients."
20. Id. at 220 (Carrasco also testified that she called Murray a second
time on April 1, 2003 to notify him that she had just made a deposit. Murray
denied that he ever had a second conversation with Carrasco on April 1, and
that he ever told Carrasco to "forget about court.").
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plaintiffs', not Murray's, as per Supreme Court's mandate). 21 The
hearing justice held "that the default should [nevertheless] be
vacated and defendants should be allowed the opportunity to
redeem their property. 22 The justice also held that plaintiff was
entitled to redemption costs and agreed with defendants that the
cost should be calculated based on the parties' redemption
agreement plus accrued interest. 23 Defendants paid plaintiff the
set amount and plaintiff conveyed the property to defendants via a
quitclaim deed. 24 A final judgment was entered, and plaintiff
timely appealed. 25
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Parties'Arguments on Appeal
Plaintiff argued that defendants' motion to vacate the default
decree should have been denied and that the Superior Court
exceeded the scope of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's mandate
when it granted defendants' motion.26 Plaintiff also argued that,
by granting the motion, the hearing justice "improperly relieved
defendants of their own attorney's negligence." 27  Additionally,
plaintiff argued that the justice should not have vacated judgment
based on equitable principles (ineffectiveness of counsel) since this
was a "statutory proceeding under § 9-21-12.' '28 Lastly, plaintiff
argued that, even if the decree was properly vacated, redemption
costs were not assessed in a correct manner.29
Defendants argued that, by accepting the redemption
amounts ordered by the lower court and by tendering the deed to
21. Id. at 221.
22. Id. (The hearing justice's reasoning was that "defendants were
'victim[s] of ineffectiveness of counsel,' because defendants' attorney did not
contact Murray to ascertain whether the April 10 hearing would proceed as
scheduled nor did she ultimately appear at the hearing.").
23. Id. (The redemption fee was $4,371 plus $1,000 in attorneys' fees.
Plaintiff argued for a much larger figure ($108,522.48) that included all the
property taxes it paid, plus interest, expenditure and capital improvement
repairs, attorneys' fees, and rents collected by defendants.).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 222.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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defendants before entry of final judgment, plaintiff waived its
right to appeal. 30 They also contended that the hearing justice
correctly calculated the redemption amount. 31
Supreme Court's Decision
The standard of review applicable to a motion to vacate a
decree is one of abuse of discretion or error of law. 32 That is,
'unless it appears that the trial justice abused his discretion or
made his determination on an error of law, that determination
will not be disturbed by [the] [C]ourt on review. '' 33
The Supreme Court found that the Superior Court committed
numerous errors on remand, but nevertheless affirmed the lower
court's ruling on other grounds.34 First, the Supreme Court held
that Murray's "violation of the anti-contact rule led to excusable
neglect by defendants because it caused them to fail to appear at
the hearing."35 The Court defined excusable neglect as 'failure to
take the proper steps at the proper time . . . in consequence of
some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance
on the care and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the
adverse party.'' 36 Excusable neglect, the Court held, "should be
interpreted flexibly" 37 and relief from judgment should be granted
if, "'taking account of all relevant circumstances,"' 38 'a reasonably
prudent person . . . under similar circumstances"'' 39 would have
taken the same course of conduct. Here the Court noted that, had
Murray abided by the anti-contact rule and communicated with
Carrasco only through her attorney, no confusion would have
30. Id. This is referred to as the doctrine of "acceptance of benefits."
31. Id.
32. Id. at 221 (citing Pleasant Mgmt. LLC v. Carrasco, 870 A.2d 443, 445
(R.I. 2005)).
33. Id. at 222 (quoting Pate v. Pate, 196 A.2d 723, 726 (R.I. 1964)).
34. Id. at 227. "[T]his Court is free to 'affirm a ruling on grounds other
than those stated by the lower-court judge."' Id. at 224 (quoting State v.
Nordstrom, 529 A.2d 107, 111 (R.I. 1987)).
35. Id. at 225.
36. Id. at 224-25 (quoting Jacksonbay Builders v. Azarmi, 869 A.2d 580,
584 (R.I. 2005)) (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 225 (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507
U.S. 380, 389 (1993)).
38. Id. (quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395).
39. Id. (quoting Pari v. Pari, 558 A.2d 632, 635 (R.I. 1989)).
4832009]
484 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:479
arisen regarding the necessity to appear in court. 40 The fact that
Murray told Carrasco to "forget about court," that Carrasco
transferred $200 to her checking account immediately after the
phone conversation, and that she attended all previous court
hearings, pointed to the fact that defendants' failure to attend the
April 10, 2003 hearing was a direct result of Carrasco's
conversation with Murray, a conversation that would never have
occurred had Murray not violated the anti-contact rule.41
The Supreme Court additionally held that the lower court did
not abuse its discretion by allowing defendants the opportunity to
redeem their property because defendants presented a meritorious
defense to set aside a default judgment.42 The Court noted the
well-established rule that, when moving to set aside a default
judgment due to excusable neglect, defendants must show that
they have 'a prima facie meritorious defense which [they] desire
in good faith to present at the trial.'' 43  Here, defendants
presented evidence that they had sufficient funds in other bank
accounts to cover the two checks that were owed to plaintiff.44
The Superior Court found this evidence to be a sufficient
meritorious defense, granted defendants' motion to vacate, and
the Supreme Court affirmed. 45
Finally, the Supreme Court held that the lower court "did not
err or abuse [its] discretion in assessing the redemption amounts"
and affirmed the lower court's judgment awarding plaintiff
$5,371.46 The Court rejected plaintiffs argument that it was
entitled to be made "whole" and receive all of the property taxes it
paid, plus interest, the amount of its expenditures for repairs and
capital improvements, attorney's fees, and certain rents collected
by defendants. 47 Instead, the Court agreed with defendants that
the amount of redemption costs should be determined by the
redemption agreement. 48 As the Court noted, this "was not a
40. Id. at 225-26.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 226.
43. Id. (quoting Shannon v. Norman Block, Inc., 256 A.2d 214, 219 (R.I.
1969)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 227.
47. Id. at 226-27.
48. Id. at 227.
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typical redemption case under § 44-9-29," under which plaintiff
may have been able to redeem "'costs, penalties, and all
subsequent taxes, costs and interest to which petitioner [was]
entitled.' 49  Rather, because the parties entered into an
agreement prior to any ruling on the foreclosure petition, that
agreement, and not the Rhode Island tax sale statute, controlled
the redemption terms. 50 Since the agreement did not contain any
terms relating to taxes, rents, capital improvements, or attorney's
fees, no such fees were owed to plaintiffs. 51 The Court explained
that when the lower court "vacated the default decree and ordered
redemption, he simply put the parties back into their pre-fault
positions.''52
COMMENTARY
A majority of the Supreme Court's opinion was dominated by
criticism of the numerous errors committed by the Superior Court
on remand. First, the Supreme Court expressed great frustration
with the inability of the Superior Court to correctly interpret their
mandate. 53  The Court pointed out that its opinions 'speak
forthrightly and not by suggestion or innuendo"' 54 and lower
courts 'may not exceed the scope of the remand or open up the
proceeding to legal issues beyond remand.' 55 This "mandate rule"
prevents lower courts from examining or varying any issues
already settled by the Supreme Court and instructs such courts to
rule only on the remanded issues. 56 In no uncertain terms, the
Court chastised the lower court for "further cloud[ing] the
landscape of this case" and expressed "disappointment" with the
lower court for not following the Supreme Court's direction to
"determine whether Murray's violation of the anti-contact rule
occasioned excusable neglect by defendants to an extent sufficient
to vacate the default. '5 7 Instead of accepting the mandate to
49. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 44-9-29 (1956)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 222.
54. Id. at 223 (quoting Fracassa v. Doris, 876 A.2d 506, 509 (R.I. 2005)).
55. Id. (quoting Willis v. Wall, 941 A.2d 163, 166 (R.I. 2008)).
56. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Thrasher, 483 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2007)).
57. Id. at 222.
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decide this "narrow issue," the Superior Court "held an in-depth
evidentiary hearing that ultimately led [it] to rule, in direct
contradiction of [the Supreme Court], that Murray did not violate
the anti-contact rule."58 By deciding on issues not before it, the
Superior Court committed "clear error," which is why the Supreme
Court took matters into its own hands and, to avoid another
remand, ruled that sufficient evidence existed to conclude that
there was excusable neglect by defendants. 59
Second, the Supreme Court noted that it "would be remiss if
[it] did not point out the flawed reasoning behind [the lower
court's] ruling' that, even though defendants' counsel was
negligent in not contacting Murray after his conversation with her
client and in failing to attend the hearing, defendants themselves
should not be held responsible for their attorney's negligence. 60
The Supreme Court pointed out that it is a 'fundamental of
agency law"' that "'the neglect of an attorney in professional
matters"' is imputed to that attorney as though it was 'the neglect
of the client himself."' 61  Thus, pending 'extenuating
circumstances of sufficient significance,"' defendants would 'not
be relieved of a default judgment resulting from the failure of
[their] counsel to comply with procedural requirements."', 62 The
Supreme Court stated that, since no such extenuating
circumstances existed in the present case, the lower court's
reasoning was erroneous and was an insufficient reason for
vacating the default decree. 63
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior
Court's vacation of the default entered against defendants for
their breach of redemption agreement because defendants
demonstrated excusable neglect sufficient to justify such vacation.
The Court additionally affirmed the Superior Court's judgment on
the issue of redemption costs owed to plaintiff, holding that such
costs were correctly calculated as per the parties' redemption
58. Id. at 222-23.
59. Id. at 225.
60. Id. at 224 n.12.
61. Id. (quoting King v. Brown, 235 A.2d 874, 875 (R.I. 1967)).
62. Id. (quoting King, 235 A.2d at 875).
63. Id.
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Property Law. Tidewater Realty, LLC v. State of Rhode
Island and Providence, 942 A.2d 986 (R.I. 2008). When a city has
an option to purchase previously condemned land under R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 37-7-3 (1956), it is not required to be "an active participant
in the process" of the sale to a third party until an agreement has
been reached, at which time the city may then choose to accept the
agreement or waive its statutory rights. 1 Additionally, under R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 45-32-5(a)(4)(1956), the Providence Redevelopment
Agency (PRA) has the authority to purchase property "within the
redevelopment area or for the purposes of redevelopment."' 2 To
qualify as a redevelopment area, land must be "blighted and
substandard."' 3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The State of Rhode Island (hereinafter "the state") originally
acquired the commercial waterfront property in dispute, an
approximately five-acre plot located at 242 Allens Avenue in
Providence (hereinafter "the property"), by condemnation. 4 As
such, when the state decided to sell the property in 2004, it was
required under R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-7-3 (1956) to grant a right of
first refusal to whomever owned the land when it was condemned
and, if that right is not utilized, the "city or town wherein the land
or property is situated" must be granted a second option to
purchase the property with the same terms and conditions under
which a third party is willing to purchase the property.5
In February, 2004, the state informed numerous public
agencies that it was going to sell the property and asked that the
agencies reply with any objections. 6 The City of Providence
Director of Planning and Development replied with a handwritten
1. Tidewater Realty, LLC v. State of Rhode Island and Providence, 942
A.2d 986, 995 (R.I. 2008).
2. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-32-5(a)(4) (1956).
3. Tidewater Realty, 942 A.2d at 998.
4. Id. at 989.
5. R.I. GEN. LAws § 37-7-3 (1956).
6. Tidewater Realty, 942 A.2d at 990.
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note stating that the City of Providence (hereinafter "the city" or
"Providence") would be interested if the present tenant of the
property was not interested. 7 The present tenant, Promet Marine
Services Corporation, has operated a successful shipyard and ship
repair facility on the property for over thirty years and has a lease
until 2011, with an option to extend until 2021.8 Promet was
interested in purchasing the property and formed Tidewater
Realty, LLC (hereinafter "Tidewater"), the plaintiff, for the
purpose of pursuing the purchase. 9
After it won a protracted bidding process, Tidewater finalized
a purchase contract with the state. 1°  The contract listed a
purchase price of $1,026,780 and a closing date of June 30, 2005 at
the latest. 1 It also included a clause terminating the contract if
"the City of Providence" exercised its right under R.I. GEN. LAWS §
37-7-3 (1956). 12 The city had thirty days from May 18, 2005 to
exercise its option. 13
On June 17, 2005, the Providence City Council instructed the
PRA to acquire the property as its agent because the city could not
complete the transaction by the closing date. 14 The state then
terminated its contract with Tidewater and, over Tidewater's
objections, conveyed the property to the PRA. 15  Tidewater
proceeded to seek a declaratory judgment that the state's
conveyance to the PRA was null and void because the section 37-7-
3 procedures were not followed, the city could not delegate an
agency to assert its right, and the purchase of the property was
not within the PRA's limited statutory powers. 16 Tidewater also
filed a two-count complaint contending that the state breached
their contract because it sold the property to the PRA instead of
the "City of Providence" as stated in the right to terminate
clause. 17 Tidewater's second count contended that the city and
7. Id.
8. Id. at 989.
9. Id. at 990.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 991.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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the PRA tortiously interfered with its contract with the state. 18
The state, the city, and the PRA moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be
granted. 19 In the alternative, they moved for summary judgment
contending that there was no issue of material fact.20  The
Superior Court denied Tidewater's claim for declaratory relief,
stating that the city did not clearly, decisively, and unequivocally
waive it's statutory right and that the city may empower an
agency to assert its right to purchase. 2 1 The court also granted
summary judgment to the defendants for both counts of
Tidewater's complaint.22 It found that the state properly
terminated the contract with Tidewater per the contract terms
and that the city and the PRA did not tortiously interfere with
Tidewater's contract because, under the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's decision in Belliveau Building Corp. v. O.Coin, the city
and the PRA had "a colorable property interest at stake."23 On
appeal, Tidewater contends that the city waived it's right to
purchase the property, that the city did not have the authority to
delegate its right to purchase to the PRA, and that the PRA did
not have the authority to purchase the property.24
HOLDING AND ANALYSIS
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first resolved that because
it was reviewing a grant of summary judgment and statutory
interpretations, the standard of review was de novo.2 5
Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations
The Rhode Island Supreme Court recently made clear in
Belliveau Building Corp. that there is no tortious interference
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Tidewater Realty, LLC v. State, No. C.A. PC 05-3316, 2000 WL
34601782, at *4 (R.I. Super. Feb. 15, 2006).
22. Id. at *5.
23. Tidewater Realty, 942 A.2d at 991-92; Belliveau Building Corp. v.
O'Coin, 763 A.2d 622, 629 (R.I. 2000); Tidewater Realty, No. C.A. PC 05-3316,
2000 WL 34601782, at *4.
24. Tidewater Realty, 942 A.2d at 992.
25. Id.
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with contractual relations unless the interference was improper. 26
In that case, the Court further expounded that "a rival claimant's
good faith assertion of a colorable property interest, when properly
communicated by appropriate means . . is privileged and
constitutes a defense to a claim of tortious interference with
contract. '27
The Court noted that Tidewater did not argue that the city
and PRA's interference was improper, nor did they attempt to
distinguish Belliveau Building Corp.28 As such, the Court
affirmed the grant of summary judgment because it found, absent
any argument to the contrary, the city and the PRA had a
colorable property interest and asserted their interest in good
faith. 29
The City of Providence's Waiver of Its Rights under section 3 7-7-3
Though Tidewater argued that whether the city waived its
rights under section 37-7-3 is a question of fact, the Court
observed that Tidewater could point to no facts that are in
dispute. 30 The issue was thus suitable for a summary judgment
ruling because "all that remained was a legal determination of
whether the city's actions and inactions . . . constituted a legal
waiver of the city's rights under section 37-7-3. ''31
Addressing first the Providence Director of Planning and
Development's handwritten note that the city was not interested
in purchasing the property if Tidewater was going to purchase it,
the Court found that the Director lacked the authority to bind the
city. 32 Further, even if Tidewater relied on the Director's
apparent authority to bind the city, it would not be enough to
constitute a waiver of the city's right to purchase. 33
The Court also found unpersuasive Tidewater's argument
that the city waived its right to purchase by failing to get involved
26. Belliveau Building Corp., 763 A.2d at 629.
27. Id.
28. Tidewater Realty, 942 A.2d at 993 n.5.
29. Id. at 993.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 994.
32. Id. at 995.
33. Id.
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in the sale process between its initial notice and the certified
notice. 34 "[W]aiver is the voluntary, intentional relinquishment of
a known right. ' 35 Under section 37-7-3, the city must accept or
reject the purchase of the property on the same terms and
conditions that Tidewater and the state agreed upon. 36 "The only
way the city knowingly could waive its rights under the statute
was to do so after those terms and conditions had been
negotiated. ' 37 Thus, even if the Director had the actual authority
to waive the city's right to purchase the property, he had no
knowledge at that point of the terms and conditions of the
agreement between the state and Tidewater and could not have
waived a known right. 38
The PRA's Authority to Purchase the Property
The purpose and power of the PRA is set out by the
Redevelopment Act of 1956. 39 R.I. GEN. LAWS 45-32-5(a)(4)(1956)
allows the PRA to purchase property "within the redevelopment
area or for purposes of redevelopment." 40 The PRA argued that
the property was in a redevelopment area and was purchased for
the purpose of redevelopment. 41 However, the Court rejected both
of the PRA's contentions. 42
A redevelopment area is defined by the Act as "any area of a
community which its legislative body finds is a blighted and
substandard area whose redevelopment is necessary to effectuate
the public purposes declared in this chapter. '43 The city and the
PRA presented the Court a map of the redevelopment areas of the
city, on which eighty percent of Providence was included in four
redevelopment areas. 44  Additionally, neither defendant
contended that the property in dispute was "blighted or
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Sturbridge Home Builders, Inc. v. Downing Seaport, Inc.,
890 A.2d 58, 65 (R.I. 2005)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 996.
40. Id. at 996-97.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-31-8(15)(1956)).
44. Id. at 998 n.10.
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substandard." 45 The Court reasoned that allowing the PRA to
obtain almost any property in the city regardless of whether the
property met the standards for a "redevelopment area" under the
statute would render the statute meaningless, particularly when
considering that the purpose of the PRA is to "prevent[ and
eliminat[e] blighted areas. '46
The Court also quickly rejected the PRA's contention that the
property was purchased for a redevelopment purpose. The Act
defines "redevelopment" as "the elimination and prevention of the
spread of blighted and substandard areas. ' 47 The City Council
instructed the PRA to "acquire the Property directly and to hold,
own, and manage such Property for the interest of the city."'48 The
Court noted that the City Council's instruction and the plaintiffs
long-term lease on the property would leave the PRA with the role
of merely collecting rent, which does not meet the statutory
definition of redevelopment because it does not contribute to
"prevent[ing] and eliminat[ing] blighted areas within the City of
Providence. ' 49 Because the Court found the conveyance invalid, it
did not address Tidewater's other arguments. 50
As the Court found the PRA did not have the authority to
purchase the property, the state's conveyance of the property to
the PRA was a breach of its contract with Tidewater. 51
COMMENTARY
The outcome of Tidewater Realty cuts back the broad,
unchecked powers Providence and the PRA have enjoyed in the
past. At a City Council meeting after the case was decided, a
member of the PRA discussed the threat the case poses to the
city's current land acquisition strategies and gave examples of
properties it had acquired in the past that it would not have been
able to under the Tidewater Realty decision, such as the purchase
45. Id. at 998 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-31-8(15)(1956)).
46. Id. at 998.
47. Id. at 997 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-31-8(14)(1956)).
48. Id. at 997 (quoting Providence, R.I. City Council Resolution § 4 (June
17, 2005)).
49. Id. at 998.
50. Id. at 996 n.8.
51. Id. at 996.
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of the Civic Center. 52 The council member also claimed that
Tidewater's ownership and maintenance of the property as an
industrial area "harms the city in its efforts to expand the tax
base" because the city could have used the property in its
Comprehensive Plan to turn that portion of Allens Avenue into a
mixed use area to include condominiums, hotels, restaurants, and
shopping areas. This property has particular value to the city
because it is adjacent to land owned by a prominent developer who
would like to develop the property to include condominiums,
restaurants, a marina, a hotel, a parking garage, and green
space. 53
However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not change the
city or the PRA's authority to acquire property. In fact, the Court
recognized the importance of the PRA's mission of eliminating
blighted areas of the city.54 The Court merely stated that the
PRA is required to follow the "prescribed statutory requirements
and procedures before it exercises its broad powers." 55  The
Redevelopment Act sets out very particular requirements and
procedures for property acquisition by the PRA in order to protect
the public from misuse of power.56
The city has met substantial resistance in its endeavor to
change the character of the waterfront area and took advantage of
this situation as a way to bypass the exhaustive procedures
proscribed on its route to attaining its goals. It abused the PRA's
powers in an attempt to further its own plans at the expense of
the citizens of Providence. In declaring that "the vehicle of
acquisition is less significant than the importance of the PRA
following its prescribed statutory requirements," the Court took
great strides in preventing abuse of power and protecting public
52. Daniel Barbarisi, Supreme Court Rules Against Providence in Land
Purchase, THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, 2 (March 21, 2008),
http://www.projo.com/ri/providence/content/MCCOUNCIL_3-21-
08_R59FC1Kv7.39c52c2.html.
53. Id. (quoting City Councilman Luis Aponte).
54. Tidewater Realty, 942 A.2d at 996-97.
55. Id. at 997; Barbarisi, supra note 52; Elizabeth Abbott, In Providence,
a Waterfront Promoter Finds Opponents, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 1
(December 26, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/26/business/
26port.html.
56. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-32-5(a)(4) (1956).
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interest. 57
Providence has made several attempts to circumvent the
Court's decision in Tidewater Realty. The city requested that the
Rhode Island Supreme Court reconsider the case and intended to
argue that Tidewater's shipyard and ship repair facility was
blighted by environmental standards. 58  However, the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of
Environmental Management has found the business to be in full
compliance with industry guidelines and the business has no
citations on record. 59 The Court was not persuaded by the city's
argument and rejected its request.60
The city also attempted to amend Rhode Islands General
Laws to avoid litigation over previous land that the PRA was not
statutorily authorized to acquire under Tidewater Realty and to
make it easier for the PRA to acquire land in the future. 6' The
proposed amendment to R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-31-17 declared legal
"[a]ll ordinances, resolutions, official acts, and determinations,
relating to or arising out of the establishment of redevelopment
areas. . .by any community or redevelopment agency."62
Additionally, the proposed amendment to R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-32-
4 states that any area that is designated a redevelopment area by
the city "shall constitute a finding by the legislative body that the
areas. . .are blighted and substandard." 63  The amendment,
combined with the City Council's declaring over eighty percent of
Providence a redevelopment area, would give the PRA a sweeping
power to acquire nearly any property in the city regardless of
whether the land is actually blighted and substandard, and
regardless of whether the PRA intended to fulfill it's purpose of
eliminated blighted and substandard areas. At the close of the
2008 General Assembly, the proposed amendment had not been
57. Tidewater Realty, 942 A.2d at 997.
58. Barbarisi, supra note 52; Chris Hunter, Interview with Providence
Working Waterfront Alliance, www.sustainableprovpiers.com/docs/
wwainterview.doc.
59. Id.
60. Barbarisi, supra note 52.
61. Tidewater Realty, 942 A.2d at 999; S. 2967, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(R.I. 2008).
62. S. 2967, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2008).
63. Id.
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voted on.64
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that under R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 37-7-3, the city is not required to participate in the sale of
property to a third party until an agreement has been reached, at
which time the city may then choose to accept the agreement or
waive its statutory rights. The Court also held that under the R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 45-32-5(a)(4), land does not qualify as a
redevelopment area acquirable by the PRA unless it is "blighted
and substandard."
Dana Merkel
64. S. 2967, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2008) (Legislative Status
Report).
Statutory Interpretation. Palazzo et al. v. Alves, 944 A.2d
144 (R.I. 2008). The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed the
manner a party may seek damages after being named as a
defendant in a "strategic lawsuit against public participation," or
a "SLAPP" suit. A SLAPP suit is a lawsuit brought primarily to
discourage a valid exercise of First Amendment rights. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court determined Rhode Island's anti-SLAPP
statute cannot reasonably be read to provide a mechanism by
which a party may file a separate "SLAPP-back" suit against the
original plaintiff or plaintiffs.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The conflict at issue began with an earlier lawsuit between
the parties. 1 In 2001, Senator Stephen D. Alves (the defendant)
filed a civil suit against Alan G. and William B. Palazzo
(collectively, the plaintiffs), alleging certain statements made by
the plaintiffs at public meetings, and written in letters to the
editor of a local newspaper, were slanderous and libelous, and
placed him in a false light.2 In response, the plaintiffs filed a
motion to dismiss, claiming the defendant's lawsuit was a SLAPP
suit, and seeking "costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to. . . the
anti-SLAPP statute."3
The Superior Court concluded the plaintiffs motion to dismiss
should be treated as a motion for summary judgment, and granted
summary judgment in favor of Alan Palazzo, awarding him costs
1. Palazzo et al. v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 147 (R.I. 2008) (citing Alves v.
Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743 (R.I. 2004)).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 147, 148. "The relevant portion of the anti-SLAPP statute
provides: If the court grants the motion asserting the immunity established
by this section, *** the court shall award the prevailing party costs and
reasonable attorney's [sic] fees ***. The court shall award compensatory
damages and may award punitive damages upon a showing by the prevailing
party that the responding party's claims, counterclaims or cross-claims were
frivolous or were brought with an intent to harass the party or otherwise
inhibit the party's exercise of its right to petition or [to] free speech under the
United States or Rhode Island constitution." Id. at 151 (citing R.I. GEN.
LAWS, § 9-33-2(d) (emphasis added).
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and reasonable attorneys' fees. 4 In regard to William Palazzo, the
summary judgment motion was denied, but the claims against
him were eventually settled.5
The defendant appealed the decision regarding Alan Palazzo
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, and the Court affirmed the
lower court's decision. 6 Thereafter, the defendant and Alan
Palazzo "agreed that the judgment would be satisfied by...
$33,000, which would be deemed to include costs and interest."' 7
However, a few months later the plaintiffs filed the action at issue
in this case against the defendant, alleging the original suit was
brought to interfere with their constitutional rights of free
expression, with an intent to harass, and was frivolous. 8 The
plaintiffs also alleged malicious prosecution and abuse of process,
and requested compensatory and punitive damages, costs, interest
and reasonable attorneys' fees. 9
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the
plaintiffs' suit was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel,
and that the plaintiffs "should have raised the claims. . . as
compulsory counterclaims in the original action." 10 The hearing
justice granted the motion, and held that the anti-SLAPP statute
did not provide for further action following a determination the
statute was violated. 11
The hearing justice concluded that because the plaintiffs had
not requested punitive and compensatory damages in the original
action, their subsequent claim for such damages in the later action
was precluded. 12 Further, the hearing justice "ruled that Alan
Palazzo's claims . . .were precluded due to the fact that he had
been the beneficiary of a judgment in his favor in the initial action
and had thereafter agreed that said judgment could be satisfied
4. Id. at 147-148.
5. Id. at 148.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. Id. The kind of lawsuit that the plaintiffs filed is referred to as a
"SLAPP-back" suit, because such lawsuits "come about as reactions to earlier
litigation that is allegedly of the SLAPP variety." Id. at 148 n.7.
10. Id. at 148.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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by... the sum of $33,000."'13 Additionally, "[w]ith respect to
William Palazzo, the hearing justice found that. . . the proper
method would have been to raise the anti-SLAPP [s]tatute and
prosecute the claim rather than... settle the suit... and then file
a subsequent lawsuit."14
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the plaintiffs
"contend[ed] that the anti-SLAPP statute provides for a two-step
process." 15 Under the plaintiffs' reading of the statute, the first
step is requesting conditional immunity in a civil action pursuant
to the anti-SLAPP statute. 16 "[I]f that defendant's claim. . . is
upheld, the court will dismiss the plaintiffs complaint and will
award... attorneys' fees and costs."' 17 Next, after the dismissal of
the original suit, a SLAPP defendant may choose to file a SLAPP-
back suit seeking compensatory and punitive damages.' 8
Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed the issues of compensatory and
punitive damages, malicious prosecution and abuse of process
were not barred by res judicata, because the issues were not
before the hearing justice in the original action. 19
BACKGROUND
The anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to thwart 'vexatious
lawsuits against citizens who exercise their First Amendment
rights'.. .'by granting... conditional immunity from punitive civil
claims."' 20 "[W]hen conditional immunity attaches, it renders 'the
petitioner or speaker immune from any civil claims for
statements, or petitions, that were not. . . objectively or
subjectively baseless."' 21 "When permitted, 'SLAPP-back suits'
are countersuits filed by SLAPP victims in which damages are
sought from the original plaintiff for abusing the legal process, for
malicious prosecution, and/or for interference with the exercise of
13. Id. at 148-149.
14. Id. at 149.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 150 (citing Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743,
752 (R.I. 2004)).
21. Id. at 150 (citing Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Mallette, 762 A.2d
1208, 1211 (R.I. 2000)).
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constitutional rights of free expression." 22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the Superior Court. 23 The Court determined the anti-
SLAPP statute clearly provides "that, in the same civil action in
which a party has successfully invoked the... statute, the court in
that case 'shall award compensatory damages and may award
punitive damages.. .,24 In so deciding, the Court noted that "both
sentences in the relevant statutory language refer to what the
court may or shall do if certain criteria are met with respect to the
civil action before the court," and the Court understood "that term
to refer to the court in which the anti-SLAPP defense was
raised. ' 25 The Court also noted that "[t]here is no suggestion in
the statute that there should subsequently be a separate civil
action."26
The Court concluded that "the overall objective of the anti-
SLAPP statute [is] to provide for a quick resolution with minimal
costs."2 7 The Court acknowledged that a two-step process was
required prior to the enactment of the anti-SLAPP statute, but
held that "[tihis process changed with the enactment of the...
statute."28 The Court stated that, in the original civil action, the
plaintiffs filed a motion in which they sought costs and attorneys'
fees, and that "[n]othing prevented them from also seeking
compensatory and punitive damages in that same motion or upon
being notified that their... motion had been granted. ' 29
The Court held that "[bly not requesting compensatory and
punitive damages in the original civil action, [the plaintiffs']
22. Id. at 148 n.7 (citing John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory
Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 26 Loy. L.A. L.REv. 395, 431-32 (1993);
Edmond Constantini and Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/SLAPP-back: The Misuse
of Libel Law For Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. POL.
417, 423 (1991)).
23. Id. at 144.
24. Id. at 151.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 152.
28. Id. at 151.
29. Id. at 152.
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claims for such damages are deemed to have been waived. '30 The
plaintiffs' claims were barred by res judicata because the doctrine
"makes a prior judgment in a civil action between the same
parties conclusive with regard to any issues... that could have
been litigated or presented therein."31
The Court also held that "the hearing justice properly granted
the motion to dismiss with respect to the [plaintiffs'] malicious
prosecution claim."32  The Court reasoned that because "[t]he
anti-SLAPP statute provides for recovery of damages identical to
those... available in tort," "to allow recovery under both the anti-
SLAPP statute and a malicious prosecution claim would constitute
double recovery." 33
Further, the Court determined that even if the plaintiffs were
allowed to maintain a separate malicious prosecution action, the
plaintiffs would not be able to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.34 Alan Palazzo "failed to assert an essential
element of a malicious prosecution claim" because he did not
allege any special injury.35 Further, in the case of William
Palazzo, relief could not be granted because a settlement will not
support a claim for malicious prosecution. 36 In fact, the Court
noted that they gave "serious consideration to sanctioning William
Palazzo and his counsel" because "[a]s a matter of black letter law,
his malicious prosecution claim was doomed from the outset." As
such, the filing of the suit raised questions as to whether the
parties acted in good faith. 37
As to the abuse of process claim, the Court described the
plaintiffs' allegations as "conclusory and non-specific." 38  The
Court determined that "nothing in the record even suggests that
[the defendant] used the initial suit for an ulterior or wrongful
30. Id.
31. Id. (citing ElGabri v. Lekas, 681 A.2d 271, 275 (R.I. 1996) (emphasis
added)).
32. Id. at 153.
33. Id (citing Graff v. Motta, 695 A.2d 486, 492 (R.I. 1997); Vallinoto v.
DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830, 842 (R.I. 1997)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 154.
36. Id. at 153, 154 (citing Toste Farm Corp.v. Hadbury, Inc., 798 A.2d
901, 908 (R.I. 2002)).
37. Id. at 153 n.16.
38. Id. at 154 n.17.
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purpose. ' 39 Accepting all of the allegations as true, the Court
concluded "the plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any
conceivable set of facts."'40
COMMENTARY
Rhode Island Lawyers Weekly ranked Palazzo, et al. v. Alves
as one of 2008's ten most important opinions. 41 This is likely
because the Rhode Island Supreme Court had never previously
construed the anti-SLAPP statute with respect to the issues
discussed in the opinion. 42 Interestingly, however, the Supreme
Court made it clear this was far from a difficult case for them to
decide.
The Court stated "[wie would have thought that venerable
principals of American jurisprudence. . . not to mention the
straightforward language of [the statute], would have counseled
against the commencement of this civil action. ' 43 In fact, the
Court found it to be "more than a little disturbing" that the action
was appealed to the level it was. 44Thus, the Court gave "serious
consideration to imposing sanctions even in the absence of a
motion for the same."45
To the Court it was "utterly apparent that the [anti-SLAPP]
statute envisions a unitary proceeding - one in which all
contentions of the parties would.., be 'wrapped up."'4 6 However,
the fact that the editors at Rhode Island Lawyers Weekly believed
this opinion was so important leads one to wonder if, prior to this
case, the statute was so abundantly clear to everyone. Although
the statute does seem relatively unambiguous, this author
wonders if the Court's evident frustration with the procedure the
plaintiffs utilized (ie: a SLAPP-back suit) was exacerbated by
sloppy pleading and a lack of underlying merit in the plaintiffs'
claims.
39. Id. at 154.
40. Id.
41. Vol. 29, Issue No. 35, January 5, 2009 at *1.
42. Id. at 154.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 151.
SURVEY SECTION
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that offended parties
may not seek to recover SLAPP-related damages in "a subsequent
civil action that is... separate from the initial civil action in which
they prevailed on a dispositive motion based on the anti-SLAPP
statute."47 "[I]f a party chooses to assert conditional immunity
under the [anti-SLAPP] statute by filing a dispositive motion, he
or she must assert at that time all claims which said party
believes accrue to him or her by virtue of what that party deems to
be the improper speech related counts in the underlying action."
48
Sally P. McDonald
47. Id.
48. Id. at 153 n. 14.
20091
Statutory Interpretation. Such, et al. v. State, 950 A.2d
1150 (R.I. 2008). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that two
seemingly contradictory bills were not irreconcilably repugnant to
one another and could therefore both be given effect within Rhode
Island General Laws § 31-27-2.1 (1956), which the bills sought to
amend. Plaintiffs were suspected of operating motor vehicles
under the influence of drugs or alcohol within Rhode Island,
refused to submit to chemical tests, and disputed the resulting
imposition of penalties set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.1, as
amended by the challenged bills. The Court found that both bills
were enacted during the same legislative session, were related not
only to the same subject matter, but to the same statute, and were
meant to achieve two distinct and reconcilable objectives.
Moreover, the Court noted that the order in which the Governor's
signature appeared on multiple bills was not relevant to a
determination of whether one bill repealed another.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.1 (1956) [hereinafter "refusal
statute"] criminalizes the refusal of any operator of a motor
vehicle suspected of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol
in Rhode Island to submit to "chemical tests of his or her breath,
blood, and/or urine for the purpose of determining the chemical
content of his or her body fluids or breath."1  Members of the
House of Representatives proposed a bill on January 3, 2006
designated as 2006-H 6700, which amended the refusal statute by
imposing increased penalties for its violation. 2 The bill was
passed by the Senate on June 23, 2006, by the House on June 24,
2006, and signed into law by the Governor on June 28, 2006 as
2006 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 232 [hereinafter "refusal bill"]. 3 On
1. R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-27-2.1 (1956).
2. Such, et al. v. State, 950 A.2d 1150, 1152-53 (R.I. 2008) ("[T]he range
for a license revocation increased from a span of three to six months to a span
of six months to a year," and "second and third offenders became subject to
criminal liability, increased fines, and more community service.").
3. Id.
504
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February 8, 2006, members of the House proposed another bill,
2006-H 7120, which was passed by the House on June 19, 2006, by
the Senate on June 23, 2006, and signed into law by the Governor
on July 1, 2006 as 2006 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 246 [hereinafter
"budget bill"]. 4  Article 10 of the budget bill duplicated the
language of the refusal statute as it had existed prior to the
enactment of the refusal bill, and added only a new subsection, §
31-27-2.1(b)(6), which assessed a two hundred dollar fine against
those in violation of the statute, to support the state's chemical
testing programs. 5
In the fall of 2006, each of the three plaintiffs were
suspected of drunk driving by police officers, refused to submit to
chemical testing for drugs or alcohol, and were subsequently
penalized in accordance with the refusal bill.6 One of the drivers,
Mr. Such, was granted a continuance by the Rhode Island Traffic
Tribunal so that he could petition the Superior Court for a
declaratory judgment with respect to alleged inconsistencies
between the refusal bill and the budget bill. 7 The Superior Court
granted the other drivers' motions to intervene and agreed with
the plaintiffs' argument that the budget bill, which was signed
after the refusal bill and reproduced the refusal statute in its
entirety without including the new penalties set forth in the
refusal bill, implicitly repealed the statutory amendments made
by the refusal bill.8  The Superior Court granted plaintiffs'
summary judgment motion, reasoning that penal statutes should
be interpreted in favor of those against whom the penalties are
imposed and that "when a conflict exists between two statutes, the
last in time controls."9 The State timely appealed to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court. 10
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Supreme Court reviewed the statutory interpretation
4. Id.
5. Id.; See 2006 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 246.
6. Such, 950 A.2d at 1153-54.
7. Id. at 1154.
8. Id. at 1154-55.
9. Id. at 1155.
10. Id.
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issues and the summary judgment motions de novo, 1 and
reversed the decision of the lower court, holding that "the General
Assembly intended for the amendatory language in both bills to
become operative in the refusal statute." 12 The Court proffered
four explanations in support of its conclusion that the budget bill
neither expressly nor implicitly repealed the increased penalties
set forth in the refusal bill. 13
First, the Court employed several tenets of statutory
construction, recognizing the presumption that apparently
inconsistent statutes relating to the same subject matter and
enacted in the same legislative session should be read in relation
to one another so as to avoid contradiction and to give effect to the
statutes' objectives and purposes. 14  Noting that 'repeals by
implication are not favored by the law,"' and that the statute
enacted last-in-time will only be preferred in situations where the
two statutes are irreconcilably repugnant, 15 the Court emphasized
that both statutes were enacted in the same legislative session
and were related to the same subject matter.16 The plaintiffs
could not defeat the resulting presumption that the amendatory
language of each statute should be given effect because the object
and purpose of the refusal bill, which is to increase deterrence, is
not at all irreconcilably repugnant to that of the budget bill, which
is to increase the Department of Health's revenue. 17
The Court then evaluated Rhode Island's law-making
process and held that the Governor does not have the
constitutional power "to repeal one of two bills solely based on the
chronological order he signs legislation when each bill has passed
the General Assembly but neither has received his signature."18
The plaintiffs accorded a significant amount of weight to the fact
that the Governor signed the refusal bill before the budget bill. 19
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1157, 1159.
13. See id. at 1157-58.
14. Id. at 1156.
15. Id. (quoting Berthiaume v. Sch. Comm. of Woonsocket, 397 A.2d 889,
893 (R.I. 1979), quoted in McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 241 (R.I.
2005)).
16. Id. at 1157.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1158.
19. See id. at 1157.
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The Court noted that the General Assembly had actually passed
the budget bill one day prior to passing the refusal bill, and
declared the timing of the Governor's signature to be irrelevant. 20
Justice Suttell reasoned that the House and Senate should not be
expected to predict the order in which the Governor could
conceivably sign bills, much less base statutory amendments on
such predictions. 21
In response to the plaintiffs' next argument concerning the
applicability of the rule of lenity, which requires ambiguous
criminal statutes to be construed in favor of the accused, the Court
held that the rule did not apply because the legislative intent of
each bill was clear.22 The lack of ambiguity with respect to the
reconcilable objects and purposes of the bills barred application of
the rule.23 Finally, the Court declined to consider indicia of
legislative intent offered by the parties because the statute was
not ambiguous, and held that '[w]hen the language of a statute
expresses a clear and sensible meaning, this [C]ourt will not look
beyond it.' 2 4
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Such v. State
can easily be misread with regard to the Governor's constitutional
power to approve or veto legislation prior to its enactment into
law. The Court carefully held that the Governor's constitutional
directive to sign or veto legislation upon House and Senate
approval does not give him the power to repeal one of two bills
based solely on the order in which they were executed by him. 25
The Court is not saying that the Governor's constitutional power
to veto or approve legislation is empty or meaningless, but rather
that the Governor will not be deemed to have vetoed or repealed
any bill based merely on the timing of his approval of other bills.
In effect, the Governor may still expressly veto any act of
legislation that he disproves of, but may not repeal one by simply
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1157-58.
22. Id. at 1158.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1158-59 (quoting First Republic Corp. of Am. v. Norberg, 358
A.2d 38, 41 (R.I. 1976)).
25. Id. at 1158.
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affixing his signature to another. 26
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the Superior
Court's decision and held that the refusal bill and the budget bill
were not irreconcilably repugnant, and could therefore both be
harmonized and given effect in the refusal statute. In so holding,
the Court stressed that its purpose is to evaluate the intent of the
legislature, not that of the Governor.27 The timing of the
Governor's signature was therefore not relevant to a
determination of whether the budget bill repealed the refusal bill,
because the bills were facially unambiguous and reconcilable.
Derek R. Cournoyer
26. See id.
27. Id.
Tort Law. State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 951
A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008). In this decision, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court consolidated five appeals and cross-appeals stemming from
an action filed by the State of Rhode Island against various former
lead pigment manufacturers for the creation of a public nuisance. 1
Addressing defendants' appeal of liability under the tort of public
nuisance, the Court held that the trial judge erred in denying
defendants' motion to dismiss because the state failed to
adequately allege two requisite elements of the tort of public
nuisance: (1) that defendants interfered with a right common to
the general public, and (2) that defendants were in control of the
product that caused the alleged nuisance at the time it harmed
the citizens of Rhode Island.2 Additionally, addressing an issue of
first impression, the Court determined that the Attorney General
may enter into a contingency fee arrangement with outside
counsel in a civil case, so long as the Attorney General retains
absolute and total control over all critical decision-making. 3
1. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 435 (R.I. 2008).
This survey addresses only the issues presented in Track I and Track V of the
decision. In Track II, the Court addressed the state's cross-appeal on the
issue of compensatory damages and held that because the tort of public
nuisance was not a proper cause of action, the issue need not be addressed on
appeal. Id. at 458. In Track III, the Court addressed the state's appeal of the
trial justice's grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant
Atlantic Richfield Co., and once again held that because the tort of public
nuisance was not a proper cause of action, the issue need not be addressed.
Id. at 458- 59. In Track IV, the Court addressed the state's appeal of
contempt orders entered against the Rhode Island Attorney General in
December 2005 and June 2006 and held that the Attorney General's public
statements regarding the case did not support findings of civil contempt. Id.
at 464.
2. Id. at 453.
3. Id. at 475.
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DEFENDANTS' APPEAL OF LIABILITY UNDER THE TORT OF
PUBLIC NUISANCE
FACTS AND TRAVEL
A. Dangers of Lead Poisoning
Until the mid-1970s, lead was commonly used in residential
paint throughout the United States. 4 Lead is a toxic chemical
that can have an array of effects on a child's development and
behavior. 5 Contact with low levels of lead may cause permanent
learning disabilities, reduced concentration and attentiveness, and
behavioral problems. 6 Exposure to higher levels of lead can cause
comas, convulsions, and even death. 7 Children under the age of
six are particularly susceptible to lead poisoning because their
growing bodies tend to absorb more lead, and their brains and
nervous systems are more sensitive to it. 8 Throughout the nation,
children are most often lead-poisoned by consuming lead paint
chips from deteriorating walls or inhaling lead-contaminated
surface dust.9
B. Lead Poisoning and Legislative Responses in Rhode Island
With a housing stock of older homes, childhood lead poisoning
has been a significant problem throughout Rhode Island. From
January 1993 to December 2004, at least 37,363 children were
poisoned by exposure to lead paint.' 0 As of 2004, a total of 1,685
children in Rhode Island were affected. 11 Of this number, 1,167
4. Id. at 437 (citing Office of Lead-Based Paint Abatement and
Poisoning Prevention, 61 Fed. Reg. 29170, 29171 (June 7, 1996)).
5. Id.
6. Id. (citing R.I. GEN LAWS § 23-24.6-2(1) (2001)).
7. Id. (citing Office of Lead-Based Paint Abatement and Poisoning
Prevention, 61 Fed. Reg. at 29170).
8. Id.
9. Id. (citing Preventing Lead Poisoning in Young Children, CDC, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Atlanta, Georgia (1991);
Rabinowitz, M. et al., Environmental Correlates of Infant Blood Lead Levels
in Boston, Environmental Research 38: 96-107 (1985)).
10. Id. at 437-38 (citing testimony of the former director of the Rhode
Island Department of Health, Patricia A. Nolan, M.D.).
11. Id. at 438 (citing Rhode Island Department of Health, Childhood
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children were newly poisoned in 2004.12
The Rhode Island General Assembly has enacted two
provisions aimed at reducing childhood exposure to lead - the
Lead Poisoning Prevention Act 13 (LPPA) and the Lead Hazard
Mitigation Act 1 4 (LHMA). Nevertheless, the rate of childhood
lead poisoning in Rhode Island is more than double the national
average. 15
C. The Attorney General's Lawsuit
On October 12, 1999, the Attorney General of Rhode Island
filed a suit on behalf of the citizens of Rhode Island against a
number of former lead pigment manufacturers and the Lead
Industries Association. 16 The state asserted that defendants were
liable under nine separate causes of action, including the tort of
public nuisance. 17 The state's complaint relative to its public
nuisance claim alleged that "[d]efendants created an
environmental hazard that continues and will continue to
unreasonably interfere with the health, safety, peace, comfort or
convenience of the residents of the [sitate, thereby constituting a
public nuisance." 18
In January 2000, defendants moved to dismiss all counts of
the state's complaint. 19  With respect to the state's public
Lead Poisoning in Rhode Island: The Numbers 2005 Edition 4, 19)
[hereinafter, The Numbers 2005].
12. Id. (citing The Numbers 2005).
13. R.I. GEN LAws § 23-24.6-3 (2001). (The LPPA's stated purpose was to
establish "a comprehensive program to reduce exposure to environmental
lead and prevent childhood lead poisoning, the most severe environmental
health problem in Rhode Island.")
14. R.I. GEN LAws § 42-128.1-8(a) (2006). (The LHMA mandates that
owners of rental properties constructed prior to 1978 correct any lead hazards
on their premises.)
15. Id. at 438 (citing The Numbers 2005). Whereas the national average
of lead paint poisoning in children is 2.2 percent, in Rhode Island the rate is 5
percent. The Numbers 2005.
16. Id. at 439.
17. Id. The state asserted defendants were liable under the theories of
public nuisance, violations of Rhode Island's Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act, strict liability, negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, unjust
enrichment, and indemnity. Id.
18. Id. at 453.
19. Id. at 440.
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nuisance claim, defendants asserted that (1) there was no
interference with a public right as it has been recognized under
public nuisance law and (2) they did not control the lead pigment
at the time it caused harm. 20 The state responded that the
public's right to be free from the hazards of unabated lead had
been infringed and that defendants were responsible for the
presence of lead in public and private properties throughout
Rhode Island. 21 Further, the state contended that defendants
could be held liable regardless of whether they controlled the
properties at issue. 22 The trial justice agreed with the state and
denied defendants' motion.23
Following a series of dismissals, only the state's public
nuisance claim proceeded to trial.24 After a seven-week trial,
however, the jury deadlocked and the trial justice declared a
mistrial.25 A second jury trial then commenced against four lead
pigment manufacturers, Millennium Holdings LLC (Millennium),
NL Industries, Inc. (NL), The Sherwin-Williams Co. (Sherwin-
Williams), and Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO), under the theory of
public nuisance. 26
On February 22, 2006, the jury found that "the cumulative
presence of lead pigment in paints and coatings on buildings
throughout the State of Rhode Island" constituted a public
nuisance, and three defendants, Millennium, NL, and Sherwin-
Williams, were liable for causing or substantially contributing to
its creation. 27 The jury then concluded these three defendants
"should be ordered to abate the public nuisance. '28 On March 16,
2007, the court entered judgment of abatement in favor of the
state against defendants Millennium, NL, and Sherwin-
Williams. 29 The defendants appealed the judgment.30
20. Id.
21. Id. at 453.
22. Id. at 440.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 440-41.
25. Id. at 441.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 442.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, defendants
argued that the trial justice erred in refusing to dismiss the public
nuisance count. 31 The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed and
held that the public nuisance claim should have been dismissed at
the outset of the case because the state did not and could not
allege that (1) defendants' conduct interfered with a public right
or (2) defendants were in control of the lead pigment at the time it
caused harm to the citizens of Rhode Island.32
A. Public Nuisance in Rhode Island
"Under Rhode Island law, a complaint for public nuisance
minimally must allege: (1) an unreasonable interference; (2) with
a right common to the general public; (3) by a person or people
with control over the instrumentality alleged to have created the
nuisance when the damage occurred; and (4) causation." 33 On
appeal, the central issues focused on the elements of "public right"
and "control."
B. Public Right
A necessary element of public nuisance is an interference with
a public right.34 After a substantive analysis of public nuisance
jurisprudence, the Court determined a "public right" to be
"indivisible resources shared by the public at large, such as air,
water, or public rights of way."3 5  Further, the Court defined
conduct that interferes with a public right to be that which
"deprives all members of the community of a right to some
resource to which they are otherwise entitled. '3 6
31. Id. at 443.
32. Id. at 453.
33. Id. at 452-53.
34. Id. at 452.
35. Id. at 453. See City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126,
131,139 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). (Court persuaded by defendants' argument that a
public right is reserved more appropriately for those indivisible resources
shared by the public at large, such as air, water, or public rights of way.)
36. Id.; See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. g (1979)
(Providing a distinction between a public right and an aggregation of private
rights, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: "Conduct does not become
a public nuisance merely because it interferes with the use and enjoyment of
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Given the Court's determination regarding that which
constitutes as a "public right" and that which qualifies as
interference with a public right, the Court held that the state
failed to allege an interference with a public right as the term
traditionally has been understood in the law of public nuisance. 37
While the state alleged that defendants infringed upon the rights
of the citizens of Rhode Island to be free of the hazards of
unabated lead, the Court held that this assertion fell significantly
short of the requisite interference with a public right. 3s Rather,
the Court held that the state must allege the defendants
interfered with indivisible resources shared by the public at large,
such as air, water, or public rights of way, in order to adequately
assert infringement upon a public right. 39
The Court explained that accepting the state's argument
would vastly expand the definition of a public right such that it
would encompass all behavior that causes widespread interference
with the private rights of numerous individuals. 40 To do so,
according to the Court, would be antithetical to the common law
and would lead to a widespread expansion of public nuisance law
that was never intended. 4 1
Accordingly, the Court held that the state failed to adequately
allege that the defendants interfered with a public right. 42
C. Control
A second necessary element of public nuisance is that a
defendant must have had control over the instrumentality causing
the alleged nuisance at the time the damage occurred.4 3 The
Court emphasized that control at the time the damage occurs is
critical because the principal remedy for the harm caused by the
land by a large number of persons.")
37. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 951 A.2d at 453.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 449; See Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F.Supp. 623,
633-34 (D.R.I. 1990). ("Importantly, the defendant must have had control
over the nuisance-causing instrumentality at the time that the damage
occurred.").
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nuisance is abatement. 44
Given the Court's determination that defendants' control over
the instrumentality causing the alleged nuisance at the time the
damage occurs is an essential element, the Court was able to
determine that the state failed to adequately allege this
element. 45  In its complaint, the state filed suit against
defendants in their capacity "either as the manufacturer of...
lead pigment . . . or as the successors in interest to such
manufacturers," for "the cumulative presence of lead pigment in
paints and coatings in or on buildings throughout the [s]tate of
Rhode Island. '' 46  Decidedly lacking from this claim is an
allegation of facts that would suggest the defendants were in
control over the lead pigment at the time it harmed the citizens of
Rhode Island. 47  In fact, in opposing defendants' motion to
dismiss, the state maintained defendants could be held liable
regardless of whether they controlled the lead-poisoned
properties. 48  Ultimately, the Court held that, to state an
actionable claim of public nuisance, the state would have had to
assert that defendants not only manufactured the lead pigment,
but also controlled the pigment at the time it caused injury to the
citizens in Rhode Island. 49
Accordingly, the Court held that the state failed to adequately
allege that defendants had control over the instrumentality
causing the alleged nuisance at the time the damage occurred. 50
D. Unreasonable Conduct and Causation
Given the Court's determination that the state did not and
could not allege that (1) defendants' conduct interfered with a
public right or (2) defendants were in control of the lead pigment
at the time it caused such harm, the Court held that it need not
44. Id.; See R.I. GEN LAws § 10-1-1 (1999) (authorizing the Attorney
General to bring an action to abate a public nuisance); State ex rel. Dresser
Indus. Inc. v. Ruddy, 529 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Mo. 1980) ("Injunctions or
abatements have been the traditional remedies where the state brings suit
for a public nuisance .... ").
45. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 951 A.2d at 455.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 440.
49. Id. at 455.
50. Id.
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decide whether defendants' conduct was unreasonable or whether
defendants caused an injury to the citizens of Rhode Island. 51
E. Remaining Remedies
Although the Court held that defendants' conduct does not
constitute a public nuisance, the Court emphasized that Rhode
Islanders are not left without a remedy for the problems of
childhood lead poisoning throughout the state. 52 First, an
injunction requiring abatement may be obtained against landlords
who permit lead paint on their property to decay. 53 Second, the
LPPA provides for penalties and fines against property owners
who violate its obligations.54 Finally, the LHMA permits a
private cause of action to be brought by households with at-risk
occupants for injunctive relief to obligate property owners to
comply with the Act. 5 5
Apart from these aforementioned actions, the Court
emphasized that the proper means of bringing a lawsuit against a
manufacturer of lead pigment for the sale of an unsafe product is
a products liability action. 56 Whereas public nuisance focuses on
the abatement of annoying or bothersome activities, products
liability law has a well-defined structure specifically designed to
hold manufacturers liable for harmful products they inject into the
stream of commerce. 57 The Court stressed it was essential that
these two causes of action remain separate and distinct. 58
THE PROPRIETY OF THE STATE'S CONTINGENCY FEE
ARRANGEMENT WITH PRIVATE COUNSEL
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Prior to commencing the civil action, the Attorney General of
51. Id.
52. Id. at 456.
53. Id.; See, e.g., Pine v. Kalian, 723 A.2d 804, 804-05 (R.I. 1998).
54. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 951 A.2d at 456; See R.I. GEN LAWS § 23-
24.6-23 (2001); R.I. GEN LAWS § 23-24.6-27 (2001).
55. Id.; See R.I. GEN LAWS § 42-128.1-10 (2006).
56. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 951 A.2d at 456.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 457.
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Rhode Island determined his office lacked sufficient resources to
undertake the demands of such a substantial case and,
consequently, entered into a contingent fee agreement with two
law firms. 59 The agreement provided that the law firms would
provide legal representation on behalf of the state and, in return,
the law firms would be entitled to 16 2/3 percent of any award
recovered.60
During the course of the trial, defendants argued that such a
contingent fee agreement was unenforceable and void because the
agreement (1) constituted an unlawful delegation of the Attorney
General's authority and (2) violated public policy.61 The trial
justice, disagreeing with defendants, upheld the contingent fee
arrangement as a lawful contract. 62  Thereafter, defendants
petitioned the Rhode Island Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
to review the propriety of such a contingent fee agreement. 63
After an oral hearing on the issue, the Court held the issue was
not then properly justiciable, and thus, the Court declined to make
a judgment. 64 Following the trial court's finding for the state on
the public nuisance claim, defendants once again requested that
the Court review the propriety of the state's contingent fee
arrangement with private counsel. 65
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, defendants
contended that the trial justice erred in permitting the state to
enter into a contingent fee agreement with private counsel
because such an agreement constitutes an unlawful appropriation
of state funds which, in turn, violates Rhode Island law.
66
Specifically, defendants argued that when the Attorney General
obtains money that rightly belongs to the state, he is obligated by
59. Id. at 469. The firms with which the state entered into a contingent
fee agreement were Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole (now known
as Motley Rice LLP) and Decof & Grimm (now known as Decof & Decof). Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 434-35.
66. Id. at 477.
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statute to pay all of that money into the General Treasury. 67
Therefore, defendants contended that the contingent fee
arrangement would allow the Attorney General to circumvent this
statutory requirement because a percentage of money obtained
would be paid to outside counsel before going to the General
Treasury.68 On this issue of first impression, the Court disagreed
with defendants' argument and held that the Attorney General
may enter into a contingency fee arrangement with private
counsel in a civil case so long as the Attorney General retains
absolute and total control over all critical decision-making. 69
A. The Contingency Fee Issue Warranted Review
Although the Court determined that the defendants' appeal
on the propriety of the state's contingency fee arrangement
became moot when the Court determined the state's public
nuisance claim was not a proper cause of action, the Court
nevertheless held that the issue warranted consideration. 70 The
Court made this determination because it found the issue to be of
"extreme public importance" and is "capable of repetition yet
evades review."71 Further, the Court noted that it would be a
disservice to Rhode Island judicial officers, the Attorney General,
and the public at large if the Court declined to address this
issue. 72
B. The Propriety of Contingent Fee Arrangements
The Court began its analysis with an overview of the powers
and responsibilities of the Attorney General in order to determine
if any inherent constitutional principles or policy considerations
precluded the Attorney General from entering into a contingent
fee arrangement with private counsel. 73 In this analysis, the
Court noted that the Attorney General is an independently elected
constitutional officer entrusted with the common law duty of
representing the public interest and ensuring that justice is
67. Id.
68. Id. at 478.
69. Id. at 475.
70. Id. at 470.
71. Id. (quoting Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 139 (R.I. 1980)).
72. Id.
73. See id. at 470-74.
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properly sought after in both the criminal and civil arenas. 74 To
uphold this duty, the Rhode Island Constitution, several Rhode
Island statutes, and the common law provide the Attorney
General with a broad degree of discretion, and historically, the
Court has tended, when appropriate, to provide deference to the
Attorney General's strategic and tactical decisions. 75 Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the Attorney General is entitled to act
with a significant degree of autonomy.76
Given consideration of the Attorney General's powers and
responsibilities, the Court determined there is nothing
unconstitutional, illegal, or inappropriate in a contractual
relationship in which the Attorney General hires outside counsel
under a contingent fee arrangement in civil litigation. 77 Rather,
the Court determined such arrangements may lead to socially
beneficial results which otherwise may not have been
attainable. 78
C. Contingent Fee Arrangements Do Not Constitute Unlawful
Appropriations of State Funds
Following a determination that the Attorney General's
contingent fee arrangement was not precluded on policy or
constitutional grounds, the Court addressed the defendants'
argument that the Attorney General's contingent fee agreement
constitutes an unlawful appropriation of state funds which, in
turn, violates Rhode Island law. 79 The Court concluded such an
arrangement does not constitute an unlawful appropriation of
state funds because an attorney operating under a contingent fee
arrangement with the Attorney General has an equitable lien on
any recovered damages pursuant to the terms of the fee
agreement.80 Hence, the contingent fee counsel has an equitable
74. Id. 471-72, 474 (citing Newport Realty, Inc. v. Lynch, 878 A.2d 1021,
1032 (R.I. 2005)); see generally Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 962 F.2d 45, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that the
solemn duty to do justice applies "with equal force to government's civil
lawyers").
75. Id. at 473-74.
76. Id. at 474.
77. Id. at 475.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 477-78.
80. Id. at 478.
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right to a portion of the damages.8 1 Accordingly, the net amount
which must be payable to the General Treasury is determined
only after the appropriate fee has been paid to the contingent fee
counsel in accordance with the equitable lien holding.82
D. Restrictions on Contingent Fee Arrangements
Although the Court determined that the Attorney General
may enter into contingent fee arrangements with outside counsel
in a civil case, the Court held that a number of limitations must be
expressly set forth in such arrangements. 83 First, the Office of the
Attorney General must have total control over the course and
conduct of case. 84 Second, the Attorney General must have veto
authority over any decisions made by outside counsel.8 5 Third, a
senior member of the Attorney General's staff must be personally
involved in all stages of the case. 86 Finally, the Attorney General
must appear to be exercising control of the case.8 7
Additionally, the Court held that contingent fee arrangements
should be subject to judicial oversight for a determination of the
reasonableness of the fee before any payment is made to counsel
and before any net amount is paid to the state.8 8 Only after a
court has reviewed and approved the fee arrangement can the
requisite fee be paid and the resulting balance turned over to the
General Treasury.89
COMMENTARY
A. The Impropriety of the State's Public Nuisance Claim.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding regarding the
impropriety of the state's public nuisance claim has received a
great deal of national media attention, making it arguably one of
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 477.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 479.
89. Id. at 480.
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the highest profile decisions ever to come out of the State of Rhode
Island. This notoriety occurred, in large part, because the trial
court's finding for the state marked the first time former lead
pigment manufacturers were found liable for the creation of a
public nuisance, and in the wake of this initial decision, a wave of
similar public nuisance litigation commenced throughout the
nation. 90 Further, much attention was paid to the trial court's
decision because it was hailed as a victory for the citizens,
specifically the children, of the State of Rhode Island. 91
Accordingly, when the Rhode Island Supreme Court overturned
the verdict, the decision drew widespread attention and, in turn,
was received by many with hostility. 92
Despite all the sound and fury, however, a meticulous
examination of the Court's decision demonstrates it is consistent
with the prior application of the tort of public nuisance in Rhode
Island. Specifically, the Court's determination that, to establish
the requisite interference with a public right one must allege
interference with "indivisible resources shared by the public at
large, such as air, water, or public rights of way," is indeed in
accordance with conduct Rhode Island courts have previously
found to state an actionable claim for public nuisance. 93 Likewise,
the Court's finding that a public nuisance defendant must control
90. See Corry E. Stephenson, After Rhode Island's Public Nuisance Case,
Lead Paint Industry on the Defensive, Lawyers USA, Apr. 23, 2007,
http://www.lawyersweeklyusa.com/index.cfm/archive/view/id/404488.
91. See, e.g., Editorial, Getting the Lead Out, The Boston Globe, Apr. 10,
2006, http://www.boston.com/news/
globe/editorial opinionleditorials/articles/2006/04/10/gettingtheIleadout/
("[I]f the verdict stands, thousands of Rhode Island children will be kept safe
from this everyday poison").
92. See, e.g., Fidelma Fitzpatrick, Bob McConnell, Jack McConnell,
Editorial, Fidelina Fitzpatrick! Bob McConnell! Jack McConnell:, Aug, 29,
2008, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CTmcconnl9_08-
19-08 MHB7EKI v24.412fc2a.html.
93. See, e.g., Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1245 (R.I. 1982) (Public
nuisance action appropriate where defendants' chemical dump emitted odors
into air which caused individuals throughout the community to suffer
illness); Narragansett Real Estate Co. v. Mackenzie, 34 R.I. 103, 123 (R.I.
1912) (Court explicated that obstructions which materially impair the
public's right of navigation in public waters would constitute a public
nuisance); State v. Providence Gas Co., 27 R.I. 142, 143 (R.I. 1905)
(Defendant's pollution of public waters that caused damage to shoreline,
emitted noxious odors, and affected fish, constituted a public nuisance).
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the instrumentality causing the alleged nuisance at the time the
damage occurred is similarly in line with prior public nuisance
claims Rhode Island courts determined to be actionable. 94 In fact,
Rhode Island courts have, on occasion, emphasized the importance
of the element of control in public nuisance actions. 95
In addition to the Court's adherence to the traditional
requirements of a public nuisance claim as applied in Rhode
Island, the Court's decision is in harmony with the overwhelming
amount of case law that suggests the tort of public nuisance is not
the appropriate cause of action to pursue product-based claims. 96
Over the past three decades, the nation has witnessed a wave of
public nuisance claims involving products such as asbestos,
firearms, tobacco, and most recently, lead paint.97 Despite the
prevalence of these actions, however, the vast majority of courts
have rejected public nuisance claims against product
manufacturers. 98 While the rationale of each court's respective
holdings are varied, their decisions frequently echo an underlying
concern that the application of public nuisance to product
manufacturers constitutes an unwarranted expansion of the tort
into a realm which greatly exceeds its traditional and logical
limitations. 99
94. See, e.g., Wood, 443 A.2d at 1245-46 (Defendants owned the chemical
dump at the time its noxious fumes caused harm to community); Pine v.
Vinagro, 1996 WL 937004, at *1, 23 (Defendants owned and operated waste
stock piles at the time its smoke and offensive odors caused harm to nearby
residents).
95. See, e.g., Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 749 F.Supp 381, 395
(D.R.I. 1990) (Applying Rhode Island law, the Court stated "liability . . .
under the law of nuisance depends primarily on the question of control and
duty . . . [o]ne who controls a nuisance is liable for damages caused by that
nuisance.").
96. See Richard 0. Faulk & John S. Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom: The
Transmutation of Public Nuisance Litigation, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 941, 962
(2007).
97. See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance:
Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L. J.
541, 552-61 (2006).
98. See id.
99. See e.g., Tioga Public School Dist. No. 15 of Williams County, State of
N.D. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Nuisance law
would become a monster that would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort);
In re Lead Paint Litigation, 924 A.2d 484, 494 (N.J. 2007) (" [Wlere we to
permit these complaints to proceed, we would stretch the concept of public
nuisance far beyond recognition and would create a new and entirely
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Ultimately, a review of Rhode Island judicial precedent, as
well as the vast majority of case law involving product-based
public nuisance claims, reveals that the Court properly concluded
a public nuisance action could not be asserted against defendants
in this instance. This decision, as disconcerting as it may seem to
the untrained eye, clearly reflects adherence to the theoretical
underpinnings of the tort of public nuisance and its respective
application in Rhode Island. While overturning the trial court's
decision undoubtedly brought the Court no pleasure, the Court is
nevertheless constrained by the law and "powerless to fashion
independently a cause of action that would achieve the justice that
these children deserve." 100
Looking ahead, this decision will undoubtedly have a
significant impact on the future application of the tort of public
nuisance in Rhode Island. The Court's decision served to add a
great deal of clarity to a tort William Prosser and Werdner Page
Keeton famously labeled an "impenetrable jungle." 10 1  Most
importantly, however, this decision illuminates the impropriety of
a public nuisance action for a product-based claim, which,
according to the Court, is appropriately reserved for products
liability actions. 102 While the wave of product-based public
nuisance actions may, for a time, continue throughout the nation,
this decision makes clear such claims have no legal foundation in
Rhode Island.
B. Contingency Fee Arrangement
Although the Court's decision regarding the propriety of the
state's contingency arrangement has not received the same degree
of national attention as its decision regarding the impropriety of
the state's public nuisance claim, it nevertheless is a monumental
holding that will undoubtedly have a lasting impact in Rhode
Island. Going forward, the Attorney General may enter into a
contingency fee arrangement with outside counsel in order to
unbounded tort antithetical to the meaning and inherent theoretical
limitations of the tort of public nuisance").
100. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 436 (R.I. 2008).
101. See id. at 455 n.17 (citing W. Page Keeton et. al., Handbook of the
Law of Torts, ch. 15, § 86 at 616 (5th ed. 1984)).
102. See id. at 456.
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assist in laborious civil litigation. 103
Overall, this decision rests on the Court's determination that
the Attorney General is dutifully bound to ensure "that justice
shall be done" and accordingly, as an independently elected
constitutional officer, is vested with broad discretionary authority
to determine how to pursue such objectives.104 The Court arrived
at this determination upon a meticulous and substantive review of
the responsibilities and respective powers of the Attorney General.
Further, the Court's decision rests soundly on the historical trend
in Rhode Island to provide, when appropriate, deference to the
strategic and tactical decisions of the Attorney General. 105
While this decision is demonstrative of the Court's great
respect for the discretionary authority vested in the Attorney
General, it nevertheless does not provide the Attorney General
carte blanche to enter such agreements without restriction.
Rather, the Court makes clear that such agreements are
permissible only in civil cases and must contain inherent
limitations. 106 At the forefront of such limitations, the Attorney
General must retain absolute and total control over all critical
decisions throughout the entirety of the case. 107 Given this
requirement, the Court effectively ensures that the interests of the
citizens of Rhode Island are, at all times, superior to any interests
of outside counsel. Additionally, the Court emphasized that the
trial judge must review the reasonableness of such fee
arrangements before any awards can be apportioned. 10 8 With this
check in place, the Court makes certain that the state of Rhode
Island recovers a fair and equitable portion of any award obtained.
Ultimately, the Court's holding represents an appropriate
balance, providing the Attorney General discretion to uphold his
duty-bound obligations by entering into contingency fee
arrangements with private counsel yet ensuring that the interests
of the citizens of Rhode Island are properly represented.
103. Id. at 475.
104. See id. at 473-74.
105. See id. at 474.
106. Id. at 475.
107. Id. at 477.
108. Id. at 479.
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CONLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the state failed to
assert a cognizable public nuisance claim because it did not and
could not allege two requisite elements of the tort: (1) that
defendants interfered with a right common to the general public
and (2) that defendants were in control of the product that caused
the alleged nuisance at the time it harmed the citizens of Rhode
Island. 109 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the trial justice
erred in denying defendants' motion to dismiss. 11°Additionally,
addressing an issue of first impression, the Court determined that
the Attorney General may enter into a contingency fee
arrangement with outside counsel in a civil case, so long as the
Attorney General retains absolute and total control over all
critical decision-making. 111  The Court emphasized that such
arrangements may assist the Attorney General in pursuit of
dutifully bound obligations, and, in turn, lead to socially beneficial
results which otherwise may not have been attainable. 112
Matthew Watson
109. Id. at 453.
110. Id. at 458.
111. Id. at 475.
112. Id.
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Tort Law. Tyre v. Swain, 946 A.2d 1189 (R.I. 2008). The
superior court has jurisdiction to declare a defendant a slayer
under Slayer's Act. Once the superior court has determined
whether or not the defendant is a slayer, the probate court will
then determine what effect that determination has on the
distribution of the decedent's assets. In addition, an aggrieved
party who does not raise an objection at trial on a particular issue
has waived his right to address that issue on appeal.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Shelley Tyre (hereinafter Shelley) died March 12, 1999, while
scuba diving near Tortola, British Virgin Islands. 1  Upon
returning to the U.S. over a week later Shelley's husband
(hereinafter defendant) informed Shelley's parents that he did not
know what had happened to Shelley, and that he was not diving
with her when she drowned. 2 Subsequently, on March 5, 2002,
Shelley's parents filed a three-count complaint against the
defendant, which alleged that defendant: (1) was a slayer,
pursuant to section 33-1.1-1(3) of the Rhode Island General Laws 3
(RIGL); (2) caused Shelley's wrongful death 4; and (3) should be
subject to civil liability for a criminal act, pursuant to RIGL
section 9-1-2. 5
Over the course of the next four years, there were numerous
hearings on pretrial motions to address the status of defendant's
counsel. 6  Defendant's initial counsel was an attorney who
handled primarily probate matters. 7 After realizing that this case
was beyond her expertise, however, the probate attorney helped
the defendant retain a trial attorney. 8 Unfortunately, the trial
1. Tyre v. Swain, 946 A.2d 1189, 1192 (R.I. 1999).
2. Id.
3. R.I. GEN. LAws § 33-1.1-1(3) (1995).
4. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1192.
5. See id.; R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-2 (1997).
6. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1192.
7. See id.
8. See id.
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attorney subsequently became seriously ill and was excused from
the case by the court.9 In June 2004, the probate attorney moved
to withdraw from representing the defendant in the wrongful
death action due to her inexperience with trial work.I° The trial
judge denied that motion on the basis that allowing the probate
attorney to withdraw while the trial attorney was court-excused
could result in the trial being stayed indefinitely. 1 1 During this
proceeding the trial judge suggested that the defendant seek
alternate counsel. 12
In August 2005, the plaintiffs moved to assign the case for a
trial date certain, 13 arguing that pursuant to RIGL sections 9-2-
1814 and 9-2-20,15 they had a right to accelerate the case. At a
hearing on the issue, the trial judge balanced the defendant's
desire to have his trial attorney's representation with the
plaintiffs' interest in accelerating the case. 16 Citing her concern
that any further continuance would infringe on the plaintiffs'
rights, the judge set a trial date of October 25, 2005.17 Before this
hearing concluded, the judge again advised the defendant to seek
alternate trial counsel. 18
In October 2005, because the defendant's trial attorney was
too ill to represent him, the defendant moved to stay the start of
the trial. 19 There were two other trial attorneys who were willing
to represent the defendant, but both needed additional time to
prepare for trial. 20 The trial judge denied the defendant's motion
to stay the trial on the basis that defendant should have retained
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 1193; R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-2-18 (1997) (requiring the
acceleration of causes of action brought by plaintiffs sixty-five years of age or
older at the request of the party).
15. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-2-20 (1997) (requiring the acceleration of actions
for wrongful death and other actions involving damages in excess of
$100,000).
16. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1192-93.
17. Id. at 1193.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. Id.
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alternate counsel sooner. 21
Defendant then petitioned the Rhode Island Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari to review the denial of his motion to stay
the proceedings, but immediately thereafter filed for bankruptcy
which automatically stayed all of the proceedings in the case. 2
2
The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the writ as moot. 23 In
December 2005, the bankruptcy stay was lifted. 24 The trial court
held a scheduling conference at which the plaintiffs requested a
trial date and defendant's two attorneys moved to withdraw from
the case. 25 The trial judge granted both motions for withdrawal,
and after the defendant informed her that he had no intention of
presenting a defense at trial, the judge set a trial date of February
13, 2006.26
Throughout the trial, the defendant's participation was
limited:27 he was in court few trial days and did not cross-examine
any witnesses. 28 The defendant did, however, move for dismissal
of count one of the complaint on the basis that Slayer's Act 29 did
not give rise to an independent cause of action. 30 The trial judge
agreed that §33-1.1-1(3) did not give rise to an independent cause
of action, but stated that a jury had to determine whether the
plaintiffs had proven that the defendant intentionally killed
Shelley with malice aforethought, so that the trial judge herself
could then declare whether the defendant was a slayer within the
meaning of the statute.31
The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on all three counts,
and awarded compensatory damages with interest totaling
$2,815,085.46, and punitive damages of $2,000,000.32 The
defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, and he timely
appealed to the Supreme Court. 33
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 1196.
28. Id.
29. Id.;R.I. GEN. LAwS § 33-1.1-1(3) (1995).
30. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1196.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first considered defendant's
argument that the superior court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to declare him a slayer under Slayer's Act 3 4 because
the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether
a person is a slayer. 35 Plaintiffs countered that the superior court
had jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act (the UDJA). 36
Rhode Island law vests probate courts with jurisdiction over
the probate of wills. 3 7 The superior court, however, "may exercise
general probate jurisdiction in all cases brought before it on
appeal from probate courts, or when such jurisdiction is properly
involved in suits in equity."38 In addition, the UDJA expressly
provides that the superior court also has jurisdiction to make
declarations in probate matters.39
The Supreme Court emphasized that because Rhode Island's
Slayer's Act may apply in the absence of a criminal conviction, a
civil proceeding was required in this case to determine whether
the defendant willfully or unlawfully took Shelley's life. 40 The
Court determined that because defendant was entitled to a jury
determination of his status as a slayer, which the probate court
could not provide, the superior court had subject matter
jurisdiction with regard to whether the defendant was a slayer; it
was then up to the probate court to determine what effect that
34. Id. at 1197.
35. Id.
36. Id.; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-30-1 (1997) (vesting the superior court with the
power to "declare rights, status and other legal relations, whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed.")
37. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1197; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-9-9 (1997) (stating, in
relevant part: "[elvery probate court shall have jurisdiction ... of the probate
of wills .... ).
38. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1197; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-2-17 (1997).
39. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1197; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-30-4 (1997) (stating, in
relevant part: "[a]ny person interested as through an executor .... next of kin
... in the estate of a decedent... may have a declaration of rights or legal
relations in respect thereto: . . . to determine any question arising in the
administration of the estate . . .
40. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1198.
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declaration had on the distribution of Shelley's assets. 41
Motion for Continuance
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the defendant's
motion for a continuance because, prior to trial, the defendant
failed to request a continuance of the February 2006 trial date,
and therefore had not properly preserved this issue for appeal. 42
The Court cited the well-recognized rule that it will not "review
issues that are raised for the first time on appeal. '4 3
Moreover, the Court noted that even if the defendant had
properly preserved this issue for appeal, because a trial judge has
great discretion in managing her trial calendar, the Court would
not disturb a trial justice's decision to grant or deny a continuance
absent an abuse of discretion. 44 Because the trial judge advised
the defendant to seek alternate counsel several times, and
properly balanced the plaintiffs' interest in an accelerated trial, 45
the Supreme Court held that the trial judge had not abused her
discretion.46
Punitive Damages
The Supreme Court next addressed the defendant's argument
that the trial judge erred in permitting punitive damages in a
wrongful death action brought under RIGL section 9-1-2. 47 The
defendant's first objection to the jury award of punitive damages
was in his motion for a new trial; he did not object to the trial
judge's jury instructions on punitive damages, nor did he object
during a later hearing on the motion for a new trial.48 The Court
held that because the defendant did not make a timely objection to
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1198-99.
43. Id. at 1199.
44. Id.
45. Id.; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-2-18 (1997) (requiring the acceleration of
causes of action brought by plaintiffs sixty-five years of age or older at the
request of the party), and § 9-2.20 (requiring the acceleration of actions for
wrongful death and other actions involving damages in excess of $100,000).
46. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1199.
47. Id.; R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-2 (1997).
48. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1200.
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punitive damages at trial, he had waived the issue on appeal. 49
Single Judgment
The defendant's fourth argument on appeal was that the jury
should have rendered separate verdicts for economic loss damages
and survival damages and that therefore, the trial court's single
judgment for plaintiffs' wrongful death claim was in error. 50
Defendant argued that combining the compensatory damages
award for plaintiffs' wrongful death and survival claims prevented
survival damages from passing to his children, who were named
as contingent beneficiaries in Shelley's will. 5 1
The Rhode Island Wrongful Death Act 52 provides two
separate causes of action: section 10-7-1 provides for recovery for
the death itself, and sections 10-7-5 and 10-7-7 provide for
survival damages. The Court noted that the Act also mandates
that damages for the wrongful death itself shall be awarded to the
decedent's next of kin and not to the estate, 53 while survival
damages shall be awarded to the estate itself.54
In reviewing the trial court's record, the Supreme Court noted
that although the trial judge failed to instruct the jury to render
separate verdicts for wrongful death and survival damages, the
defendant did not object at the time, and first raised this issue in
his motion for a new trial. 55 Citing Rule 51(b) of the Superior
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. R.I. GEN. LAws §10-7 (1997).
53. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1200; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-10 (1997) (stating: "[a]ll
damages recoverable under §§ 10-7-1 - 10-7-4 shall be recoverable by and
awarded to those beneficiaries as specified in § 10-7-2 and shall not be
deemed or considered damages to the estate of the decedent, nor shall they be
considered in any way an asset of the estate of the decedent, nor liable to any
claims against the estate of the decedent."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-2 (1997)
(providing, in relevant part: "of the amount recovered in every action under
this chapter one.half shall go to the husband or widow, and one-half shall go
to the children of the deceased, .. and, if there is no husband or widow, to
the next of kin .... ).
54. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1200; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-6 (1997) (providing, in
relevant part: "the amount recovered in every action under § 10-7-5 shall go
to the decedent's estate and become part of the estate.").
55. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1201.
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Court Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 which states in relevant part,
that "[n]o party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an
instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires
to consider its verdict," the Supreme Court refused to interfere
with the compensatory damages judgment entered in favor of the
plaintiffs. 57
Conformed Verdict
Defendant's final argument on appeal was that the trial
justice erred by sua sponte applying the compensatory damages
award to the plaintiffs' section 9-1-2 claim, 58 because the
plaintiffs' complaint did not seek compensatory damages on that
claim. 59 The Court held that because the defendant failed to
object to the application of compensatory damages to the section 9-
1-2 count at trial, he could not raise the argument on appeal. 60
COMMENTARY
The Tyre Court correctly held that the superior court has
jurisdiction to declare a defendant a slayer under Rhode Island's
Slayer's Act.61 The plaintiffs in this case were obviously seeking a
declaration that the defendant was a slayer so that he would not
qualify as a beneficiary of their daughter's estate. 62 Because
Rhode Island's Slayer's Act does not require a criminal conviction
for a defendant to be declared a slayer, a civil proceeding may be
necessary to determine whether a defendant willfully took the
victim's life. Section 9-30-4 of the UDJA clearly vests the superior
court with jurisdiction to make declaratory judgments with
respect to probate matters. 63 Thus, the Rhode Island Supreme
56. See id.; SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 51(b).
57. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1201-02.
58. See id.; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-2 (1997).
59. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1202.
60. Id.
61. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-1(3) (1995).
62. Tyre, 946 A.2d at 1198.
63. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-30-4 (1997) (stating, in relevant part: "[any person
interested as through an executor, .. . [or] next of kin ... in the estate of a
decedent . . . may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in respect
thereto: . . . to determine any question arising in the administration of the
estate. . ").
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Court properly held that in the absence of a criminal conviction,
the superior court had jurisdiction to declare the defendant in this
case a slayer, so that he would not be a beneficiary of his deceased
wife's estate.
Above all, however, the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
decision in this case illustrates the importance of making timely
and appropriate objections during lower court proceedings. A
party who neglects to raise an objection at trial waives his right to
address that issue on appeal. Future litigants who elect to
proceed pro se, as the defendant in this case, must be cognizant of
this fact and adhere to the rules of civil procedure at trial or risk
losing their right to raise issues on appeal.
CONCLUSION
In Tyre v. Swain, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
the superior court has jurisdiction to declare a defendant a slayer
under Slayer's Act, 6 4 and that once the superior court has
determined whether or not defendant is a slayer, the probate court
will then determine what effect that determination has on the
distribution of the decedent's assets. 65 In addition, the Court
affirmed that an aggrieved party who does not raise an objection
at trial on a particular issue has waived his right to address that
issue on appeal. 66
Julie K. Moore
64. Id. at 1198; R.I. GEN. LAws § 33-1.1-1(3) (1995).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1199-1202.
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Torts. Willis v. Omar, 954 A.2d 126 (R.I. 2008). A social host
is not under a duty of care to protect third parties from an
intoxicated driver leaving the host's home, where the driver was
an invited guest who consumed alcohol served by the host. The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island was asked to create a new cause
of action that imposes a duty of care on a "social host to protect a
person from injury resulting from alcohol consumption by either a
guest or a drunk driver who leaves the party and is involved in an
accident that causes injury or death."1  The Court declined to
overturn established precedent, and reiterated its stance that
creation of a cause of action based on social host liability is best
suited for the Rhode Island Legislature.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On August 30, 2002, after a long night of drinking, the
intoxicated plaintiff, Elizabeth Willis, suffered permanent injuries
from a single-car collision in a vehicle operated by her similarly
intoxicated boyfriend, Steven N. Grise (Grise).2 The night began
around 5:30 p.m., when the plaintiff went to Grise's apartment 3,
where the two ate dinner and each consumed a kamikaze
cocktail. 4 Afterward, the plaintiff and Grise went to meet Maurice
and Barbara Omar, the defendants, at a pizza restaurant in
Smithfield, Rhode Island. 5 While at the restaurant, both Grise
and the plaintiff consumed two margaritas with their pizza before
departing to the defendants' home. 6
Upon arriving at the defendants' residence around 8:00 p.m.,
Maurice Omar concocted two pitchers of Long Island Iced Tea. 7
The defendants poured drinks for the plaintiff and Grise
1. Willis v. Omar, 954 A.2d 126, 129 (R.I. 2008).
2. See id. at 127.
3. Id. (Grise's apartment is located in Manville, Rhode Island.)
4. Id. A kamikaze is an alcoholic beverage that consists of triple sec,
vodka, and limejuice.
5. Id. at 128.
6. Id.
7. Id. A Long Island Iced Tea is an alcoholic beverage consisting of
vodka, tequila, rum, gin, and Cr~me de Menthe.
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continuously for over three hours, during which time the plaintiff
claimed Maurice encouraged her to keep drinking.8 The actual
amount of alcohol consumed by Grise at the defendants' home was
in dispute. 9
After leaving the defendants' home, the couple drove less than
a mile to the plaintiffs aunt's house to pick up the plaintiffs
niece. 10  However, the plaintiffs aunt would not allow her
daughter to leave with the visibly intoxicated plaintiff. 11 Shortly
thereafter, Grise crashed his truck into a utility pole and
surrounding rock. 12 Grise was subsequently observed stumbling
around his vehicle, and police noted a strong odor of alcohol on his
breath.13 Upon arrival at Rhode Island Hospital, plaintiff had a
blood alcohol level of 0.261, and Grise's was 0.196.14 As a result of
the accident the plaintiff suffered serious injuries, resulting in the
amputation of her left leg. 15
Grise was charged with two felonies; operating a vehicle
under the influence of alcohol, res injury, and driving to endanger,
resulting in serious bodily injury. 16 Grise entered into a plea
agreement on both counts and is serving a ten-year sentence at
the Adult Correctional Institution. 17
On October 27, 2003, Elizabeth Willis filed suit against the
defendants alleging negligence and civil liability for crimes and
offenses. 18 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants reasoning that; "Rhode Island has not embraced
social-host liability for drunk-driving casualties, in the absence of
8. Id. Plaintiff contends that Maurice pressured her with statements
like: 'You're Irish. You can do better that." Id.
9. Id. The plaintiff first informed police that she and Grise "had a
couple drinks," but later recalled having eight drinks and being "blurry-eyed"
and that Grise was staggering as he walked out of the defendants' residence
to his car. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The crash occurred on Old River Road in Lincoln, Rhode Island.
13. Id.
14. Id. (Thirty-five minutes after his initial test another blood sample
was taken from Grise that resulted in a 0.185 blood alcohol level).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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a special relationship."'19 Plaintiff filed a timely appeal of the
summary judgment motion. 20  The issue on appeal became
whether a special relationship existed giving rise to a duty of care
on the part of the defendant social hosts who provided alcoholic
beverages to the plaintiff and her boyfriend, making them liable
for the plaintiffs injuries.
BACKGROUND
To maintain a negligence cause of action "a plaintiff must
establish a legally cognizable duty owed by a defendant to a
plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proximate causation between the
conduct and resulting injury, and the actual loss or damage. ' 21
The existence of such a legal duty is a question of law, and if no
duty is found to exist the plaintiffs claim must fail as a matter of
law. 22
Rhode Island courts have consistently "refused to adopt the
principle that a social host owes a duty to a third party for injuries
suffered by an intoxicated guest who was imbibing at his or her
home, and a have only imposed such a duty where a special
relationship exists."23 While the Court has recognized social host
liability in the past, it has been limited to circumstances when
alcohol was illegally provided to a minor and that minor suffered
an injury.24 However, illegally furnishing minors with alcohol
alone is insufficient to impose a duty of care if the resultant risk of
injury is not foreseeable. 25 Further, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has made clear that, while supplying alcohol to minors may
19. Id. at 129
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing Mills v. State Sales Inc., 824 A.2d 461, 467 (R.I. 2003)
(quoting Jenard v. Halpin, 567 A.2d 368, 370 (R.I. 1989)).
22. Id. at 129-30. When determining whether a legal duty exists, the
Court will look to "the relationship between the parties, the scope and burden
of the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, public policy
considerations, and notions of fairness." Id.
23. Id. at 130 (citing Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 968 (R.I. 1995); see
Marty v. Garcia, 667 A.2d 282, 283 (R.I. 1995)).
24. Id.; see Martin v. Marciano, 871 A.2d 911, 915-16 (R.I. 2005) (Based
on public policy and foreseeability, the Court held that a party host who
makes alcohol illegally available to an underage guest owes a duty of
reasonable care to protect the guest from harm, including criminal assault).
25. Willis v. Omar, 954 A.2d 126, 130 (citing Selwyn v. Ward, 879 A.2d
882, 888-89 (R.I. 2005) (minor used alcohol as fuel for a fire)).
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trigger a special relationship sufficient to impose a duty of care on
a social host, serving alcohol to an adult does not.26
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding
that the plaintiff failed to present facts sufficient to trigger a duty
of care on behalf of the defendants. 2 7 The Court found that the
case was similar to Ferreira v. Strack, "a negligence action seeking
damages for injuries suffered when an intoxicated party guest hit
the plaintiffs. '28  In Ferreira, the Court found no special
relationship existed giving rise to a duty of care to the defendants
and thus they were not liable for the negligence of their uninvited
adult guest who brought his own alcohol to their house. 2 9
Similarly here, although Grise and the plaintiff were invited
guests who consumed alcohol served by the defendants, the Court
found no "special duty-triggering relationship between the host
and his. . .guests."30  The Court did not wish to overturn
established precedent and create a new cause of action. 31
Additionally, the Court also held that G.L. 1956 chapter 14 of
title 3, or the "Rhode Island Liquor Liability Act," does not impose
liability on private social hosts who serve alcohol in private
settings. 32 The Court reasoned that the statutory language
applies only to licensed liquor retailers and those required by law
to have a retail license. 33 The language clearly did not apply to
the defendants in this case, and the Court would not "inject a
judicial remedy... into a statute that plainly does not contain a
remedy."34
26. See id.
27. Id. at 130.
28. See id. at 131; Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 967 (R.I. 1995).
29. Willis, 954 A.2d at 131 (citing Ferreira, 652 A.2d at 967).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 132 (R.I. Gen. Laws section 3-14-6 imposes liability on a
licensed alcohol retailers and those required by law to have an alcoholic
beverage retail license who negligently serve alcohol to an intoxicated
individual for damages proximately caused by the individual's consumption
of alcohol).
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 585 (R.I. 1998).
20091 537
538 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:534
COMMENTARY
This well publicized case is significant because Elizabeth
Willis gave the Court the opportunity to reconsider well-
established precedent regarding social host liability in Rhode
Island. Understanding that the Court has never before held a
social host liable for the negligent acts of an adult guest, the
plaintiff asked the Court to recognize the public policy concerns
and overturn precedent so that adult victims could acquire a
remedy against social hosts. The court proceeded with the issue
cautiously, noting that it was sympathetic towards Elizabeth
Willis' injuries and the public policy issues surrounding drunk
driving and its consequences. However, in a unanimous decision,
the Court declined to overturn precedent, and made clear that any
changes in social host liability needs to be undertaken by the state
legislature.
CONCLUSION
A social host is not under a duty of care to protect third
parties from an intoxicated driver leaving the host's home, where
the driver was an invited adult guest who consumed alcohol
served by the social host. The Court was explicit in refusing to
overturn established precedent and stressed its position that
"[t]he issue of liability vel non for social hosts whose guests cause
harm is a matter that belongs in the Legislature."3 5
Matthew Schechtman
35. Id. at 132.
Wills & Trusts. Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386
(R.I. 2008). Under Rhode Island General Laws, a will must meet
the statutory requirements to be admitted into probate. If an in-
terested party contests the validity of the will, a self-executing af-
fidavit is not sufficiently determinative of the execution to admit
the will to probate. Therefore, even with the existence of a self-
executing affidavit, when an interested person contests the validi-
ty of the will, summary judgment is not proper because a genuine
issue of material fact exists as to whether the statutory require-
ments have been met.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Louis J. Giuliano, Sr., the father of the defendant, died on
February 8, 2006. 1 Subsequently, Patricia Lett, the named ex-
ecutrix of the will, filed a petition to probate the will of Mr. Gi-
uliano with the Probate Court.2 The will specified the residue of
decedent's estate would be distributed to a trust that the decedent
and Ms. Lett had established before the decedent created the
will. 3 Decedent's son, the defendant in this case, objected to pro-
bate of the will because he alleged the testator's signature on the
will was not his father's. 4
A hearing was held before the Probate Court on April 27,
2006.5 The attorney who drafted the will testified he recalled the
decedent's execution of the will. 6 An affidavit was also produced,
which was notarized by the drafting attorney and signed by two
other attorneys, declaring "(1) that the signers had, in the pres-
ence of each other, witnessed the execution of the will by the dece-
dent and (2) that the decedent appeared to be of sound mind."' 7
1. Estate of Louis J. Guiliano, Sr., et al. v. Louis J. Giuliano, Jr., 949
A.2d 386, 387 (R.I. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 387-388.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 388.
7. Id.
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However, at the hearing one of the signing attorneys testified that
he could not recall if the other signing attorney was present when
he witnessed the will's signing.8 Additionally, the other signing
attorney testified that he did not remember the events that oc-
curred during the execution of the will.9 The second signing at-
torney did testify that he believed that the statutory requirements
were met as that was the "normal course of action" that his firm
would have followed. 10
At the hearing, the decedent's former wife, his daughter, and
his son all identified documents on which the decedent's signature
appeared. 11 A handwriting expert, Curtis Baggett, compared
those documents with the signature on the will, and concluded
that the signature on the will was not the decedents.12 Included
in this testimony was an explanation of his methodology in ex-
amining the signatures. 13 Alternatively, the plaintiffs introduced
the testimony of a handwriting expert who determined that the
signature was authentic. 14
The Probate Court judge concluded that neither parties' ex-
pert was "particularly persuasive," but that the testimony of the
three attorneys established that the signature was "more probably
than not" the signature of the decedent. 15 However, the judge de-
nied the plaintiffs' petition for probate of the will because the
plaintiff could not demonstrate the statutory requirements had
been met. 16
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The second signing attorney testified that he believed the dece-
dent had signed the will in his presence as well as in the presence of the first
signer, and that they had signed in the presence of each other, as that was
the "normal course of action" that his law firm would have followed when a
will was executed.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. n. 3.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 389. See R.I. GEN LAwS § 33-5-5 ("No will shall be valid *** un-
less it shall be in writing and signed by the testator, or by some other person
for him or her in his or her presence and by his or her express direction; and
this signature shall be made or acknowledged by the testator in the presence
of two (2) or more witnesses present at the same time, and the witnesses
shall attest and shall subscribe the will in the presence of the testator, but no
form of attestation shall be necessary, and no other publication shall be ne-
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On August 31, 2006, plaintiffs filed a complaint in Superior
Court arguing that the Probate Court judge had erroneously con-
cluded that the will was not properly executed, seeking an order to
the Probate Court to admit the will to probate.17 Thereafter, the
plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the
statutory requirements for executing the will had been met by the
self-executing affidavit which stated that the witnesses to the will
signed in the presence of the decedent and each other, and that
the decedent signed in the witnesses' presence. 18 The defendant
objected, arguing that genuine issues of material fact existed with
respect to the proper execution vel non of the will.19 Defendant
argued that both the affidavit from the defendant's handwriting
expert, and the fact that the witnesses were unable to state
whether they had witnessed the decedent's signature in each oth-
er's presence, supported his contention.20
The Superior Court granted the motion for summary judg-
ment and on January 4, 2007 sustained plaintiffs' probate appeal,
ordering the will be admitted to probate. 2 1 The hearing justice
stated "the legislature enacted the whole process of self-executing
affidavits to create some sort of presumptive effect" and she did
not think that the handwriting expert's affidavit was enough to
overcome the presumptive effect of the self-executing affidavit. 2 2
The justice concluded that the handwriting expert's affidavit was
so cursory that she could not, with confidence, say she was able to
find a genuine issue of material fact. 23 On January 16, 2007, the
defendant filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Rhode
cessary.")
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 390.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 389-390. Reading the affidavit, the hearing justice stated:
"All he says is, 'I base my opinion on my analysis of the signatures
on the known and question[ed] documents and my use of accepted fo-
rensic document examination tools, principles and techniques.";
After having quoted these words from the experts' affidavit, the hearing
justice sardonically commented: "Well, that's helpful. How can I say, Oh,
wow, this dispute is genuine?"
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Island. 24
HOLDING AND ANALYSIS
Under Rule 56 of Rhode Island's Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure, the moving party, in a summary judgment motion,
must establish there is no genuine dispute with respect to the ma-
terial facts of the case. 25 If this burden is met, the nonmovant
must, by competent evidence, prove the existence of a disputed is-
sue of material fact. 26 In determining a motion for summary
judgment, a court must review the evidence from a perspective
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. 27
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, the defen-
dant contended that the Superior Court justice should not have
granted the motion for summary judgment because "the self-
executing affidavit [was] not sufficient to establish that all of the
requirements for probating the will were satisfied. ' 28 The defen-
dant also contended a genuine issue of material fact existed with
respect to the authenticity of the decedent's signature on the
will. 29 The plaintiffs argued that the Superior Court justice ap-
propriately granted their motion because the handwriting expert's
testimony failed to set forth sufficient facts in support of his opi-
nion that the decedent did not sign the will.30 The plaintiff also
argued the defendant was improperly relying upon the proceed-
ings before the Probate Court to create a genuine issue of material
fact. 31
Under Rhode Island General Laws, a will must meet specific
requirements to be admitted into probate.3 2 These rules provide
that "a valid will in Rhode Island must be signed by the testator in
the presence of two witnesses; those witnesses must sign the will
in the presence of each other."33 Further, a self-executing affida-
vit may be used to prove the validity of a will if, but only if, there
24. Id.
25. Id. at 391.
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing Steinberg v. State, 427 A.2d 338, 340 (R.I. 1981)).
28. Id. at 390.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 392 (citing R.I. GEN LAws § 33-5-2 (2008)).
33. Id. (citing R.I. GEN LAWS § 33-5-5 (2008)).
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is absence of objection by anyone interested in the estate. 34
In the present case, the defendant, an interested person in the
estate, did object to the purported will. The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island found that because the statutory language specifical-
ly stated that a self-executing affidavit is insufficient in the pres-
ence of an objection by an interested person, the self-executing af-
fidavit in this case did not create the presumptive effect that the
Superior Court justice found. 35 Additionally, because the testi-
mony of the signing attorneys raised questions as to their pres-
ence during the will's execution, the Court concluded that a ge-
nuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether or not
the will was properly executed.36
The defendant contended an additional issue of material fact
existed as to the authenticity of the testator's signature. 37 The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that although the defen-
dant's handwriting expert's affidavit was "less than replete with
information" regarding how he made his determination, "it was at
least minimally adequate to satisfy the obligation of defendant to
show the presence of a genuine issue of material fact. ' ' 38 The
Court held that the granting of summary judgment was erroneous
because of the existence of two genuine issues of material fact. 39
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reversed the Supe-
rior Court's grant of summary judgment. 40
COMMENTARY
Summary judgment is proper if there is no disputed genuine
issue of material fact. Here, the nonmovant, pointed to "(1)
whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the statu-
tory requirements; and (2) whether or not the signature on the
will [was] genuine. '41 Although the Probate Court and the Supe-
rior Court came to opposite conclusions, neither justice addressed
the issue that a self-executing affidavit may be used to prove the
34. Id. at 392-393 (citing R.I. GEN LAWS § 33-7-26 (2008)).
35. Id. at 393.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 394.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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validity of a will, if, but only if, there is the absence of objection by
someone interested in the estate. 42
The Probate Court judge instead focused upon the three sign-
ing attorneys' inability to testify that they did in fact sign in the
presence of one another and that the decedent signed in front of
them. 43 Although the inadequacy of the self-executing affidavit is
not spelled out, it appears that the Probate Judge was correct in
his analysis of the statutory requirements for the probate of the
will. However, it seems unrealistic to expect an attorney to re-
member every will they ever witnessed, especially when they must
swear to it under oath.44 It appears that the Probate judge may
have recognized this when he noted that the signature "more like-
ly than not" was that of the decedent's because of the attorney's
testimony. 45 However, due to the strict nature of intestate succes-
sion law, the judge disregarded this reality, finding that the statu-
tory language was not met. 46
The Superior Court justice stated that a self-executing affida-
vit created a "presumptive effect" of a will's validity and the jus-
tice held that she did not "believe that the handwriting expert's
affidavit overcame [that] 'presumptive effect'. ' 47 However, a court
42. Id. at 392-393 (citing R.I. GEN LAws § 33-7-26 (2008)).
43. Id. at 389.
44. Id. at 388. The second signing attorney testified that he did not have
a specific recollection of the events that occurred during the execution of the
will because so many years had passed. The second signing attorney did
identify the witness signature as his own. Offering the Probate Court an in-
terpretation based on the "normal course of action" that his law firm would
have followed when a will was executed there, the second signing attorney
testified that, "based on past patterns and practices," he believed that the de-
cedent had signed the will in his presence as well as in the presence of the
first signing attorney and that they then had signed in the presence of each
other.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 392 n. 5.
"Although the primary purpose of succession laws is realization of
the decedent's intent, statutes intercede to thwart even the dearest
goals of a would-be-testator***. Naturally, the purpose of these sta-
tutes, which set forth the requirements for a valid will, is not to con-
vert the will-writing process into a game of connect the dots. The
statutory requirements are generally straightforward, and as long as
the testator is careful, she [or he] should succeed in meeting these
requirements."
47. Id. at 393.
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must follow the statutory language, which specifically states that
a self-executing affidavit is not sufficient when the will is con-
tested by an interested person. 48 As the self-executing affidavit
did not have a presumptive effect, the signing attorneys' testimo-
ny and the handwriting experts' affidavits created a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the statutory requirements were
met. The Superior Court justice's grant of summary judgment
was improper because an issue of material fact did, in fact, exist.
Another issue worth discussing is that a judge who passes on
a motion for summary judgment must review the evidence from a
perspective most favorable to the party opposing the motion;
therefore, it would appear inconsistent to view the self-executing
affidavit as "presumptive" in a summary judgment proceeding. 4 9
Additionally, the Superior Court justice granted summary judg-
ment because she could not say, "with confidence," that the
handwriting expert's affidavit created a genuine issue of material
fact. However, on a motion for summary judgment, a justice need
not determine the facts with confidence. Rather, "it is important
to bear in mind that the purpose of the summary judgment proce-
dure is issue finding, not issue determination." 50 Therefore, the
Superior Court justice's grant of summary judgment was impro-
per.
CONCLUSION
This opinion illustrates that in a probate case it is imperative
to ensure that the statutory requirements are met because intent
may not be presumed when a will is contested. If the validity of
the will is questioned by an interested party, a self-executing affi-
davit is not sufficiently determinative of the validity of the execu-
tion to admit the will to probate. Further, whether a will has been
executed in accordance with the statutory requirements does
create a genuine issue of material fact and renders summary
judgment improper.
Brittanee Bland-Masi
48. Id. at 392. See Supra note 42.
49. Id. at 391. See Supra note 25.
50. Id. (citing Indus. Nat'l Bank v. Pelose, 397 A.2d 1312, 1313 (R.I.
1979))
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Workers' Compensation Law. City of Pawtucket v.
Pimental, 960 A.2d 981 (R.I. 2008). The Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that a court is not precluded from determining that an
injured employee has reached "maximum medical improvement"
(MMI) pursuant to R.I.G.L. 1956 § 28-29-2(8) when the employee
refuses to undergo a recommended surgery which may improve
his injury. Additionally, the Court found that pre-trial procedures
utilized by the Workers' Compensation Court, which do not
require a full hearing on the issue of "maximum medical
improvement," do not violate an injured employee's due process
rights.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Michael Pimental (Pimental), a sanitation engineer, suffered
a herniated disk while working for the City of Pawtucket (the
City). 1 The City and Pimental reached an agreement on June 20,
2001 whereby Pimental would receive "workers' compensation
benefits for partial incapacity."' 2 On December 6, 2001, Pimental
began receiving total disability benefits for a duration of ten
months while recovering from a back surgery.3 Subsequently, on
October 8, 2002, the Workers' Compensation Court reduced his
benefits after it was determined that he had improved to partial
disability. 4  Thereafter, Pimental had an MRI that revealed a
recurrent disk herniation, indicating that the first surgery was
unsuccessful. 5  Hesitant to undergo any additional surgery,
Pimental sought a second opinion from Dr. Mark A. Palumbo who
"recommended surgery but cautioned that 'surgical treatment
would likely provide [Pimental] with only partial relief on his long
term symptomology."' 6  Pimental refused the surgery and
attempted physical therapy, but ceased the treatment shortly
1. City of Pawtucket v. Pimental, 960 A.2d 981, 984 (R.I. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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thereafter because he felt it worsened his condition. 7
Arguing that Pimental had reached MMI, the City requested
that the Workers' Compensation Court review Pimental's status
on January 20, 2004.8 On August 3, 2004, a pretrial order finding
that Pimental had reached MMI was entered and Pimental filed a
claim for trial.9 Pursuant to R.I. General Laws § 28-33-18(b), the
City again petitioned the court for a reduction of Pimental's
benefits by thirty percent on September 10, 2004.10 The City's
petition to reduce Pimental's benefits to seventy percent was
granted in a pretrial order on October 7, 2004; however, the trial
judge delayed the effective date of the reduction and the pretrial
order until March 1, 2004. 11 Arguing that there had been no trial
to determine his MMI status and that the petition was premature
because the matter was not ripe, Pimental filed a motion to
dismiss the City's petition to reduce his benefits on March 2,
2005.12 On March 10, 2005, Pimental's motion was denied. 13
On May 4, 2005, a consolidated trial on both the MMI and
benefit reduction petitions was held, and the trial judge, relying
on the testimony of Dr. James E. McLennan (Dr. McLennan),
affirmed the pretrial orders. 14 Dr. McLennan examined Pimental
in October 2002 and December 2003 on behalf of Pimental's
insurer and concluded that Pimental had reached MMI because
Pimental's condition had not improved.15 Dr. McLennan, noting
that Pimental was "only mildly disabled," advised that surgery,
whereby the protruding disk material aggravating Pimental's
nerve would be removed, might improve his condition; however,
without the surgery, "it was unreasonable to expect his condition
to improve." 16  Dr. McLennan concluded that, in his opinion,
Pimental had reached MMI because he rejected any additional
surgery. 17 At trial, Pimental testified and acknowledged that he
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 984-85.
11. Id. at 985.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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had decided not to have any additional surgeries because he felt
the first surgery had exacerbated the injury.18 Pimental further
acknowledged that he was collecting Social Security disability
benefits and had not attempted to gain employment. 19
Affirming the holding in Robin Rug v. Manteiga, the
Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision.20 The court
held that "[t]o adopt the employee's position that a surgical
candidate can never be found to have reached MMI, would created
a special protected class of injured workers who, by their own
decisions not to have the surgery, can remove themselves from
certain provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act."' 2 1 The
Appellate Division indicated that the statute clearly stated that
pretrial orders are effective upon entry and that the trial judge's
holding was consistent with the legislative purpose of providing
timely resolutions to worker's compensation matters. 22  The
Appellate Division refused Pimental's argument that the trial
court erred in making an MMI determination prior to a full
trial.23 On March 19, 2007, the final decrees were entered and
Pimental filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which was granted
on September 20, 2007.24
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviews appeals from the
Appellate Division, pursuant to § 28-35-30, for errors of law or
equity25 by reviewing the record to decide if the findings made by
the trial judge are supported by evidence. 26 Moreover, the Court
reviews questions of statutory interpretation using the de novo
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing W.C.C. No. 93-4363 (App.Div. Aug. 16, 1994)) (When an
employee refuses a recommended surgical procedure, a possibility of
improvement does not bar a finding of MMI.). See also City of Pawtucket v.
Pimental, W.C.C. 04-6055, W.C.C. 04-460, at *3 (App. Div. Mar. 19, 2007).
21. Id. (quoting Pawtucket v. Pimental, W.C.C. 04-460, at *8).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 986 (citing Rison v. Air Filter Sys., Inc., 707 A.2d 675, 678 (R.I.
1998).
26. Id. (citing City of Providence v. S & J 351, Inc., 693 A.2d 665, 667
(R.I. 1997)).
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standard. 27
The "Maximum Medical Improvement" Determination
The Court determined that "allowing an employee to delay a
finding of MMI by refusing to undergo a recommended treatment
would frustrate the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act."
28
'Maximum medical improvement" is statutorily defined as "a
point in time when any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment as a result of injury has become stable and when no
further treatment is reasonably expected to materially improve
the condition." 29 Pimental argued that because the statute does
not include the word "surgery," the legislature did not intend to
include surgery candidates and they are exempt from an MMI
finding. 30 The City argued that the plain meaning of the statute
is clear and allows MMI findings for injured employees who refuse
recommended surgery. 31
In interpreting the statute, the Court examines "the
language, nature, and object of the statute."32 The Court "must
give to the words in a statute their plain and ordinary meaning,
unless a contrary interpretation is apparent. ' 33 The Court relied
upon the Appellate Division's interpretation of MMI in two similar
cases where employees were injured and refused recommended
surgery.34 In those cases, the Appellate Division found that an
employee should not be allowed to circumvent a finding of MMI by
refusing surgery. 35 The Court found that MMI does not mean
that an employee will never improve or decline, but rather MMI
indicates that an employee has reached a point where no further
treatment is expected to improve the condition. 36
27. Id. (citing Rison, 707 A.2d at 678).
28. Id. at 988
29. Id. at 986 (quoting R.I.GEN.LAwS § 28-29-2(8) (1956)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting Howard Union of Teachers v. State, 478 A.2d 563, 565
(R.I. 1984)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 986-87 (citing Providence Coll. v. Gemma, W.C.C. No. 95-1493,
at *2-3 (App.Div. Aug. 19, 1996); Robin Rug v. Manteiga, W.C.C. No. 93-4363
(App.Div. Aug. 16, 1994)).
35. Id. at 987 (citing Gemma, No. 94-1493 at *3).
36. Id.
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Noting that the reduction in benefits was not a punishment
and that the General Assembly encourages partially disabled
workers to return to work when they have fully recovered, the
Court rejected Pimental's argument that the Appellate Division's
determination forced him to choose between his physical well-
being and his family's well-being. 37  The Court stated that
Pimental was still receiving benefits and he was not "ensnared in
the catch-22 situation that he implie[d]." 38
Further, the Court noted that the legislature made several
changes to the Workers' Compensation Act in 1992 in order to
'eliminate waste and unnecessary costs' and to 'swiftly and fairly
make appropriate adjustments for employees who are capable of
employment.' 39  The Court held that allowing an injured
employee to evade a finding of MMI by refusing surgery is
inconsistent with the legislature's intent of deterring waste and
abuse. 4o
The Validity of the Pretrial Order Reducing Benefits
The Court found that the pretrial order reducing Pimental's
benefits, which was entered prior to a full trial on the issue of
MMI, did not violate his due process rights. 41 The Court began its
review of the constitutionality of the Workers' Compensation
Court's decision by applying the three part test developed by the
United State Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.42 In order
to determine if a pretrial procedure violates an individual's right
to due process, the Court analyzes the following factors: .'(1) the
private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used and the possible value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entail.' ' 43 The Court noted that
37. Id.
38. Id. at 988.
39. Id. (quoting P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 1).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 991.
42. Id. at 988-989 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
43. Id. at 989 (quoting John J. Orr & Sons, Inc. v. Waite, 479 A.2d 721,
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when state action deprives an individual of benefits to which he is
entitled, due process concerns arise. 44
During the Workers' Compensation Court's pretrial process,
both parties are allowed to submit medical and other evidence,
have the right to be represented by counsel, and are allowed to
submit written arguments in favor or opposition of any proposed
orders. 45  Moreover, "[o]n the specific issue of reduction of
benefits[,]" the trial judge may enter an order immediately, or he
may delay the execution of the order, depending on the employee's
efforts to obtain employment.46
The Court found that the only private interest at stake was
Pimental's right to full workers' compensation benefits; however,
the Court found that because the trial judge delayed the execution
of the order for five months to allow Pimental sufficient time to
obtain employment, "'the degree and duration of the possible
deprivation [did] not rise... to the level of denial of due process."' 47
Next the Court considered the value of the procedural safeguards
in the MMI pretrial order by comparing the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Mathews to that of the holding in
Goldberg v. Kelly. 48 The Court found that MMI is based on
medical evaluations, like the disability hearing in Mathews, not
an employee's credibility, like the welfare benefits hearing in
Goldberg, and that it would not increase the risk of erroneous
decisions if oral testimony was not allowed. 49 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the pretrial process in Workers'
Compensation Court, which allows an employee to be represented
by counsel and submit documentary evidence, is 'fair and
reliable."' 50
723-24 (R.I. 1984) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335)).
44. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-62 (1970).
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing § 28-35-20(c); § 28-33-18(b)).
47. Id. (quoting Waite, 479 A.2d at 725).
48. Id. at 990 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343 (using only documentary
evidence for a disability assessment did not violate due process); Goldberg,
397 U.S. at 269 (written submissions were insufficient for due process rights
because welfare benefits are based on matters of credibility and
truthfulness)).
49. Id.
50. Id (citing John J. Orr & Sons, Inc. v. Waite, 479 A.2d 721, 725 (R.I.
1984)).
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Further, the Court noted that the trial judge delayed the
entry of the order for five months; therefore, the value of any other
safeguard would be minimal. 51 Finally, the Court found that
allowing a full hearing for MMI prior to any modification of
benefits would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Workers'
Compensation Act. 52 A clear goal of the Act is the "expeditious
resolution of... disputes" and requiring additional hearings would
delay disputes, creating a greater burden on Rhode Island
taxpayers. 53 In considering all the factors of the three part test,
the Court found that the MMI determination and the entry of the
pretrial order did not violate Pimental's right to due process. 54
COMMENTARY
This case is the Rhode Island Supreme Court's first
interpretation of § 28-29-2(8).55 The Court's interpretation is
clearly aligned with the reading of the Appellate Division of the
Workers' Compensation Courts and the goals of the General
Assembly. 56 Relying on the reforms made to the Workers'
Compensation Act in 1992, the Court finds that the actions taken
by employees to avoid MMI would create unnecessary costs and
lengthen the time it takes for these matters to be resolved. 57 This
case illustrates the Court's dedication to applying the plain and
ordinary meaning of the words of statutes. Moreover, the Court
also demonstrates a commitment to the General Assembly's goal
of timely resolutions of workers' compensation matters, not only
for individual companies and employees involved but for the
taxpayers of Rhode Island as well.
CONCLUSION
Relying on the plain meaning of § 28-29-2-(8), the Court found
that an MMI determination can be made despite the fact that an
employee is recommended for additional surgery and refuses it.58
51. Id.
52. Id. at 990-91.
53. Id. at 990.
54. Id. at 991.
55. See Id. at 986.
56. Id. at 987.
57. Id. at 988.
58. Id.
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Allowing an employee to avoid an MMI determination by refusing
a recommended surgery would frustrate the purpose of the
Workers' Compensation Act. 59 The purpose of Act is to promote
the "expeditious resolution of workers' compensation disputes,"
which would be frustrated if a full trial was required to determine
MMI. 60 Therefore, the Court found that because the pretrial
process of the Workers' Compensation Court were fair and that
allowing a full trial on MMI would frustrate the purpose of the
Workers' Compensation Act, Pimental's due process rights were
not violated. 6 1
Staci M. Buss
59. Id.
60. Id. at 990.
61. Id. at 991.
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